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Export credit agencies (ECAs), private banks and the World Bank are all 
institutions which facilitate the construction of infrastructure projects in developing 
countries, which often have significant environmental ramifications. However, although 
all three types of institutions have also been known to acquiesce to public pressure to 
consider the extent of the environmental impact of their projects, export credit agencies 
were able to resist this pressure for 25 years, implementing environmental rules in their 
operations much later than did the World Bank and private banks, which introduced 
similar reforms within a much shorter period of time.  
This dissertation explains why ECAs as public institutions were less responsive to 
public demands than an international organization and even private banks. The answer to 
this puzzle is advanced in two dimensions: one dealing with the rule-making process and 
the other addressing the harmonization of policies among ECAs. 
In a cost-benefit analysis approach covering both dimensions, the political costs 
and benefits of changes to existing rules as well as the regulatory costs of these changes 
are considered. Political costs and benefits are considered to result from the effects of 
these rules on competing groups combined with the power these groups wield in the rule-
making process. Regulatory costs result from changes in rules and procedures. They are 
especially pronounced when adaptations go beyond changes to regulatory targets and 
include modifications in regulations or even challenge meta-regulatory principles 
engrained in regulatory cultures. 
Diverging speed and scope of reform among these institutions is the consequence 
of variations in the power of competing demands made on them and variations in the 
institutional contexts enabling, channeling, and constraining the power of the groups 
making the demands. Adopted rules reflect these power relationships. 
ECA harmonization involves changes to pre-existing regulations and 
compromises on meta-regulatory principles. This kind of agreement is very difficult to 
achieve – if achieved at all. Institutional incompatibility between rules proposed by the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Export credit agencies, private banks and the World Bank are all institutions 
which facilitate the construction of infrastructure projects in developing countries, which 
often have significant environmental ramifications. However, although all three types of 
institutions have also been known to acquiesce to public pressure to consider the extent of 
the environmental impact of their projects, export credit agencies were able to resist this 
pressure for 25 years, implementing environmental rules in their operations much later 
than did the World Bank and private banks, which introduced similar reforms within a 
much shorter period of time. The speed and scope among export credit agencies 
themselves also differed with the United States Export-Import Bank implementing 
comprehensive policies in 1995 and the German Hermes credit guarantees being 
subjected to much less ambitious policies much later. Thus is the question of my 
dissertation: How could export credit agencies resist for 25 years the same pressure that 
greened other financial institutions in a relatively short time? 
Public export credit agencies (ECAs) include bank-type organizations and 
government-backed insurers, and combinations of these two ideal-types as well (for a 
detailed discussion see Evans 2005; Walzenbach 1999). Government-backed export 
credits and export credit guarantees are critical for exporters in gaining access to markets 
in high-risk countries (often developing and transition countries). In these cases, 
governments act as “banks of last resort” and help finance domestic exports with either 
insurance against political and commercial risk (in the form of export credit guarantees), 
or with export credits. This fills the role refused by commercial insurers who are 
unwilling to cover such risky projects and the political risks they entail. However, 
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without at least some insurance against non-payment, exporters are unable to gain 
financing from banks.  
ECA support is especially relevant for exports to risky markets, for sales with 
long repayment terms, or for transactions of high value; infrastructure projects in 
developing countries, along with the export of individual project components, fall within 
all three categories. This dissertation concerns itself with rules for such projects, and in 
particular, with why export credit agencies were able to avoid environmental restrictions 
on their operations, despite a history of public demands for the imposition of such 
conditions.  
We must take into account two forces that are shaping economic regulation today: 
the increasing salience and relevance of environmental and social norms, and the need for 
market integration, or harmonization of market regulations. As environmental and social 
norms play into the environmental and social regulation of activities once considered 
sectorally distinct from environmental and social policy, and market integration forces 
states to seek the creation of common rules in facilitating the exchange of goods and 
services across borders, it is expected that the combination of these forces would translate 
into pressure on ECAs to consider social and environmental aspects in their operations, 
and, as state agencies, strive towards a harmonization of rules which would take these 
impacts into account. This, however, has not been the case to the extent one would 
expect. Social and environmental concerns in ECA rules have more nominal significance 
as they are substantially effective. Furthermore, the harmonization of such rules among 
ECAs has been similarly weak.  
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In seeking an explanation for these suboptimal outcomes, my analysis will focus 
on two different issues: standard-setting of ECAs vis-à-vis that of institutions such as the 
World Bank and private banks, and the harmonization of ECA rules. Thus, there are two 
related questions to be addressed:  
1. Given the similarity in project portfolios and public demands for change, 
why were some ECAs slower than others, and all of them so much slower 
to respond to the environmental challenge than the World Bank and even 
private banks?  
2. Considering the low relevance of ECAs for trade, why has harmonization 
been so slow and cumbersome?  
I address the first question by comparing ECA politics concerning the U.S. 
Export-Import Bank and German Hermes export credit guarantees with environmental-
rule making within and among the World Bank and private banks. The functional 
outcome of activities of multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank, 
and private banks (such as Citigroup, ABN AMRO, and West LB) are similar to those of 
ECAs’ involvement in the provision of financing for infrastructure projects in developing 
countries. In addition, all three types of institutions have been subjected to public 
criticism because of their apparent neglect of environmental concerns. The World Bank 
Group developed environmental and social policies for its project loan business in the 
1980s and 1990s (Weaver 2007; Park 2007; Gutner 2005a, 2005b; Nielson and Tierney 
2005; Park 2005b; Thorne 2004; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Wade 1997). Private banks 
adopted the Equator Principles (EPs) in 2003 as a voluntary private-sector version of the 
World Bank policies to guide their project finance business (Wright and Rwabizambuga 
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2006; Amalric 2005; Missbach 2004). Both MDBs and private banks responded 
relatively quickly to demands for environmental policies. Although environmental 
standards for export credit agencies had been on domestic political agendas since the 
early 1970s, it was not until some 25 years later that they received serious political 
attention. Environmental reforms among ECAs also varied in speed and scope. Therefore, 
given the similarity in project portfolios and public demands for change, why were some 
ECAs slower than others, and all of them so much slower to respond to the environmental 
challenge than the World Bank and even private banks? 
The second question suggests the comparison of ECAs’ harmonization of 
environmental standards with the harmonization processes of financial aspects of ECA 
operations, which did not involve environmental concerns. Harmonization negotiations 
regarding financial aspects involved the same states and were conducted in the same 
OECD harmonization venue (Moravcsik 1989). Furthermore, as these negotiations were 
motivated by an effort to eliminate competition among ECAs over the terms of 
government support, so were negotiations on the harmonization of environmental 
standards. However, where agreement on common financial rules was timely and fairly 
comprehensive, agreement on harmonized environmental rules was slow to develop. 
The harmonization of all sorts of product standards, process standards, and other 
regulatory barriers, in all sectors of economic activity, is the result of market integration 
brought about by globalization, and such harmonization has facilitated the cross-border 
exchange of goods (Woll and Artigas 2007; Carruth 2006; Elgström and Jönsson 2005; 
Drezner 2005; Heisenberg 2005; Brandhauer, Curti, and Miller 2005; Vogel and Kagan 
2004a; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Knodt and Princen 2003; Esty and Geradin 2001). 
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The creation of a single market has been the core European project for over 50 years; the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), its successor, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) all have promoted and facilitated market integration and 
regulatory harmonization beyond Europe. The result is harmonization of all sorts of 
product standards, process standards, and other regulatory barriers among EU, OECD, 
and WTO member states. The harmonization of environmental rules for ECAs, however, 
despite being on the international agenda since the mid-1990s, was not successfully 
negotiated until 2003. Considering the low relevance of ECAs for trade (less than 3% of 
exports are facilitated by them), why has harmonization been so slow and cumbersome? 
In seeking to unravel these two related puzzles, this dissertation advances the 
following explanations for both: the development of specifically environmental standards 
for ECAs was hampered by domestic power relationships and the influence of powerful 
actor groups on ECA policy (and therefore by the inherent structural power1 of business 
to resist restrictions on access to government support), and harmonization of these 
standards was impeded by an incompatibility between the proposed policies and existing 
continental European regulatory cultures.  
I introduce both of these core arguments in more detail in the following sections. 
In the end, obstacles to the development of standards and the harmonization of these 
standards ultimately led to the adoption of international environmental rules for ECAs 
                                               
1 Throughout this dissertation power is considered in its instrumental, structural, and discursive dimensions. 
Instrumental power refers to the ability to get one actor to do something this actor would not otherwise do. 
Structural power emerges from the dependency of one actor upon another. The dependent may choose not 
to engage in activities that would be against the interests of the actor it depends on, even if not instructed to 
do so. Discursive power refers to the ability to influence ideas and the meaning of things. Chapter two 
provides a detailed discussion of the concept and its implications. 
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which brought about neither substantial environmental standards nor truly harmonized 
policies. The resulting OECD agreement, the Recommendation on Common Approaches 
on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits (Common Approaches), 
represents a more symbolic than substantial compromise. 
A comparison of domestic standard-setting in both the US and in Germany 
provides an appropriate context in which factors contributing to the development of 
environmental standards can be identified. Germany and the US represented 
diametrically opposed positions regarding both domestic standard-setting for ECAs and 
international harmonization. The United States was the first country to establish 
comprehensive environmental rules for its ECA, the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), and it 
was also the key leader in pressing for international harmonization of these standards. 
Germany, on the contrary, was slow to devise domestic environmental rules for its 
Hermes export credit guarantees, it opposed the U.S. bid for harmonization, and it also 
emerged as the key laggard in international harmonization. Comparing domestic ECA 
environmental standard-setting and harmonization in the United States and Germany with 
rule-making among the World Bank and private banks allows us to identify factors 
working for and against environmental standards. Methodologically, the examination of 
both standard-setting and international harmonization will be done through the 
application of Mill’s method of concomitant variations.  
An analysis such as this, which examines both the impact of NGOs in the 
promotion of norm change and which details the relationship between globalization and 
harmonization, is both timely and necessary. Too much of the literature links NGOs and 
the emergence of new norms without paying much attention to how such change is 
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achieved. Similarly, globalization is associated with a drive towards regulatory 
harmonization without detailing how this occurs. An analysis which remedies these 
deficiencies in the literature is needed both to advance our theoretical knowledge of this 
process and to aid policy-makers in understanding obstacles to regulatory harmonization. 
The theoretical framework advanced in this dissertation makes it possible to integrate the 
study of domestic regulatory reform with international regulatory harmonization by 
employing the same explanatory factors of rule content and domestic power relationships 
for both. Below, I present the main arguments of this dissertation in brief, and in doing 
this focus attention on the following key variables: the power of competing actors making 
demands on financial institutions; political institutions enabling, channeling, and 
restraining their power; and the content of adopted rules and harmonization proposals.. 
1.1 Argument: obstacles to environmental standards 
Six years after it became the target of a campaign by U.S.-based NGOs, the 
World Bank was pressured into establishing far-reaching environmental review 
procedures, which included the transparency of these reviews. Private banks, as the result 
of a similar campaign by a similar set of groups, responded within five years with the 
adoption of the Equator Principles as a private-sector version of the World Bank 
environmental policies that would guide their project finance business. ECAs, 
conversely, needed upwards of 20 years to respond to similar challenges. Since the 
1970s, a similar campaign has pressured ECAs to consider environmental and 
developmental aspects in their operations, but the ECAs have not developed policies 
comparable to those developed by the World Bank and private banks until recently. 
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Ex-Im, the ECA of the United States, was subject to the same NGO pressure that 
also brought about the greening of the World Bank. Unresponsive to demands raised 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s to conduct environmental reviews of its export support 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Ex-Im finally implemented a 
comprehensive environmental policy in 1995 in response to a 1992 Congressional 
mandate to do so. Conversely, the German government refrained from such a step for its 
Hermes export credit guarantee program until 2001, when considerable political pressure 
for so doing had built up both domestically through NGO pressure and internationally 
through negotiations on the topic in the G7 and the OECD Export Credit Group (ECG). 
NGOs are considered here as key actors in shaping and promoting environmental 
norms by attaching agency to these norms into political processes. Actors interested in 
maintaining the status quo or critical of the norms promoted by NGOs seek to oppose 
their influence in these rule-making processes. With this in mind, explanations for the 
diverging reform speeds can be found in the relative power of competing demands made 
on the financial institutions. These pressures not only affected the speed, but also the 
scope of reforms. We need to consider especially how the aggregate power wielded by a 
combination of actors making competing demands on financial institutions has impacted 
the costs and benefits to environmental rule-makers in creating these rules.  
1.1.1 Institutions’ reactions to competing demands 
To start, the concerns of countries receiving the financed goods and projects were 
not effectively represented within any of the rule-making procedures for any of these 
types of institutions; only the demands made from within industrialized countries 
providing finance and exporting goods seemed to have had significance for the rule-
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makers. It can be therefore posited that there are roughly two types of demands: those of 
environmental NGOs pressing for environmental rules, and those of actors dependent 
upon the availability of financing. Demands made of the World Bank and of private 
banks fall only into the first category, whereas the creation of rules for ECAs required the 
additional effort of balancing NGO concerns with the interests of exporters receiving 
export credit support 
It is therefore argued that certain complications arose in the face of NGO 
demands, and that it is therefore important, now, to turn our attention to the role of NGOs 
in the standard-setting procedures of the three types of financing institutions referred to in 
this dissertation. Although NGO campaigns were similar in their goal of greening 
international finance, they differed in regards to the strategy chosen to maximize leverage 
on their targets. In the cases of both the World Bank and of Ex-Im, U.S. NGOs worked 
by lobbying Congress to establish legal requirements for environmental policies among 
these institutions. In contrast to this instrumental exercise of power, NGO campaigns 
targeted at private banks relied on discursive power through name-and-shame tactics 
aimed at damaging brand-name reputation to compel private banks to create 
environmental rules. Although lacking the legislative access of their US peers, German 
NGOs nevertheless targeted Hermes credits through similar discursive practices in order 
to change the terms of the debate on export credits and the environment.  
This variance in strategies provides a good explanation for World Bank and 
private bank reform. Regarding ECA standards, however, it is important to consider, in 
addition to pressure exerted by NGOs, the role of exporters who had a stake in ECA 
politics and the power these exporters exerted. This should be contrasted with the fact 
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that similar client interests were effectively absent from the politics of the World Bank 
and private banks.  
It is easy to see that business possesses a substantial amount of structural power 
vis-à-vis national governments in that national governments, unlike business, are 
dependent on the economic prosperity of the state. It is from the economic prosperity of 
the state that a government merits legitimacy, and it is this prosperity which enables a 
government to draw revenues from its population. Hence, decisions that may affect 
productivity are more difficult for governments to make than those that may not affect 
productivity. Policy decisions that undermine economic growth may not only reduce 
government revenue and thus the government’s ability to sustain its public services, but 
they may also reduce the government’s legitimacy in its role as the guardian of 
prosperity.  
For national governments, environmental policies for ECAs fit the bill perfectly: 
the environmental policy objective comes with a trade-off in assistance to industry. 
Export credits, as a form of government support, were designed to facilitate exports. It 
follows thus, that an imposition of environmental restrictions on these government 
programs could potentially reduce the volume of supported exports, resulting in the 
reduced overall volume of exports, lower economic growth, and ultimately reduced 
employment. In light of this trade-off, governments fended off the imposition of 
environmental requirements for ECAs for as long as they could. They gave in only when 
the activities of NGOs raised the costs of non-action to the point that this political cost 
outweighed that of restricted export support.  
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1.1.2 Domestic power relationships and ECA reform 
Among the ECAs themselves, reform reflecting environmental concerns occurred 
at different speeds and to diverging extents. The explanation for this variation lies in the 
differing domestic power relationships among ECAs, industry, and societal groups – 
resulting partially from diverging institutional contexts. The U.S. Ex-Im bank, however, 
is an outlier among ECAs: its environmental policies are comprehensive, and it adopted 
these rules unilaterally when no other ECA had similarly ambitious rules. Its unilateral 
rules are the unique consequence of US political institutions.  
As a “sunset institution”, Ex-Im depends on regular Congressional reauthorization 
– its existence is at the complete mercy of Congress, which itself is open to the lobbying 
efforts of any group which manages to bring legislators on its side. Thus, NGOs were not 
only able to command direct instrumental power in Ex-Im politics, but industry groups 
were also forced to compete with NGOs for influence over political dynamics. 
US-style interest group pluralism allows a wide range of functional interests to 
influence policy-making; even the US Senate as the chamber of regional representation in 
the legislature is subject to functionalist lobbying. As a result there is no moderating 
institution to balance functional interests with general ones. The consequences for policy-
making are narrowly defined and poorly integrated policy initiatives that often result 
from the lobbying activities of different interest groups. Furthermore, initiatives tend to 
be ad-hoc in nature, and are designed to promote specific objectives while reducing the 
scope of reform to avoid obstacles to successful coalition building in the pursuit of these 
policy initiatives.  
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Such initiatives can contradict or circumvent policies promoted by other 
coalitions, and thus result in inconsistent and inefficient policy making. At the same time, 
this decision-making process allows for substantial reforms – albeit narrow in scope – 
which would otherwise fail in decision-making processes based on broad consensus. The 
process leading to environmental reform of the US Export-Import Bank may serve as an 
example of the development of such narrowly-defined policy reforms as the result of 
such a process. When the environmental reforms for development agencies were 
developed, Ex-Im was precluded from these reforms, despite a striking similarity of the 
kinds of projects supported by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and those of Ex-Im. When pressure was put on the World Bank by Congress to develop 
environmental rules, this again did not affect Ex-Im. When Ex-Im was mandated to 
develop an environmental policy in 1992, this, too, occurred in isolation from initiatives 
elsewhere.  
Its 1992 reauthorization required Ex-Im to integrate the environmental 
externalities of its export credits into its decision-making process. Despite its history of 
poor policy integration and a rather erratic environmental policy record since the Reagan 
administration, the United States took the lead in regulating access to export credits based 
on environmental criteria. This can be explained by the individualist policy making 
process in which a single Senator’s initiative led to the inclusion in Ex-Im’s 1992 
reauthorization of an amendment calling for environmental export credit rules.  
In German corporatist arrangements, the pattern of domestic power relationships 
is different; industry enjoys privileged access, while these same political opportunity 
structures remain closed to environmental NGOs (Dryzek et al. 2003; Kitschelt 1986; 
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Schreurs 2002). Furthermore, the administration of Hermes credit guarantees is also 
institutionally shielded from legislative control. Without the instrumental power that 
came with Congressional lobby access for NGOs in the United States, German NGOs 
could rely only on their discursive power to influence the debate over environmental 
reform, and industry was comfortably in a position to resist the introduction of 
environmental restrictions on Hermes guarantees. Limited reform was possible only 
when domestic demands for reform coincided with favorable international developments 
– that is, the implementation of Ex-Im’s policies in 1995, the adoption of an OECD 
Statement of Intent on Officially Supported Export Credits and the Environment in 1988 
(OECD 1998b), and the development of the OCED Draft Recommendation on Common 
Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits in 2001 (OECD 
2001a). 
The power of demands made on rule-makers affected not only the likelihood of 
reform, but also its scope. Demand from the US government for such reform, for 
example, led to the creation of the World Bank’s policies. Aside from the Bank’s own 
reservations, there was little opposition to these rules, and these clearly reflected the 
interests and terms of the Bank’s most powerful principal. Private banks responded to the 
environmental challenge quickly, taking ownership of the rule-making process and 
creating the Equator Principles to fit their business model. The ambitious Ex-Im rules 
were derived from World Bank policies and broad in scope in response to the 
Congressional mandate. Hermes rules, finally, represent the result of a tug-of-war 
between environmental and industrial policy objectives. The rules were based on a 
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minimalist interpretation of draft OECD rules and designed to sideline environmental 
criticism while interfering with operations to the least extent possible.  
Given the similarity in project portfolios and public demands for change, why 
were some ECAs slower than others, and all of them so much slower to respond to the 
environmental challenge than the World Bank and even private banks? 
Environmental rules for the World Bank were developed relatively quickly, 
because the creation of these rules translated into political benefits for member states 
without domestic costs. The Equator Principles for private banks were adopted in 
relatively short time because the NGO campaign posed such a threat to brand name 
reputation that the benefits of incorporating environmental rules actually outweighed the 
reputational cost of inaction. Environmental rules for ECAs took much longer to devise 
because governments were faced with a trade-off between environmental and industrial 
policy objectives. Environmental reform was feasible only when this balance shifted in 
favor of environmental objectives. 
Beyond the consideration of ECAs as a class of actors, we also need to consider 
Ex-Im and Hermes guarantees individually. The assignment of leader and laggard roles 
among these ECAs appears counter-intuitive. Given the recent environmental policy 
track records of the U.S. and the German governments, one would expect Germany to 
take the lead role as opposed to the United States. The answer to this puzzle can be found 
at the domestic level. If the environmental reform of ECAs is considered as a power 
struggle between NGOs fighting for environmental restrictions, and industry, which 
would rather operate without any restrictions, then the resulting balance of power 
between industry and NGOs in domestic politics becomes an important predictor for the 
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course and scope of environmental policy development. When confronted by the 
structural power of business, it is not surprising, then, that NGOs, by making use of 
instrumental power in the United States, were more successful in the United States than 
they were in Germany, where (without recourse to any variant of this instrumental power) 
they had to rely on discursive power, although this power was much weaker than the 
instrumental power of NGOs in the United States. This dissertation discusses these power 
relationships and cost-benefit considerations in detail. 
1.2 Argument: obstacles to harmonization 
Having addressed obstacles to environmental reform, I now turn to my second 
core argument, regulatory harmonization and its obstacles. The increasing exchange of 
goods and services across national borders has brought with it the necessity to harmonize 
and standardize national rules. Producers can reap the benefits of increased trade best if 
the various national markets, for which they produce their goods, would require little 
product differentiation. From a manufacturer’s point of view, the ability to sell a single 
version of a product worldwide is an ideal situation. However, this is true only when the 
product is competitive in foreign markets. Producers of uncompetitive products fear 
competition by foreign producers in their domestic market, and would therefore prefer 
rules that shield their domestic market from these foreign competitors. National 
governments, for their part, seek to maximize benefits to domestic industry. This entails 
establishing regulatory barriers that serve domestic industry, while at the same time 
supporting this industry through working towards the removal of foreign states’ 
regulatory barriers. Ultimately, this creates a drive towards harmonization and 
standardization, with some reservations guided by the interests for domestic industry.  
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Considering the low relevance of ECAs for trade, why has harmonization been so 
slow and cumbersome? The harmonization of environmental rules for ECAs is 
considerably more difficult than coming to an agreement on product or process standards 
which are the subject of most harmonization literature. This literature suggests that strict 
product or process standards can be implemented by any great power and then spread 
through market power (Drezner 2005). Once implemented, these rules exert pressure on 
other states, since exporters there will often adjust manufacturing output to meet the 
stricter standard, and then respond with a tightening of their own domestic rules to 
exclude other competition. This is typically referred to as the “California Effect” (Vogel 
1995). Restricting market access shields domestic production, and environmental 
leadership, as a consequence of strictly unilateral decisions, can result in future trade 
benefits. This is the argument of the ecological modernization literature (Mol and 
Sonnenfeld 2000). 
However, environmental rules for ECAs do not, in the end, benefit domestic 
exporters as ecological modernization suggests, since the rules restrict access to 
government support through their environmental criteria. Whereas protectionist 
environmental rules can work to the advantage of domestic firms, environmental rules for 
ECAs must always be to their detriment. The effects of environmental ECA rules can be 
neutral at best, and that is only when ECA rules among competitor countries are 
established with the same level of stringency. Tightening environmental rules for ECAs 
never benefits exporters, not even producers of environmental goods who could gain 
support under both lenient and restrictive rules. Consequently, governments can expect 
opposition from business to any rule that would restrict access to export credits. This 
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would be the case even if all competitor states established stricter values, because softer 
domestic rules would translate into the competitive advantages of gaining easier access to 
export support. Given the negative effects of restrictions on export credits on the 
competitiveness of domestic industry, it is not surprising then, that governments resisted 
the imposition of environmental rules for ECAs for as long as they could 
Despite the disincentives to harmonize ECA rules, OECD countries have 
successfully harmonized financial terms for export credits and have thereby squeezed 
subsidization out of export credits (Evans 2005). The harmonization of environmental 
policies, however, was slow and cumbersome, even in a proven harmonization venue and 
with U.S. leadership. This discrepancy between environmental and financial standards 
harmonization cannot be explained on the international level. Negotiations on the 
harmonization of environmental standards were placed into a negotiation venue with a 
30-year history of successful ECA policy harmonization. In addition, US leadership had 
led to successful negotiations in harmonizing financial aspects of ECA operations in the 
past. The presence of both factors did not lead to a similar outcome for environmental 
terms. 
Explanations for the delayed harmonization can be found in the domestic costs 
and benefits of harmonization, which, again, are consequences of power relationships and 
rule content. The harmonization of financial terms provided states with an opportunity to 
both reduce their expenditures for export subsidies and to avoid a costly subsidy race. 
While this did mean a reduction in support for exporters, the ultimate effect on their 
relative competitiveness was not significant, since the new terms ultimately maintained a 
level playing field, albeit at a lower level of subsidization. Governments could, therefore, 
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benefit from reduced expenses without also incurring the substantial costs of foregone 
exports.  
Cost-benefit consideration did not favor common environmental policies to the 
extent that they encouraged financial harmonization. From the perspective of a country 
with weak environmental policies such as Germany, however, harmonization of 
environmental terms creates considerable costs and brings only negligible benefits. These 
costs include the political costs of restricting access to government support to powerful 
firms, undoing institutionalized deals and bargains, and the regulatory costs of devising 
new rules and procedures.  
In considering political costs of harmonization to a government, the agreement’s 
effects on industry are important. This economic effect of environmental rules depends 
on the combination of the relevance of those rules to that ECA’s export portfolio and the 
relevance of export credits to a nation’s total exports. The sectoral composition of ECA 
portfolios vary, as does the impact that rules have on a nation’s exports. When comparing 
U.S. and German ECA portfolios, a considerably larger share of German exports would 
be affected by environmental ECA rules than would be the case for U.S. exports. 
Coupled with industry’s strong power position in German politics, the political costs of 
imposing such environmental rules was much higher than they were in the United States.  
In addition to these political costs, harmonization of environmental rules also 
entails regulatory costs which stem from changes to rules and procedures. This type of 
harmonization entails regulatory adaptations that are broader and more substantial in 
scope than are involved in the harmonization of product and process rules. While product 
and process standards do not directly challenge government activity, ECA rules proposed 
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by the United States did challenge continental European regulatory cultures. That meant 
that harmonization required not only agreement on an optimal level of regulation, but 
also mandated changes in fundamental regulatory approaches. Put differently, proposals 
for the environmentally-oriented ECA rules put the stringency of rules into question, and 
moreover, challenged basic principles of government intervention. U.S. Ex-Im policies 
included provisions for environmental impact assessment, transparency of environmental 
information, and the reliance on nonnegotiable qualitative and quantitative evaluation 
criteria; all of which conflicted strongly with continental European regulatory cultures.  
Thus, agreeing to such rules would require costly regulatory adaptation by 
European governments. This presented a real challenge, since ECA rules were being 
negotiated by the same bureaucrats who would later be in charge of their implementation. 
Furthermore, these negotiator-implementers were unlikely to consider proposals that 
would require modifications to rules beyond their jurisdiction, since broadening the 
regulatory community to additional members could also introduce further unwanted 
reforms in addition to the adaptations necessary for the implementation of harmonized 
rules. Enlarging a regulatory community is likely to change the majority patterns 
supporting prior compromises, and could thus lead to even greater regulatory reform 
which could go beyond the control of the negotiator-implementer.  
The way out of this predicament would have been a symbolic political 
compromise providing the United States with a face-saving environmental agreement and 
at the same time minimizing the need for regulatory adaptation in Europe. However, such 
a draft compromise was rejected by the White House in 2001. Negotiators were caught in 
a situation that necessitated an environmental agreement, the terms of which were 
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defined by the US government. Agreement was possible only after enough flexibility was 
incorporated into the contentious U.S. terms so that they required only slight modification 
of preexisting rules on the European side.  
The combination of (i) costs associated with raising environmental standards for 
ECAs and (ii) the incompatibility of U.S.-style ECA rules with continental European 
regulatory frameworks made harmonization of ECA policies difficult, despite the 
overarching transatlantic trend towards market integration. This dissertation analyzes the 
harmonization process in detail to explain how the nature of ECA rules worked against 
the U.S. campaign for common environmental standards among ECAs.  
1.3 Result: Weak Policies and Limited Harmonization 
The combined effect of the obstacles discussed in the previous sections manifests 
itself in limited harmonization. Here, environmental policies have been established and 
harmonized to the extent where governments can benefit from having addressed the 
issues, but those governments are not required to bring about dramatic policy change.  
Before environmental standards for ECAs were established, projects were 
examined primarily for commercial viability, and social and environmental 
considerations were only marginally considered in cover decisions. A prominent example 
of this from the time between the environmental Congressional mandate for Ex-Im and 
the adoption of the resulting Ex-Im policies is the Three-Gorges-Dam in China. In 
addition to the large-scale involuntary resettlement of local populations, this controversial 
project also included potentially significant yet poorly understood environmental effects. 
Both the World Bank and the U.S. Ex-Im Bank denied their support out of social and 
environmental concerns. European ECAs, however, were, at the time, exempt from 
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regulations concerning social and environmental impacts, so nothing prevented them 
from supporting the project and facilitating it through the export support of key 
components.  
The cover decisions of the Three-Gorges-Dam pre-date the OECD Common 
Approaches and most European environmental ECA rules. If the OECD agreement was 
effective, such a cover decision should not have been taken after the adaptation and 
implementation of the OECD Common Approaches and the European rules. However, 
the German, Swiss, and Austrian ECAs have approved support for the Turkish Ilisu Dam 
in April 2007. This Dam project also entails involuntary resettlement, the destruction of 
cultural heritage, and the reduction of cross-border water flows to Syria and Iraq in an 
arid area, in addition to considerable environmental impacts. The Ilisu Dam had been 
considered by European ECAs for a number of years, and had emerged as a highly 
problematic project. The Austrian, German, and Swiss ECAs approved support for this 
project, despite the lack of much information regarding its environmental impact and any 
implementation plans. The Terms of Reference for the project were approved before a 
comprehensive evaluation of environmental impacts could be conducted; this constituted 
a fundamental breach of the World Bank rules to which ECAs committed themselves. 
World Bank rules regarding project evaluation required full impact assessment as well as 
the development of implementation plans prior to granting cover (Erklärung von Bern, 
WEED, and ECA Watch 2007). 
The Ilisu Dam can be seen as a crucial test for the ECA environmental policies. In 
this case, project evaluation was carried out after the ECAs involved had signed on to the 
Common Approaches. While a single case may provide an incomplete picture of the 
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Common Approaches’ implementation, ECA reports to the OECD Secretariat suggest 
that implementation is also lacking in other areas of ECA operations, especially with 
regard to transparency provisions. It is to be noted that these observations concern the 
formal compliance with the text of the agreement only. What might be of even more 
relevance for the environmental performance of these projects are the loopholes that were 
incorporated into the Common Approaches to facilitate European governments’ 
agreement with U.S.-style rules. These loopholes concern transparency requirements and 
adherence to international standards (Görlach, Knigge, and Schaper 2007). As the 
detailed analysis in this dissertation shows, the Common Approaches allow relatively 
weak environmental policies among ECAs, and the degree of harmonization achieved by 
the agreement is low. Common rules were established on a symbolic level, and often 
lacked substance. This may have facilitated agreement, but it also impeded effectiveness.  
1.4 Power, Institutions, and the Greening of International Finance 
The arguments introduced in the preceding sections build on the combination of 
an actor-centered institutionalist inquiry with an analysis of power relationships in their 
instrumental, structural, and discursive dimensions. Establishing and harmonizing 
environmental rules requires changes in pre-existing institutions. These changes, in turn, 
put prior bargains and compromises in question. Clearly, actors need to exert power to 
bring about such changes. As the primary drivers behind these environmental reforms, 
NGOs often lack direct instrumental power to affect this kind of change. By leveraging 
the power of intermediary actors with more direct means of control over those who can 
change the rules, NGOs transformed their discursive power into more immediate 
structural and instrumental leverage. NGO interests were typically opposed to those of 
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business. Business actors held both structural power over the policy agenda and 
instrumental power over governments through lobbying. Business’ structural power was 
closely related to an industry sector’s relevance for national exports and the sector’s 
susceptibility to environmental rules. Export-oriented sectors subject to environmental 
rules (such as suppliers of hydropower components) were more influential in domestic 
policy-making than those sectors not subject to such standards (such as arms 
manufacturers) or those not dependent on export credits 
Power relationships among NGOs, states, and business actors, however, explain 
only part of the story. In addition to power, it is also important to consider the costs of 
regulatory change. The more substantial a reform or harmonization challenge is in terms 
of the required regulatory change, the higher the costs of its implementation are. These 
costs consist of the regulatory cost of changing existing rules and institutions, as well as 
the political costs of undoing prior deals and compromises. The political costs, in turn, 
are clearly related to the power relationships within a regulatory community. The more 
powerful an actor is, the more costly it is to modify the rules to that actor’s disadvantage. 
Dynamics of environmental reform and regulatory harmonization can then be explained 
in terms of the costs and benefits of regulatory change.  
Political and regulatory costs and benefits arise on the domestic level: domestic 
rules need to be adapted, and governments must be mindful of competing constituencies’ 
demands on policy-making. These domestic considerations in turn determine 
governments’ positions and strategies on international bargaining. Thus, this dissertation 
is concerned with both domestic politics and international relations. The emphasis, 
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however, is on the domestic level since it is the domestic level that is crucial in defining 
international-level preferences and for implementing the resulting agreement.  
1.5 Outline of this Dissertation 
Financial aspects of ECA operations have been covered in the academic literature; 
however, the environmental policies of these institutions and the international 
harmonization of these policies – issues which have emerged as policy challenges in the 
1990s – have thus far escaped detailed academic scrutiny. This dissertation is the first 
comprehensive academic examination of these policies.  
Chapter two reviews the literature on export credit agencies and surveys the 
theoretical bases of my arguments. The following two chapters analyze the creation of 
environmental rules for international finance. Chapter three analyzes NGO campaigns 
that have pushed environmental policies for international finance on the political agenda. 
Studying the strategies and impacts of these campaigns on the World Bank and private 
banks aids in understanding the obstacles experienced in ECA reform. Obstacles to 
establishing similar rules for ECAs are addressed in chapter four.  
The next two chapters are then concerned with regulatory harmonization. By 
placing ECA politics in this context this again helps in appreciating the obstacles ECA 
reform faced in the harmonization dimensions (chapter six). The focus here is on 
diverging regulatory cultures in hampering harmonization of ECA policies. 
The seventh chapter ties the preceding parts together by assessing the effects and 
limitations of environmental standards for international finance. The conclusion in 
chapter eight, finally, revisits the questions raised here as well as the hypotheses 
generated in chapter two. It also posits suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Context 
This chapter frames the discussion in the remainder of this dissertation by first 
introducing the reader to the existing literature on export credits and the environment, 
developing the theoretical framework, and introducing the research design and 
methodology. As the literature review in the first section of this chapter shows, 
specialized literature on the topic is very scarce; only financial aspects of export credits 
have received some attention in the scholarly literature. As a consequence of this lack of 
analytical literature, applicable theoretical frameworks are not readily available. The 
theory discussion in this chapter’s second section develops such a framework by first 
discussing environmental rule-making and regulatory harmonization as two distinct 
processes before offering a formal model that integrates both aspects with each other. 
This chapter’s final section addresses the research design and methodology of this 
comparative interpretive dissertation. 
The framework developed in this chapter suggests that an analysis of 
environmental rule-making for international finance needs to consider the power of 
groups making competing demands on the rule-makers, the institutions through which 
their power is channeled, and the impact these have on the resulting rules. The same 
analytical categories apply when analyzing regulatory harmonization. However, here the 
rule content is externally given in the form of a harmonization proposal; power and 
institutions affect whether harmonization proposals are accepted or rejected. These 
arguments will be detailed in the theory section following after the literature review 
section below. 
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2.1 Review of the existing literature 
Cross-national research on environmental standards for export credit agencies is 
almost non-existent. A paper by Thomás Carbonell and Roland Stephen entitled Unseen 
Agents and Global Standards: Export Credit, Institutional Design and the Environment 
(Carbonell and Stephen 2003) is the only analytic inquiry into the topic that is 
international in scope thus far. Environmental Defense, a NGO active in this area, 
commissioned a study by the Yale Environmental Protection Clinic in 1998. This mostly 
descriptive summary compiled by students (Hsieh et al. 1998) of environmental standards 
in place for export credit agencies has since become outdated, due to the developments 
since its publication. Furthermore, it did not attempt to analyze the reasons for the 
divergence in environmental standards. Carbonell and Stephen note that “no academic 
study of the causes of environmental reform at official ECAs has been undertaken to 
date. This void in the literature is surprising given the increasingly important role of 
ECAs […]” (Carbonell and Stephen 2003: 6, emphasis in original).  
Carbonell and Stephen (2003) provide the first academically analytical attempt at 
coming to terms with diverging levels of national environmental standards for ECAs. 
Their approach is very straightforward, arguing that the level of autonomy of the export 
credit agency within the government, the export orientation of a nation (measured in 
exports to GNP ratio), the size of the domestic international financial services sector, and 
environmental values among voters may impact the level of environmental standards for 
export credit agencies. However, only the export orientation emerges as a consistently 
significant predictor across their models. They argue that the level of environmental 
standards is a function of the relative strength of the ECA’s client base measured by 
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export orientation and size of the international financial services sector. Furthermore, 
high autonomy of the export credit agency may also facilitate capture of the ECA by 
relevant economic actors. Environmental sentiments held among the electorate do not 
appear to be significant predictors. 
2.1.1 Literature on export credits and the environment 
Carbonell has since contributed to a number of reports for NGOs working on 
ECA Reform. One paper (Carbonell 2004) addresses the relationship between the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Arrangement, and rules for 
ECAs; another co-authored with the former ExIm chairman James Harmon, addresses the 
role of ECAs in development finance (Harmon et al. 2005). 
Christian Steinreiber (2002) discusses the role of ECAs and their impact on global 
sustainability. His graduate thesis is a mostly descriptive account of ECA policies in 
Austria, Switzerland, and Germany. Wolfram Kuoni’s dissertation addresses 
environmental aspects from a developmental perspective as part of his comprehensive 
legal treatment of the Swiss ECA Exportrisikogarantie (Kuoni 2004). The OECD Export 
Credit Group periodically compiles surveys of its members’ environmental policies 
(OECD 2003a, 2005c, 2005d, 2004c, 2006); these surveys provide snapshots of existing 
environmental policies. However, these matrices are mere compilations of national 
ECAs’ responses to the surveys and do not really provide for analysis; they need to be 
analyzed carefully given national ECAs’ tendencies to describe their policies in only 
favorable terms. Since implementation of the Common Approaches, the Export Credit 
Group also reports on “Category A” and “Category B” projects reported by Member 
States (OECD 2004b, 2005b, 2007a). The United States General Accounting Office 
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compiled a report on the convergence of environmental guidelines for ECAs in 2003 
(United States General Accounting Office 2003). This report provides a good overview in 
a cross-national perspective of the development of environmental standards up to that 
point.  
Gerster (1997) analyzed the significance of export credits for developing 
countries and their contribution to Third World debt. He suggested that “steps proposed 
in a G-7 communiqué following the Denver summit offer a good starting point for 
environmental issues. Nongovernmental organizations could build on these steps to 
advance the cause of coherent development policy in a meaningful way.” A number of 
NGOs are now active in this field; among them are the U.S. Environmental Defense and 
German Urgewald. Bruce Rich (1998; 2000) and Aaron Goldzimer (2002) of 
Environmental Defense provide interesting and substantial NGO perspectives on the 
issue. Recently, Jon Sohn and Jennifer Villemez (2003) of Friends of the Earth compared 
environmental guidelines of the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the French Coface. Their 
very detailed analysis discusses oil and gas guidelines in particular.  
In a report for the World Resources Institute (Evans 2004), Evans evaluates 
options for promoting the export of renewable energy technology through modifying 
rules under the Arrangement and argues that such changes in terms are unwarranted. 
Other reports from the NGO community that compare national environmental standards 
are also good sources of empirical material (e.g. Bree and Hunter 1998; Udall 2000). A 
number of case studies of ECA support for individual controversial projects have been 
compiled by the NGO network ECA Watch (www.eca-watch.org).  
29 
An expert workshop in September 2003 hosted by the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in London provided stakeholder groups with an opportunity to 
discuss the state of ECAs and sustainable development. A preliminary summary of the 
results of this multi-stakeholder workshop (Calder 2003) provides a good account of the 
contemporary policy debate. I had the opportunity to take part in this meeting and the 
workshop discussions were very helpful in refining my thinking on the subject as were 
similar meetings convened by UNEP-FI in London (2003), Germanwatch (2004), and the 
European Commission (2006). 
This body of literature is a rich data source and provides descriptive accounts of 
ECAs and their relationship to the environment, but it does not address the drivers of 
environmental policies for these institutions. There is clearly a lack of analysis 
concerning ECA environmental politics. Beyond this international literature and case 
studies of projects, there is also literature dealing with national ECA politics. The 
following subsections briefly consider existing writing on Germany (Hermes credit 
guarantees) and the United States (Ex-Im Bank). 
2.1.1.1 Germany 
In Germany, critiques of Hermes originated from the context of development 
policy. A report published by the Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung 
(GKKE - Käpernick and Kulessa 1994) provides a synopsis of the discussion concerning 
export credits and development policy up to the early 1990s. Five years later, the 
scientific advisory committee to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) assessed the compatibility of Hermes cover with development 
policy goals (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 
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1999) and came to the conclusion that export credits do not have to stand in conflict with 
development policy as they are not really an instrument particularly well suited to 
development objectives. Armin Sandhövel (Sandhövel 2000) of the German 
Environmental Council argued for an integration of environmental goals into ECA 
policies to increase the legitimacy of ECAs and showed how such integration could be 
achieved in Germany as well as throughout the OECD. He argued that harmonization 
within the EU was needed but that it would not be enough to stop at the EU-level. 
All of the German reports were targeted at policy audiences. Only the BMZ report 
analyzed ECA activities. However, its economic analysis was limited to the suitability of 
export credits as a development policy instrument; it is, thus, only tangential at best for 
the discussion in this dissertation. 
2.1.1.2 United States 
A number of authors touch on the issue of environmental standards in broader 
discussions of individual ECAs. Becker’s and McClenahan’s otherwise comprehensive 
history of Ex-Im (Becker and McClenahan 2003) gives little attention to environmental 
critiques of Ex-Im operations prior to its 1992 re-authorization requiring the 
establishment of an environmental policy, and they barely mention U.S.-initiated 
harmonization endeavors. Theodore Moran’s treatment of the U.S. Overseas Private 
Investment Council (OPIC) (Moran 2003) deals with OPIC’s environmental standards on 
four pages of the main text and in an eight-page appendix. Also published by the Institute 
for International Economics is a volume on the U.S. Export-Import Bank edited by Gary 
Clyde Hufbauer and Rita M. Rodriguez. The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century: A New 
Approach? (2001) contains a chapter by Peter C. Evans and Kenneth A. Oye on 
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International Competition: Conflict and Cooperation in Government and Export 
Financing which touches on environmental standards briefly as one area in need of 
harmonization. 
Similar to internationally oriented reports, country-specific literature either does 
not address the bases for environmental policies or is prescriptive rather than analytical. 
2.1.2 Export Credits in general 
Most literature on export credit agencies does not focus on environmental 
standards. Attention is usually paid to credit terms, use of controversial instruments such 
as tied aid, untied aid, market windows, and their implications for trade, competitiveness, 
and welfare. This group of authors includes Walzenbach (1998; 1999), Brander and 
Spencer (1985), Carmichael (1987), Krugman (1984; 1986), Ho and Werkhorst (1995), 
Schickinger (1999), Backhaus, Köhl, and Werthschulte (2000), and Milner and Yoffie 
(1989). Out of this group, Walzenbach’s Co-ordination in Context (1998) is the most 
relevant to my analysis as he discusses harmonization of ECA terms in the OECD and 
EU contexts by linking international and super-national discussions to domestic politics 
in his interdisciplinary institutionalist framework which integrates legal, economic, and 
political approaches to the issue. Taking Britain, France, and Germany as cases he 
inquires  
“how does the use of export credits, export credit insurance and development aid in three 
leading European countries match with repeated and long-standing efforts undertaken by the 
European Community (EC) and the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) to control state aids to industry? Why have both organizations failed 
to keep national support measures to exporting firms competitively neutral? Which direction 
did institutionalized expert advice take before it became influential at the various levels of 
the co-ordination process, and what influence had institutional reforms on the co-ordination 
capacity of the control system for subsidies as a whole?” (Walzenbach 1998: 2)  
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While Walzenbach’s study predates the emergence of environmental concerns in 
the OECD Export Credit Group, the direction and theoretical framework of his analysis 
are similar to my project. Like Walzenbach, I am interested in the coordination of ECA 
policies within the OECD, and similar to his study, my analysis also considers the roles 
NGOs and business interests play in shaping domestic ECA politics. 
Ho and Werkhorst (1995) are also concerned with regulatory harmonization in the 
EU context, and argue that European harmonization has largely failed because of the 
prevalence of intergovernmental factors over supranational or transnational ones. Despite 
the Commission’s activity in this area and fairly clear treaty language establishing the 
Commission’s competence, Member States have retained control over their ECAs’ 
policies as tools of national export promotion. This is important in understanding the EU 
Commission’s limited role in ECA politics which may have complicated ECA 
harmonization considerably. The lack of a European filter in ECA politics increases the 
relevance of domestic power relationships and institutions, the effects of which would 
have been attenuated through consensual politics on the European level otherwise (see 
Hoornbeek 2004). In other words, the member states prerogative empowered functional 
interests that worked against effective harmonization. 
Ray’s Managing Official Export Credits: The Quest for a Global Regime (1997) 
and Moravcsik’s Disciplining Trade: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement (1989) 
provide good historical accounts of the development of the OECD Arrangement. More 
recently, Malcolm Stephens (1999) analyzes the Changing Role of Export Credit 
Agencies in an international perspective. Gianturco (2001) provides a descriptive account 
of ECAs in both developed and developing countries. Stolzenburg’s (1987) description of 
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the German export credit system is rather outdated. Stankovsky and Url (1998) analyze 
the costs and benefits of Austrian export credits in a study commissioned by the Austrian 
ECA OeKB. 
Peter Evan’s dissertation (2005) discusses the Arrangement as a cartel “comprised 
of the leading suppliers of state-backed trade finance.” According to Evans, compliance 
with the Arrangement is high because it serves the collective interest of supplier states.2 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) periodically publishes reports on ECAs 
(Stephens 1999; Wang et al. 2005; Kuhn, Horvath, and Jarvis 1995) which provide a 
good overview of the financial aspects of export credits, but do not devote much attention 
to environmental aspects of ECA operations. 
As this brief overview of literature in the field indicates, there is little analytical 
work dealing with environmental standard-setting for export credit agencies. The 
considerable degree of attention civil society actors and governments dedicate to the issue 
illustrates the need for comparative analyses. This dissertation moves beyond this largely 
descriptive literature and seeks to address the question: How could export credit agencies 
resist for 25 years the same pressure that greened other financial institutions in a 
relatively short time? The analysis of this question involves an examination of 
environmental rule-making among financial institutions, including ECAs, as well as an 
investigation of harmonization of ECAs’ environmental policies. The second part of this 
chapter develops a theoretical framework for this analysis. 
                                               
2 Evans has also compiled information on the development of Ex-Im environmental policy but has not 
published on this topic. He has made this material available to me which has proved very helpful in 
developing the historical outline of environmental policy development in chapter three. 
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2.2 Theoretical Context 
This study is at the intersection of comparative politics, international relations, 
and political economy. The politics analyzed here span from the national, to the supra-
national, to the international level. Standard setting and implementation are mostly 
domestic processes, whereas harmonization entails supra-national and international 
coordination. This theory discussion, consequently, draws on insights from literature 
across all levels. In terms of substance, this theoretical framework centers on institutions, 
power relationships, and their impact on the development and harmonization of 
environmental rules. In drawing from this literature, I focus my arguments on the impact 
of competing demands on the content of the resulting rules and the role of domestic 
actors and institutions in influencing the acceptance or rejection of harmonization 
proposals. 
The establishment of environmental policies is a struggle among those favoring 
environmental rules and those opposed to them. Analyzing power relationships within the 
involved regulatory communities is important to understanding the outputs of domestic 
standard setting processes. Analysis of domestic rules setting must, therefore, include 
consideration of actors having a stake in ECA politics and the institutional framework 
through which their power is channeled. 
Harmonization of national standards also involves a struggle among promoters of 
harmonized rules and those opposed to common rules. Contrary to the central tenet of 
much of the regulatory harmonization literature, ECA harmonization cannot easily be 
explained as a power struggle among states on the international level because the unique 
character of environmental policies for ECAs renders market power as a coercive 
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instrument ineffective. Instead, the analysis of ECA harmonization requires attention to 
be paid to the interaction of rules proposed on the international level with national-level 
institutions. The primary struggle is between those who seek to upload their own rules to 
the international level and those who would need to change their national rules as a 
consequence. The degree and type of required adaptations is important to understand the 
costs and benefits of harmonization. Cost-benefit analysis of harmonization must, 
therefore, include both political and regulatory cost considerations. 
Environmental rule-making and regulatory harmonization are the main building 
blocks of the theoretical framework developed here. Of these, rule-making is considered 
in the following part before turning to harmonization in the second part of this theory 
section. The final part ties rule-making and harmonization together in a cost-benefit 
model that applies to both regulatory reform and regulatory harmonization. 
2.2.1 Environmental rule-making: power, institutions, and politics 
This dissertation addresses the issue of environmental standard-setting for export 
credit from a domestic perspective and it is rooted in a new institutionalist framework. 
My analysis traces the processes by which the standards are set. The focus is on actors, 
their power, the institutional framework within which they are acting, and their influence 
on environmental rule-making. Diverging institutional frameworks in the cases studied 
limit actors with respect to the policy choices available to them and promote different 
policies in each of the cases studied.  
Environmental rule-making involves a struggle among actors making competing 
demands on the rule-makers. The next section addresses the power relationships in this 
struggle. This discussion distinguishes between instrumental, structural, and discursive 
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forms of power and also suggests that actors can transform one form of power into 
another if they channel it through an intermediate actor. Following this discussion of 
power, the next section deals with the role of institutions in channeling, enabling, and 
restraining power. Here it is important to recognize that different institutional contexts 
favor different actors. The level and ease of access to the political process determines 
what kind of power which actor can employ effectively. The third and final section of this 
part of the theory discussion on environmental rule-making then considers the power of 
competing demands made on ECAs. The second part of this theory section turns to 
regulatory harmonization, before the final part presents a model to integrate regulatory 
reform and harmonization in the same cost-benefit analysis. 
2.2.1.1 Power3 
Financial institutions restrict access to financing through the imposition of 
environmental constraints. Both the restriction of access to financing and the mere 
existence of such rules are manifestations of power which are explored in this 
dissertation: financial institutions exert power over their clients, while the institutions 
themselves are subject to pressure requiring the adaptation of such environmental 
requirements. Many infrastructure projects in developing and transition countries are now 
designed with consideration of international environmental rules – even when such 
environmental regulations are weak or absent in the recipient country; such is a 
                                               
3 Parts of this section have been published as “Leveraging Green Power: Environmental Rules for Project 
Finance” (Schaper 2007). They are used here with permission of the copyright holder Berkeley Electronic 
Press. 
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manifestation of financial institutions’ power over business actors developing projects or 
exporting components to such projects.4 
Examining financial actors “as either instruments of power or as independent 
governing agents” (Haufler 2005) situates the power they wield within the context of 
their relationship with other actors. Financial institutions govern the activities of actors 
that depend on their financial support. The use of finance as leverage is anything but new. 
However, what we are observing now is that this control is not manifested in rather 
diffuse financial policies; instead, access to finance is contingent upon the fulfillment of 
non-market criteria which serve to realize policy goals in other policy areas. Financial 
institutions build on their structural power in order to green their clients’ projects.  
Financial institutions wield considerable power over business actors in other 
sectors. States and civil society actors have successfully employed the finance sector’s 
leverage over business in establishing these policies. The public or private nature of a 
financial actor is important on the input side for the choice of strategy to employ the 
actors’ leverage over clients, but it is irrelevant on the output side with regard to this 
actor’s power over business. Private financial actors’ power over other types of business 
is similar to that of public financial actors over business.  
Actors may choose to employ financial leverage if their direct power over 
business is limited or when channeling their power through an intermediate financial 
                                               
4 This dissertation is primarily concerned with the creation of environmental policies for international 
finance as an important step in reducing negative environmental impacts of supported projects. Obviously, 
the adoption of policies says little about their implementation or even their outcome on the ground. The 
literature on the World Bank suggests that the environmental performance of Bank supported projects has 
not changed much (for example Gutner 2005a); implementation of the Common Approaches among ECAs 
is uneven (Görlach, et al. 2007); and the impact of the Equator Principles is limited to few regions at best 
(Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006). In fact, the impact of all three sets of policies hinges upon the 
availability of alternative financing not subject to environmental requirements (see chapter 7). Still, the 
proliferation of environmental policies among these institutions is an important step and deserves attention. 
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actor allows them to instrumentalize the financial actor’s more immediate power over the 
business target. Such cooptation can occur in both policy development and 
implementation. The literature on agency theory in World Bank environmental reform 
deals with these power relationships in the context of Principal-Actor models (Gutner 
2005b, 2005a; Nielson and Tierney 2003, 2005; Nielson, Tierney, and Weaver 2006), but 
does not address different manifestations of power. This particular analysis is concerned 
with power in the initial delegation of rule-setting tasks amongst a broader group of 
financial institutions.  
An examination of the international finance sector shows that power is manifested 
in at least three different ways in its interaction with other sectors: (i) Through the 
provision of project financing, financial institutions wield structural power over project 
sponsors. (ii) Through name-and-shame tactics, NGOs can exert direct discursive power 
of financial institutions or utilize other actors’ more immediate forms to effect change 
(see also Sell and Prakash 2004). (iii) Through the adoption of comprehensive 
environmental policies, the World Bank, Equator Principle banks, and Ex-Im establish 
far-reaching environmental norms which provide these institutions with new sources of 
discursive power (see also Park 2005a, 2007). The next section considers different 
manifestations of power in the control of access to financing contingent upon non-market 
criteria.  
2.2.1.1.1 Power and the conditionality of finance 
Fuchs’ classification of power (Fuchs 2005a, 2006; Fuchs 2005b) suggests 
analyzing business power within the context of its instrumental, structural, and discursive 
dimensions. Instrumental power refers to the ability of A to “get B to do something that 
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B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957). In her discussion, Fuchs suggests that such an 
exertion of instrumental business power most clearly relates to the lobbying and 
campaign finance activities both within the state and on sub-, supra, and international 
levels. NGOs also exert instrumental power through lobbying activities. The ability to 
engage in such activities depends on the institutional context these actors operate in. 
Different political opportunity structures privilege different actors in participation in the 
political process. 
Business’ structural power pertains to the “input side of policy and politics and 
the predetermination of the behavioral options of political decision-makers” (Fuchs 
2006). In this view, states’ dependence on economic growth to deliver their services 
provides business with agenda control power over those policies which limit business 
activity and which may, therefore, negatively affect a state’s economic performance. 
Even without active intervention in the policy-making process by business, governments 
are likely to concede privileged consideration to business concerns, since states cannot 
afford to undermine economic growth which fuels government activity, or to risk 
business re-locating to other polities (Levy and Egan 1998). Fuchs further argues that this 
source of structural business power also “endows actors with direct rule-setting power” 
(Fuchs 2006). This rule-setting power is most obvious in industry self-regulation and in 
public-private partnerships as forms of governance where the state concedes its authority 
over rules to non-state actors. NGOs do not possess a structural power base of their own, 
but they can attempt to transform discursive power into structural power (see below). 
Discursive power, finally, is the least direct form. It “shapes perceptions and 
identities and fosters the interpretation of situations as of one type rather than another” 
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(Fuchs 2006). Instead of exerting direct influence over another actor or controlling the 
policy agenda, discursive power shapes the frames of policy debates (Sell and Prakash 
2004), creates and modifies norms and acceptable behavior, and even creates interests. In 
the sphere of business power, such activities as re-framing social policy debates in terms 
of competitiveness or supporting of cautious scientific interpretations of environmental 
problems constitute applications of discursive power. Discursive power is also the staple 
of NGO influence – especially in polities where societal groups lack effective lobby 
access and thus need to rely exclusively on the power of words and ideas. 
This dissertation extends Fuchs’s discussion in two ways. Finance as a class of 
business actors is not merely seen as an actor influencing policy-making or being the 
target of policies, but also as a conduit by which other actors exert leverage over 
businesses dependent on finance. Instead of analyzing only the exertion of power, this 
dissertation distinguishes between the bases of power and the way it is applied, that is, it 
considers the transformation of one type of power into another. 
Table 2.1 Power base matrix 
Direct 
power base 
Of states Of NGOs of  Of IBRD Of ECAs Of EPFIs Of 
Business 





- Structural Structural 
Over NGOs  * Discursive - Discursive Discursive 
Over IBRD Instrumental; 
structural 
(client states) 
Discursive * - Discursive Discursive 
Over ECAs Instrumental Discursive Discursive * Discursive Discursive 
Over EPFIs Instrumental 
(limited) 





Discursive Structural Structural Structural * 
 
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the possible direct power relationships among 
the actors considered here. States take a central position in this analysis. They have direct 
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control over actors operating within their borders, as well as over ECAs and the World 
Bank. At the same time, they depend on business (including financial institutions) 
structurally. Client states are also structurally dependent upon the World Bank. Financial 
institutions yield structural power over other types of business requiring financing. The 
remaining power dyads are discursive in nature: actors can seek to exert influence by 
framing issues or by modifying norms, but they consequently lack more immediate 
means of control. Influence of ECAs over actors other than their clients is not considered 
here since most ECAs as creatures of their respective governments do not engage in 
much political activity of their own. The World Bank, on the other hand, has developed 
quite a life of its own despite being the agent of states (Haas 1990). 
Of these relationships, instrumental ones are the most direct and discursive 
relationships are the least direct. Any actor can augment indirect sources of power by 
enlisting intermediate actors that yield more direct control over their targets as power 
conduits; that is, they can leverage the power held by third actors. In this perspective, 
discursive, structural, and instrumental sources of power of one actor over another are 
instrumentalized by third actors. Thus, it is argued that business actors employ their 
structural power over states in combination with states’ own structural power over third 
actors to augment their indirect discursive power over NGOs, ECAs, and the World Bank 
with indirect structural leverage. Similarly, NGOs can leverage states’ instrumental 
power over the World Bank, ECAs, EPFIs, and business through discursive and 
instrumental power within domestic politics. With regard to influencing business, NGOs 
can also build on the power held over business by the World Bank and EPFIs (see Table 
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2.2). When utilized in such a way, structural and discursive bases of power are 
transformed into instrumental applications. 
Table 2.2 Power leverage matrix 
Power 
leverage 




* Discursive Structural 
(client 
states) 
- Structural Structural 
Over 
NGOs 























via states and ECAs; 
via states and MDBs; 
via EPFI 
Structural Structural Structural * 
 
Hence, the power base of finance over other types of business is structural in 
nature: business depends upon the availability of financing for the development of 
projects.5 This dissertation examines how this structural basis of power is instrumentally 
employed by both state and non-state actors. Financial institutions’ power is then 
considered to be structural rather than instrumental in nature since the existence of 
environmental policies is likely to influence the design of projects for which financing is 
sought from a particular institution. The institution’s instrumental power over project 
design is limited, as clients can choose to source financing elsewhere. 
Furthermore, actors with structural power of their own can then become the 
instruments of others, and the line between structural and instrumental power is thus 
                                               
5 This structural dependence is mutual: firms need financing and financial institutions need clients. 
However, given the scarcity of financing, financial institutions are in a privileged position, thus reducing 
the power of clients over them. 
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blurred. In addition to these first and second-face conceptions of power exerted by 
financial actors, the discursive power of non-state actors in changing norms of acceptable 
behavior plays a crucial role in causing finance to exert its power over other business 
actors; NGOs thus instrumentalize the structural power of finance through discursive 
practices. Finance, in turn, responds to this normative challenge by attempting to reclaim 
authority over determining the appropriate interpretation of the role of the environment in 
their operations – albeit with varying levels of success in their exercise of discursive 
power. 
NGO strategies exploiting weak links in commodity chains have been discussed 
in the literature. The argument here suggests that the privileged position of financial 
institutions and states allows NGOs to transform their discursive power into instrumental 
power. Schurman (2004), for example, has analyzed the anti-biotech NGO campaign in 
Europe. In the United Kingdom, NGOs targeted supermarket chains as an important link 
in the commodity chain. Producers of genetically modified foods depend on the retailers 
to bring their goods to the market and the highly concentrated nature of the food retail 
business allowed activists to concentrate their campaigns on few pivotal actors. Activists 
“consciously targeted a handful of big food retailers” in distributing leaflets about the 
dangers of GMO foods to consumers – potentially driving them from particular chains in 
this highly competitive market and thereby causing retailers to take GMO foods off the 
shelves (Schurman 2004: 253). Cast in power terms, NGOs exploited the structural power 
of supermarket chains over food producers. This allowed them to transform their 
discursive power over consumers into structural power over food producers.  
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Carbonell and Stephen’s (2003) model presumed that citizens take an interest in 
ECA politics, otherwise their indicator of environmental orientation among voters would 
not matter. They neglect that ECA policies are a rather obscure topic and highly technical 
in nature, and this is not conducive to generating public interest in the issue. What is 
needed here is an analysis of NGOs’ ability to raise the issue salience of ECA 
environmental reform. Environmental orientation among voters may be an important 
facilitating factor in that NGOs can enlist green voters to exert political pressure, but they 
need to be mobilized to care about an obscure and marginal issue. Considering NGOs’ 
discursive power does exactly this. The next section turns to the role of institutions in 
affecting the power relationships discussed above. 
2.2.1.2 Institutions – channeling, enabling, and restraining power 
Power is channeled, enabled, and restrained by institutions. Different institutional 
contexts result in different power relationships. Institutions, in turn, are manifestations of 
power relationships at the time of their creation or modification. Thus, the preceding 
actor-centered discussion of power needs to be placed within an institutional framework 
to account for national differences in power bases and relationships. This section 
introduces two institutional concerns that are important for the impact competing 
demands have on financial institutions. The institutional autonomy of an ECA affects its 
overall susceptibility to political demands and a political system’s political opportunity 
structure determines the level of access different groups have to the political process. 
Of interest are particularly the financial institutions themselves, as well as 
legislatures, the respective ministerial bureaucracies, organizations representing industry, 
and NGOs working on the issues. Most important is the political process of standard 
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setting, but it can be analyzed only by studying the interactions of the relevant actors. 
Since this project compares standard setting in different states, the institutional 
frameworks in which these processes take place, as well as the variation among the 
frameworks, are of interest. 
Following Carbonell and Stephen’s (2003) argument, the institutional autonomy 
of an ECA is an important factor in pre-determining the likeliness and level of national 
environmental standards for ECAs. Where ECAs are directly accountable to a legislature 
(e.g. the U.S. Export Import Bank), that legislature may impose policies and restrictions 
upon the ECA as legislators see fit. If, on the other hand, an ECA has been created as a 
rather autonomous executive agency equipped with a clearly defined mandate (e.g. the 
German Hermes Kreditversicherung), it may be much more difficult for the legislature to 
impose policies and procedures upon the ECA. Furthermore, ECAs with a higher degree 
of institutional autonomy may be more prone to capture by business interests – no matter 
if they were designed in such a way to facilitate capture or whether capture occurred 
unintentionally. This is an observation of a classic principal-agent problem: The level of 
environmental standards for an ECA and the ECA’s institutional autonomy are inversely 
related: the more autonomous an ECA is, the more resilient it is against strict 
environmental standards. 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) have convincingly demonstrated the power advocacy 
networks have even when the domestic political opportunity structure is closed for them. 
Mexican NGOs’ adaptation of their strategies to existing institutional constraints and 
cooperation with international NGOs created a feedback loop into their home state, and 
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thus bypassed the closed political opportunity structure. Related to this is Paul Wapner’s 
(1996) observation that NGOs tailor their strategies to the ends they seek to achieve. 
Political opportunity structures not only affect strategy choice by NGOs (Dryzek 
et al. 2003; Kitschelt 1986; Schreurs 2002), but also the power bases of all involved 
interest groups. In open systems with pluralist interest group representation all organized 
interests can exert pressure by lobbying. The only constraints on their activities are 
available resources and the legality of the actions. In an open competition for influence, 
NGOs as well as industry interests can exert instrumental power. This application of 
instrumental power is in addition to business’ structural power and all actors’ ability to 
change the terms of the debate through discursive power. The United States provides an 
almost perfect example for this type of interest group access: legislative lobbying is a 
powerful tool and open to all interest groups. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are corporatist systems which provide 
selected groups access to both policy-making and implementation, but tend to be closed 
to groups that are not involved in an established policy community (Mayntz 1997, 2002). 
Here, the ability to exert instrumental power depends on an actor’s status; groups that are 
not included in tightly knit policy-communities find it very difficult or impossible to gain 
access. This is especially true for environmental NGOs as opposed to industry groups, 
which are typically included in corporatist arrangements. Consequently, excluded groups 
can only resort to their discursive power for lack of either instrumental or structural 
power over policy decisions. The usual examples for corporatist states are the 
Scandinavian countries, but Germany is not far from them on the pluralism-corporatism 
spectrum. German political opportunity structures for environmental NGOs, too, have 
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been historically closed on the input side (Dryzek et al. 2003; Kitschelt 1986; Schreurs 
2002). This is also true to some extent for the EU that by virtue of its decision-making 
process privileges regional or functionalist interests (Hoornbeek 2004). Institutional 
constraints – including the political opportunity structure – have an impact on NGO 
power and strategies. 
2.2.1.3 Power and ECAs 
After discussing the relevant power relationships and their institutional channels, 
this section considers their impact on ECA politics. The power of NGOs and industry in 
making competing demands on ECAs depends not on their institutional context, but also 
on the affected industry’s relevance for domestic exports and the presence of additional 
competing demands. 
In their analysis, Carbonell and Stephen (2003) convincingly argue that power 
relationships and institutional arrangements are important. However, their proxies do not 
adequately capture the competing demands made on ECAs. Export orientation and size of 
the financial service sector are poor indicators for the power of firms relying on ECA 
support. Export orientation is questionable for two reasons: (1) it varies with size of the 
economy with small economies trading more than larger ones; (2) ECAs only cover a 
small portion of exports. Portfolio composition is the more relevant indicator, as it is 
related to an ECA’s “vulnerability” to environmental policies. This requires a sectoral 
analysis. Carbonell and Stephen introduce the size of the financial sector; however, a 
sectorally sensitive analysis would need to assess the relevance of sectors which depend 
on export credits and which are also affected by environmental policies for ECAs. 
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One way to consider industry’s structural power over ECA policy-making is the 
export relevance of firms affected by environmental standards. The more relevant ECA 
facilitated exports are for a national economy, the more policy-makers will consider 
losses in job creation or government revenue that could occur as trade-offs with 
environmental policies. The key point to analyzing this aspect is an appropriate 
assessment of a state’s vulnerability to environmental standards for ECAs as a proxy of 
likely responsiveness to structural industry power. 
ECAs’ business varies greatly from supporting small and medium sized 
enterprises seeking to enter an emerging market to assisting national industrial 
champions, to granting cover for arms and aircraft sales. Consequently, environmental 
standards may ultimately “hurt” domestic business more in some states than in others, 
depending on the respective ECAs’ portfolios. This in turn means that business’ 
structural power is more relevant for ECA policies in states where environmental policies 
would affect a large share of exports than in those polities where most exports would not 
be subject to environmental scrutiny. At the domestic level, this impacts the level of 
national standards. ECAs supporting primarily business not affected by environmental 
standards are more likely to implement such policies because they only affect an 
insignificant share of their business. ECAs that support primarily infrastructure projects 
subject to environmental standards are less likely to pursue such policies. 
On the discursive level ECA politics in many states seem to resemble a tripartite 
arrangement: the ECA and its environmental and corporate welfare critics (see Figure 
2.1). Environmental critics challenge ECAs on grounds of their sub-par environmental 
standards and policies and the resulting environmentally destructive projects. While 
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environmental critics seek to reform and turn ECAs “green,” they rarely question their 
continued existence, as reformed or “greened” ECAs are believed to be an important tool 
for spreading environmentally superior technologies and production processes. Corporate 
welfare critics, on the other hand, challenge the very existence of ECAs. They argue that 
the very existence of ECAs distorts markets, and that they should be abolished for this 
reason. Since ECA business tends to be heavily concentrated with a few large clients 
profiting disproportionally, these critics strongly emphasize that ECAs are no more than a 
tool to provide hidden subsidies to a small number of companies that know how to play 
the political game. ECAs respond to these charges by trying to diversify their business, 
particularly by offering SME programs or by reducing red tape for small projects. 
Domestically, the interplay between environmental critics, corporate welfare critics, and 
ECAs themselves is critical for the resulting level of environmental standards. In states 
where corporate welfare critics are strong, ECAs may seek the support of the 
environmental critics (who do not seek to abolish ECAs) and implement high 
environmental standards. In cases where ECAs respond to corporate welfare critics by 
implementing SME programs they may not need to address environmental issues as 
thoroughly. 
 


















Welfare Critics Abolishment of ECA? 
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This discussion of institutions and politics constitutes the core of my argument. 
Not only do the power dynamics discussed above determine to a great extent the level of 
environmental standards, but, at the same time they are also crucial to national 
negotiation strategies in ECA policy harmonization. They are important; however, they 
are not enough to constitute a complete explanation. Politics across levels matter. 
Domestic politics shape states’ positions in the OECD negotiations, while activities at the 
OECD level feed back into domestic politics.  
2.2.2 Regulatory harmonization 
My first concern was with environmental rule-making. Here, the relevant political 
actors interacted and shaped policy. The focus was on the power relationships through 
which these actors influence policy. The following second part of this theory section 
addresses the interplay between domestic politics and international harmonization of 
ECA policies. Here the focus is on institutional change as a consequence of 
harmonization and the involved costs and benefits. In rule-making, actors shape policies 
through the demands they direct at rule-makers. Rules, consequently, reflect the balance 
of power among these actors at the time of their creation. In harmonization, rule content 
is externally given and power relationships affect the acceptance or rejection of 
harmonization proposals. 
After a short introduction of harmonization as a political concern, the next section 
turns to market integration as a driver of harmonization and the two possible directions of 
harmonization: up or down. It is important to realize that most established accounts of 
regulatory harmonization cannot make predictions about ECA harmonization, because 
ECA coordination affects domestic regulations and meta-regulatory principles whereas 
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most analyses of harmonization are only concerned with product and process standards. 
These aspects are discussed in the second section on regulatory culture. 
Conflicts between trade and environmental concerns are becoming increasingly 
salient. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) (see e.g. Bernauer 2003; Isaac 2002; 
Toke 2004), hormones in beef (see e.g. Josling, Roberts, and Hassan 1999), leg-hold 
traps (see e.g. Princen 2002), and chemicals regulation (see e.g. Selin forthcoming) have 
all proven their potential to create transatlantic conflict. Common to these challenges are 
the effects of behind-the-border environmental standards on international trade. What is 
intended as a domestic measure of environmental or consumer protection can, at the same 
time, represent a non-tariff barrier to trade by excluding goods which do not meet the 
standards from market access. Much of the trade-environment literature focuses either on 
the relationship of multilateral environmental agreements and WTO rules (e.g. Eckersley 
2004), on the compatibility of national regulation with the WTO regime (e.g. Petersmann 
and Pollack 2003), or on the effects of standards in one polity on those in another (cf. 
Vogel 1995; 1997a; Busch and Jörgens 2004; Jacob et al. 2005). Less attention is being 
paid to the harmonization challenge on the national level in the international 
environmental politics literature, despite experiences with regulatory harmonization in 
the EU context (Héritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996; Knill and Lenschow 1998, 2000). 
Many of these regulatory conflicts over environmental issues are of a different 
nature than global environmental summitry: they occur within a realm governed by the 
WTO and are ultimately affected by WTO rules, dispute settlement procedures, and 
WTO-authorized trade sanctions. In addition to enforceable international law in the trade 
area, the removal of such regulatory differences requires harmonization of domestic 
52 
regulations, which can be more challenging than agreement to a lowest-common-
denominator international treaty with no or poor enforcement mechanisms. These 
conflicts are about different domestic approaches to regulating a certain issue area, and 
they require substantial concessions by the parties that need to change their domestic 
regulations as a result. As such, regulatory harmonization is a difficult task, because it 
questions existing domestic regulations that are not only a product of complex political 
bargaining processes, but which also reflect what is considered the proper and right way 
of regulating an issue area. As a result, many regulatory conflicts are allowed to simmer 
indefinitely as Mark Pollack observes (Pollack 2003: 71).  
Environmental standard-setting for export credit agencies, the subject matter of 
this dissertation is among the more under-researched of the regulatory harmonization 
challenges. It lies outside of the focus of much of the trade literature as these 
environmental standards cannot be applied in a protectionist manner. It is nevertheless an 
intriguing topic for study, as in this case, ambitious environmental standards do not help 
domestic firms by shielding the market from foreign importers, but rather, these standards 
work against domestic firms by impeding access to export support. Consequently, they 
provide an opportunity to assess the applicability of approaches developed to analyze 
standards with a protectionist potential to this non-protectionist class of environmental 
standards. 
In this context, regulation refers to the establishment and enforcement of rules 
governing a given policy domain. This includes governments governing through laws, 
but also includes rules which exist beyond state authority (Picciotto 2002). In this sense, 
regulation covers more activities than the rather popular regulatory governance literature 
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primarily concerned with deregulation and principal-agent problems in the context of 
public governance through independent regulatory agencies overseeing network and 
natural monopoly industries. 
2.2.2.1 Regulatory harmonization: racing up or down? 
Globalization is usually credited with being the driver of market integration and 
regulatory harmonization. Chase-Dunn et al. define it as “changes in the density of 
international and global interactions relative to local or national networks” and suggest 
that “[e]conomic globalization means greater integration in the organization of 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities in the world economy” 
(Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000: 78, their italics). The integration of national 
markets into a global one results, among other phenomena, in the convergence of rules 
governing national markets. This convergence of rules is driven by firms’ interests in 
producing identical products for various national markets. Similarly, governments may 
choose to harmonize their rules with those in other polities in order to facilitate access to 
foreign markets by domestic exporters. These dynamics not only challenge national rules 
put in place to address domestic concerns, but they also re-define the relationship 
between firms and the state. Susan Strange (1996) calls this the “Retreat of the State.” In 
Strange’s analysis, multinational firms become involved with states in interactions 
resembling traditional diplomacy among states. States no longer negotiate the shape of 
the world economy among themselves, but are joined by increasingly stronger private 
companies with considerable bargaining strength. Their bargaining strength is usually 
defined by their potential for shifting production from one state to the other; that is, by 
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the potential for influencing the economic well-being of the states they deal with 
(structural power). 
Such market integration arguments typically presume that firms are hindered by 
strict regulations, and that the removal of regulatory barriers will always result in 
economic gains. However, strict regulation can both aid and hinder domestic firms. Some 
rules can shield markets from foreign competitors and thus help domestic firms – 
something often called “protectionism.” Others impose additional costs on domestic 
firms and thus hurt them. Basic economic reason tells us that the former type should be 
difficult to remove, while we should expect a “race-to-the-bottom” among rules with 
respect to the latter type. However, races-to-the-bottom are rarely occurring as many 
empirical accounts show. Still, we do see convergence in many regulatory fields, just not 
on the lowest common denominator. Crucial questions are: when can we expect rules to 
converge? And in which direction is convergence likely? 
The race-to-the-bottom hypothesis suggests that states seek to attract mobile 
factors of production – capital and high-skilled labor – by relaxing rules and thus 
lowering costs of production. Competition among states then results in a downward spiral 
in levels of regulation. David Vogel calls this the “Delaware” effect (Vogel 1997b). 
Empirical evidence for this hypothesis is not clear. While it is generally accepted that 
labor regulations have an impact on firms’ investment decisions, the evidence for 
environmental rules is more ambiguous. David Vogel suggests that “in contrast to labor 
standards, the costs of complying with stricter consumer and environmental standards has 
not been sufficiently large to force political jurisdictions to lower their standards in order 
to keep domestic firms or plants competitive” (Vogel 1997b: 6). Similarly, Braithwaite 
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and Drahos find that “while ratcheting-up is more common than races-to-the-bottom in 
the regulation of safety and environment, the opposite is true of economic regulation” 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 5). 
Vogel goes on to suggest that stricter environmental and consumer regulation may 
in fact benefit domestic producers because compliance with such rules is easier for them 
than for their foreign competitors. He labels such races-to-the-top a “California Effect,” 
where states ratchet standards up in an attempt to support domestic firms. Once one state 
introduced strict rules, others may harmonize their own rules upward to retain market 
access. This is the core of the regulatory competition issue that is often not clearly spelled 
out: some rules inflict costs on domestic firms, and we should expect races-to-the-bottom 
in these instances; other rules, on the opposite, can shield domestic markets from foreign 
competitors, and we should expect upward harmonization. 
In his study of rules for trapping and data protection, Princen has documented 
processes where we would expect upward harmonization. He also showed in cases of 
genetically modified organisms and beef hormones that upward harmonization does not 
always occur, even if expanded market access provides clear incentives (Princen 2001, 
2002, 2004). 
While Princen’s analyses point to the relative costs of target country regulatory 
adjustment as a predictor for upward harmonization (Vogel and Kagan 2004b), Dale 
Murphy suggests in his study of cases prone to races-to-the-bottom that firms are often 
not as mobile as assumed: the more specific their assets, the less likely they are to exploit 
regulatory opportunities through re-location (Murphy 2004). Most of the literature deals 
with setting and harmonizing rules, but it does not address outcome. Neal Woods’ study 
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of strip-mining regulations in the United States (Woods 2006) reminds us that a race-to-
the-top with regard to standard-setting can be linked to a race-to-the-bottom in the 
implementation of the very same rules. Such a combination of races can be expected 
where downward harmonization of rules is not politically feasible (concerned 
constituency), but influential organized interests (industry) nevertheless requires 
leniency. 
Given the unclear empirical evidence for both upward and downward 
harmonization processes, and even the linkage of both types of races with regard to the 
same policy challenges, it is clear that it is not sufficient to study only the structure of 
competition in a regulatory domain, the type of rules, or the distribution of costs and 
benefits. I argue that we also need to look inside the states and consider the nature of 
rules. Convergence requires more than agreement on an abstract optimal level of 
regulation. It is not just about the purpose or goal of rules, but also about the means to 
achieve a regulatory goal. 
Besides the nature of the standards, we also need to consider the instruments used 
to achieve regulatory objectives. While objectives may not be controversial, the means to 
achieve them may differ considerably among states. Environmental standards for export 
credit agencies provide a good opportunity for studying the effects of regulatory 
instruments on the prospects for harmonization, since the arguments discussed thus far do 
not provide sufficient explanations for the course of their harmonization process. ECA 
environmental policies regulate access to government support for domestic exporters. 
Thus, strict rules hurt domestic exporters. We should expect a race to the bottom; 
however, the Common Approaches have provided for upward harmonization of 
57 
environmental policies among providers of officially supported export credits. Dale 
Murphy suggests that strong and concentrated industry will lobby against strict standards. 
Still, harmonization proceeded in an upward direction despite affecting national 
champion industries.  
2.2.2.2 Harmonization and regulatory culture 
Regulatory harmonization is occurring in all sectors of political activities which 
have an effect on trade or cross-border business activities. However, the range of these 
harmonization endeavors is broader than the well-documented area of product and 
production process standards. The difference between the two lies in that environmental 
standards for export promotion instruments being a far more complicated matter than the 
technical devices that save dolphins and turtles from being caught in fishing nets. Also, 
implementation of environmental standards and review procedures is much more 
involving than setting a standard for a certain product. While product standards can be 
implemented more or less uniformly across varying polities and then enforced by import 
restrictions, environmental requirements for access to government support require more 
coordination. Regulatory harmonization can occur on four levels of increasing 
complexity: 
• Harmonization of product standards: prescriptions for qualitative product 
characteristics pose considerable barriers to trade, but in most areas 
harmonization is mostly a technical matter 
• Harmonization of production processes: the question of how products are 
made is more challenging, but adaptation is possible provided the resulting 
increase in market size can compensate for the cost of adaptation 
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• Harmonization of domestic regulation: domestic rules which govern 
behavior in a given area are embedded in a broader institutional 
framework. Harmonizing these regulations can be a very challenging task 
when domestic institutional contexts suggest different fundamental 
approaches to the same regulatory task 
• Streamlining of meta-regulation: basic regulatory principles or 
philosophies that inform how states regulate a given issue area. I.e. how 
are rules and regulations created? What kind of instruments and policies 
are favored? Meta-regulatory disagreements are the most challenging 
harmonization task. 
While the first three levels of regulatory harmonization require little explanation, 
streamlining of meta-regulation does beg a more detailed explanation. Whenever 
governments set out to regulate a given issue area, certain regulatory instruments may 
appear as a “natural” tool for addressing that task. However, this selection of tools is not 
only driven by the regulatory task but also by the cultural and institutional context in 
which regulation is occurring. This means that instrument choices may differ among 
states. An instrument considered a perfect fit for the task at hand in one state may be 
considered an ill-advised choice elsewhere. However, when domestic regulations are 
harmonized beyond the establishment of goals and targets, regulatory instruments will 
inevitably be affected. Contemporary examples for such meta-regulatory tools and 
principles that have proven to be of a rather contentious nature include transparency in 
government and regulation, regulatory impact assessments (RIA), environmental policy 
integration (EPI), and the precautionary principle. All of these are considered ingredients 
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of “good” regulation by their proponents, while their opponents may view their spread as 
regulatory imperialism on behalf of their promoters. 
Radaelli discusses meta-regulation in the context of integrating European 
regulations in the “Better Regulation” paradigm. In his activist perspective, meta-
regulation is defined as “an experiment in politics in that its major aim is to change 
governance and institutional behaviour by altering the political opportunity structure” 
(Radaelli 2007: 11). My use of the concept departs from Radaelli’s approach and is more 
in line with Morgan’s original use: “The social logic of metaregulation is characterized as 
an instance of nonjudicial legality, situated at the intersection of two trends -- an 
increasing legalization of politics and a growing reliance on nonjudicial mechanisms of 
accountability. The political implications can be summed up as an 'economization' of 
regulatory politics” (Morgan 2003: 489). The difference in the usage of this term is that 
both Radaelli and Morgan are concerned with regulatory reform, that is, an expansion of 
the tool set available to regulators. Regulatory harmonization is a different process, but 
poses similar challenges in that regulatory tools may be imported from other polities that 
can be at odds with existing regulatory culture. In this sense, regulatory harmonization 
may provide a stimulus or external forcing event for regulatory reform. 
 Harmonization of ECA environmental policies involved the harmonization of 
domestic regulations as well as concessions on the meta-regulation level by continental 
European states that agreed to environmental assessment, transparency, and public 
consultation provisions which run counter to their established regulatory cultures. Thus, 
ECA harmonization took place at the two most complex levels of regulatory 
harmonization. 
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A key term that I have not defined thus far is regulatory culture. From the 
previous discussion, it should be clear that regulatory culture impacts – if not determines 
– regulatory instruments chosen to address given regulatory tasks. Just as culture in 
general contains shared understandings, norms and practices as well as prescriptions for 
standard patterns of behavior, regulatory culture generally prescribes accepted modes of 
devising and implementing regulations. On a material level, this includes the tools and 
instruments regulators choose to achieve a regulatory objective. However, regulatory 
culture entails more than instrument choice. In a constructivist perspective, Meidinger 
suggests that regulatory communities (including regulators, regulatees, and other 
stakeholders) are defined not only by the prevailing regulatory culture, but also 
themselves re-define regulatory culture.  
[Regulatory] traditions become as important in regulatory interactions as any other factors. 
Whether we call them settled expectations, policies, standard operating procedures, 
conventions or regulatory culture, they generally play a central role in organizing regulatory 
interactions. They may of course be changed in the course of these interactions, but they 
constitute the stuff of collective organization which must be changed if the pattern of 
regulation is to change. In this view, the pattern of collective action cannot effectively be 
changed without changing the developed culture of regulation (although one way of doing 
this is to systematically change the membership of the regulatory community, as by 
admitting or excluding certain types of participants). (Meidinger 1987: 372) 
The burden of much of the above argument is that critical aspects of regulation are in fact 
worked out in the daily interactions of regulatory communities. In these interactions 
structural constraints, political pressures, general cultural assumptions, legal requirements, 
and bureaucratic procedures are actually turned into a form of regulatory culture which 
organizes the activity of regulation. (Meidinger 1987: 373) 
Regulatory harmonization then requires agreement on potentially different 
normative visions of appropriate regulation (meta-regulation level) as well as over 
potentially incompatible institutional and legal frameworks (domestic regulation level) by 
two or more autonomous regulatory communities. At the same time, the harmonization 
task and the involvement of an external regulatory community can bring about the change 
in the pattern of collective action needed to make the adoption and implementation of 
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new rules possible. Regulatory harmonization then becomes externally induced 
regulatory reform (see also Woll and Artigas 2007). The problem is how to reach an 
agreement when this agreement requires us to rethink fundamental convictions of how 
something ought to be done. 
The second quote also makes clear that more than normative agreement is needed 
for successful regulatory harmonization. Regulatory cultures also include institutional 
aspects that may require changes and reform beyond the specific regulatory arena in 
order to make harmonization or reform within the arena possible. However, such changes 
require cooperation by actors beyond the regulatory community who may have no 
interest in making the necessary changes. After all, most policies and rules are the 
products of complex bargaining processes, the outcomes of which may be put into 
question if reforms were pursued. This suggests that harmonization initiatives are most 
promising when the proposed harmonized rules are compatible with the regulatory 
cultures of all involved parties. This, in turn, requires regulatory communities to 
understand not only their own regulatory culture but also that of the other affected 
communities to identify any potential overlap.  
Among such institutional differences are legal systems (common law, civil law), 
the role of the judiciary, as well as the nature of the regulator (state bureaucracy, 
regulatory agency, independent regulator). Ogus notes: “The functioning of the regulatory 
system may be strikingly different if, for example, State A has a panoply of process 
values incorporated into its general administrative law and enforced by an independent 
judiciary, whereas in State B the matter is simply one of bureaucratic diktat” (Ogus 2002: 
2, his italics). The cases in this study are almost perfect examples for these opposing 
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poles in regulatory system characteristics: U.S. regulation is rich on process, and the 
actual implementation of rules depends highly on their interpretation through an 
independent court system (substantial judicial review). German administration, on the 
other hand, still operates very much on the ethos of an independent professional 
bureaucracy as described by Weber more than 80 years ago (Weber 1977). This 
difference plays out not only in the way regulations are designed but also in the way rules 
are interpreted. The German Rechtsstaat operates on the principle that administrative 
actions must conform to formal legal rules. The role of administrative courts is then to 
scrutinize compliance with these rules. U.S. courts, on the contrary, also evaluate the 
appropriateness of rules. (Ogus 2002: 5-6) As a consequence, U.S. rule-makers have an 
incentive to provide much more detailed procedural details that leave less room for 
interpretation by the courts.  
The difference in legal systems not only has an effect on the nature of rules, but 
also on their end-effects. Identical rules could have very different effects on either side of 
the Atlantic. Litigation costs are substantially higher in the United States than in Europe, 
and litigation culture differs, too. Shaffer (2000) notes:  
Individuals are more likely to bring suit against companies in the United States, the costs of 
litigation (and particularly of discovery) are substantially steeper in the United States, and 
damage awards are larger, increasing average settlement costs. In addition, activist groups 
will more likely challenge agencies before courts in the United States for failing to 
stringently apply regulations. In contrast, in continental Europe, non-governmental groups 
play only a limited role in challenging governmental and corporate actions before courts and 
regulatory bodies.  
Thus we need to consider the legal system not only from an administrative 
perspective (which rule will withstand litigation?) but also from a political point of view, 
since the likelihood of costly adversarial litigation can have an impact on business 
support or opposition to a rule and thus impact political costs. 
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2.2.2.3 Conclusion 
The preceding sections have dealt with the costs of changing existing rules 
without providing a clear conceptualization of the involved costs and benefits. Cost and 
benefits of harmonization arise in the economic, political, and regulatory realms. 
Economic costs are borne by firms. They include opportunity cost stemming from strict 
national rules and adaptation costs when harmonized rules require changes in business 
and production processes. Political costs affect policy-makers when they need to consider 
the popularity of harmonized rules among their constituency. This is where business’ 
structural power enters regulatory harmonization, because acting against business 
interests can result in political costs. Regulatory costs, finally, are the costs that 
bureaucrats and policy-makers face in changing rules and procedures. This includes 
challenges to established power balances as a consequence of harmonization. 
Benefits from harmonization are closely related. Economic benefits include 
reduced transaction costs as a consequence of level playing fields. Political benefits 
derive from the satisfaction of domestic constituents favoring harmonization, the 
avoidance of international disputes over the issue, and the exertion of influence on the 
international stage. Regulatory benefits are mostly limited to those parties who could 
maintain their pre-existing rules without change by diffusing their own rules. But all 
involved parties benefit from more clarity about and easier monitoring of competing 
states’ rules.  
The regulatory harmonization part of this theoretical framework has established 
the importance of the compatibility of harmonization proposals with regulatory cultures 
to minimize adaptation costs. This can serve as a predictor for successful harmonization. 
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The next part ties the rule-making and harmonization aspects together in a coherent 
formal model that allows for considering both regulatory reform and regulatory 
harmonization using the same cost-benefit analysis approach. 
2.2.3 Politics across levels 
This third part of my theoretical discussion ties together the previous parts on 
rule-making and regulatory harmonization using the same cost-benefit analysis approach 
for both aspects. After discussing and expanding a model developed by Daniel Drezner 
(2005), the second section advances a hypothesis for ECA harmonization derived from 
the regulatory cost aspects of this model. 
Table 2.3 Coordination game (based on Drezner 2005: 845) 
  State B 






Coordinate at A 
(p, p-c) 
No coordination 
(0, 0) State A 




Coordinate at B 
(p-c, p) 
p = benefits from regulatory coordination 
c = adjustment cost of switching standards 
Drezner provides a fairly sophisticated account of regulatory harmonization. His 
argument is based on a cost-benefit analysis, which includes political and regulatory cost 
considerations. Aiming to explain harmonization of product standards, he argues that 
market power is crucial in explaining harmonization. While the market power argument 
is irrelevant to ECA politics, he augments his analysis with a consideration of domestic 
costs that is very relevant to my analysis. Drezner’s study is concerned with 
harmonization among the great powers (EU and United States), since disagreements 
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among these polities are the only harmonization conflicts that cannot be settled by either 
power’s unilateral exertion of market power (Drezner 2005). 
In its simples form, Drezner’s coordination game is based on pay-offs that are 
defined by costs and benefits of harmonization. The balance between costs and benefits 
of harmonization decides a country’s strategy. If the benefits are greater than the costs (p 
> c), then a government may choose to switch to the other county’s standards. If costs 
exceed benefits (p < c) than the only equilibrium outcomes are no coordination or 
coordination at one’s own standards. The most costly (and also unrealistic) outcome is 
mutual switching of standards. In this basic form, the coordination game does not pose a 
challenge to IR theorizing. However, when considering cost and benefits more closely the 
importance of domestic politics becomes very apparent. 
As discussed above, cost and benefits fall into economic, political, and regulatory 
categories. Of these, regulatory benefits can be omitted since the best possible 
harmonization solution is coordination at one’s own regulatory standards, that is, the 
absence of adaptation costs. Thus, the first extension of the model must be the 
consideration of these:  
p = ƒ (peconomic, ppolitical)  
And  
c = ƒ (ceconomic, cpolitical, cregulatory)  
Economic costs and benefits include opportunity and adaptation costs as well as 
reduced transaction costs on the benefits side. However, these will not be specified 
further since they are beyond the scope of this analysis. Furthermore, economic costs and 
benefits only become relevant for political decisions, when they are brought into political 
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process by firms. In this sense, economic costs and benefits become components of 
political costs and benefits. 
Political cost and benefits are much more central to this analysis. They include 
domestic political costs and benefits (i.e. the popularity of harmonized rules among 
policy-makers’ constituents) and international benefits of avoiding international disputes 
over regulatory disparities and exerting international influence:  
ppolitical = ppol-domestic + ppol-international  
And 
cpolitical = cpol-domestic + cpol-international  
The domestic costs and benefits are functions of the power positions held by the 
competing constituencies:  
ppol-domestic = ƒ (powerindustry, powerNGOs)  
And  
cpol-domestic = ƒ (powerindustry, powerNGOs)  
This in turns demands differentiation of the different types of power exerted, 
including instrumental, structural, and discursive power:  
powerindustry = powerind-instrumental + powerind-structural + powerind-discursive  
And  
powerNGOs = powerNGOs-instrumental + powerNGOs-structural + powerNGOs-discursive 
 Furthermore, economic costs and benefits are brought into the political process 
through industry power. Especially, industry’s structural power is derived from a 
combination of the industry’s relevance for exports and the costs/benefits to industry 
resulting from new rules:  
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powerindustry = ƒ ((peconomic - ceconomic), (powerind-instrumental + powerind-structural + powerind-
discursive))  
International political costs and benefits which states derive from the absence of 
regulatory conflict or the gratification of having been involved in the creation of new 
international standards are not further specified here since they can be assumed to be 
small compared to the domestic political costs and benefits. Summing up, political costs 
and benefits involve complex calculations based on the relative power of competing 
constituencies. Substitution yields these models:  
ppolitical = ƒ (((peconomic - ceconomic), (powerind-instrumental + powerind-structural + powerind-discursive)), 
(powerNGOs-instrumental + powerNGOs-structural + powerNGOs-discursive)) + ppol-international  
And  
cpolitical = ƒ (((peconomic - ceconomic), (powerind-instrumental + powerind-structural + powerind-discursive)), 
(powerNGOs-instrumental + powerNGOs-structural + powerNGOs-discursive)) + cpol-international 
Regulatory costs are most directly related to Drezner’s adaptation costs. These 
include the bureaucratic costs of changing existing rules and procedures. Since Drezner’s 
analysis was concerned with the harmonization of product standards as the simplest of 
the four harmonization challenges introduced earlier, he could specify the adaptation 
costs relatively easily as a function of the difference between the stringency of State A’s 
and B’s rules:  
cregulatory = ƒ (a - b) 
However, if we move beyond product standards to also include harmonization of 
process standards, regulation, and meta-regulation, this function becomes multi-
dimensional to account for differences in all four dimensions. Furthermore, the different 
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levels of harmonization also contribute to differing extents to adaptation costs; meta-
regulatory change is much more costly than adaptation in the product standard 
dimension. Given the complexity of this aspect, it shall suffice for now to define 
regulatory costs as a function of the differences in rules without specifying the exact 
relationship:  
cregulatory = ƒ (a, b).  
Putting together all these components yields fairly complicated models:  
p = ƒ (((peconomic - ceconomic), (powerind-instrumental + powerind-structural + powerind-discursive)), 
(powerNGOs-instrumental + powerNGOs-structural + powerNGOs-discursive)) + ppol-international  
And  
c = ƒ (((peconomic - ceconomic), (powerind-instrumental + powerind-structural + powerind-discursive)), 
(powerNGOs-instrumental + powerNGOs-structural + powerNGOs-discursive)) + cpol-international + ƒ (a, b) 
One important insight these models yield is that neither costs nor benefits can be 
assumed to be static. Since both of these are functions of domestic power relationships, 
domestic politics matter and shifts in domestic politics can change the payoffs in the 
international coordination game.  
Remembering that the benefits of harmonization must outweigh the costs of 
adaptation (p > c) for a state to consider switching standards, we can also see that 
changes in the terms of the harmonization proposal can change the cost-benefit analysis. 
Slightly changing the harmonization proposal in one or more dimensions (from a to a’), 
may decrease the adaptation costs for B (and thus also increase overall benefits to B). 
However, change is limited by A’s cost and benefits since its cost will rise and its 
benefits will decline. Compromise over previously irreconcilable positions becomes 
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possible if the required change in the harmonization proposal changes the costs-benefit 
analysis for B without upsetting A’s incentive for harmonization:  
 ƒA (a’, b) - ƒA (a, b) < pA,political – cA,political 
And 
pB,political – cB,political - ƒB (a’, b) > 0 
While it is difficult to attach numbers to all these factors, it should be clear that 
both domestic politics and the terms of the harmonization proposal are important in 
influencing the likelihood of an agreement on harmonized rules. Another concern that is 
not clearly evident from this formal discussion is linkage across levels. While the impact 
of changing domestic politics is captured in the political cost and benefit functions, 
ongoing harmonization negotiations also impact domestic politics and may also modify 
domestic power relationships. The success of harmonization negotiations can thus be 
impacted by changing either costs or benefits of agreement or non-agreement. Such 
changes can come about in either the domestic political spheres or by modifying the 
harmonization proposal.  
The above model was developed for regulatory harmonization, but it can easily be 
adopted for one actor’s regulatory reform. Moving from the old set of rules a to a new set 
a’ entails cost-benefit considerations just like making decisions about harmonization. 
Regulatory reform is only likely when the benefits of the new rules are net positive. That 
is, political benefits from the new rules must outweigh political and regulatory costs: 
ppolitical – cpolitical - ƒ (a, a’) > 0. 
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2.2.3.1 Applying cost-benefit analysis to ECAs 
One key aspect in determining regulatory adaptation costs is the business model 
of ECAs which differs from state to state. While all ECAs support domestic exporters by 
facilitating access to finance, they can do this in a number of different ways. Here, a very 
crude distinction between two ideal types of ECAs shall suffice (in reality hardly any two 
ECAs are alike): ECAs may operate as either banks or as insurers. An agency like the 
U.S. Export-Import Bank needs to examine a project before granting credit, because the 
project details will determine its viability, associated risks, and the terms under which the 
ECA will grant credit. An insurer like the German Hermes Kreditversicherung can set 
certain requirements and only needs to confirm that requirements have been met when a 
client wants to collect the insurance premium. Here we observe the fundamental 
differences between finance and insurance business, and their respective evaluation 
processes. While banks need to conduct most project assessment ex-ante, insurers require 
relatively little information before underwriting a policy. However, insurers will screen 
an insurance claim very thoroughly ex-post. Naturally, environmental screening for ECA-
supported projects occurs ex-ante and thus does not pose a major obstacle to bank-type 
ECAs that conduct intensive ex-ante project screening in any case; insurance-type ECAs, 
on the other hand, would need to adopt a different approach to project evaluation. 
Furthermore, clients of insurance-type ECAs would have their projects screened twice - 
once by the finance provider and once by the ECA – whereas their competitors may have 
had their projects evaluated only once by a bank-type ECA. Thus, ECAs acting only as 
insurers are confronted with higher regulatory costs in comparison to bank-type ECAs 
when implementing environmental project screening.  
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Note that these preferences are all consequences of domestic politics that cannot 
be assumed identical across states. A purely international analysis is not possible. 
2.3 Research Design and Methodology 
My analysis builds on data gathered through analysis of public documents, 
statements, press articles, and – most importantly – elite interviews. Between December 
2003 and August 2004 I conducted 27 interviews with experts on export credits on both 
sides of the Atlantic. All formal interviews were conducted for background information 
only. Participation in conferences on environmental standards for ECAs in London, 
Berlin, and Brussels between October 2003 and May 2006 enabled me to follow policy 
development closely in discussions with the ECA policy community. Beyond these 
formal encounters I also exchanged views with many academics and practitioners 
working on international finance and the environment. With this data I traced the policy-
making process in Germany and the United States and isolated relevant factors that 
influenced the policy process at critical junctures. Contrasting ECA politics with 
environmental reform at the World Bank and private banks, puts the environmental NGO 
campaigns into a broader comparative context. 
Starting from a scientific-realist logic of causal inference (Schwartz 2003) this 
analysis focuses on processes that allow to a researcher to infer causality rather than just 
observe co-variations. Margaret Levi and Robert Bates (Bates 1998; Levi 1997) have 
developed the concept of analytic narratives to structure such inquiries, and Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennett (Bennett and George 1997; George and McKeown 1985; 
George and Bennett forthcoming) encourage the use of process tracing in case study 
research. Both of these approaches focus on processes and mechanisms (Tilly 2001). 
72 
Methodologically, this dissertation takes the approach of a theoretically informed 
narrative: the focus is more on interpretation and explanation than on theory evaluation. 
Still, this dissertation tests explanations from other harmonization challenges on a case 
with unusual properties (standards which hurt domestic firms).  
Theoretically, it speaks mainly to the literature on domestic sources of foreign 
policy (e.g. DeSombre 2000, 2005), environmental standards (e.g. Vogel 1997a, 1986, 
1995), regulatory harmonization (e.g. Esty and Geradin 2001; Mattli and Büthe 2003; 
Knodt and Princen 2003; Brandhauer, Curti, and Miller 2005), and writing on regulatory 
politics in the EU (e,g, Elgström and Jönsson 2005; Mastenbroek and Keulen 2004; Oates 
1998) which is applied to OECD harmonization here. 
Following van Evera’s (1997: 89-95) typology of political science dissertations, 
this project is a hybrid of the theory testing and historical explanatory types. He states 
that historical explanatory dissertations are not highly regarded but suggests that “this 
bias is misguided. …. [W]ithout explanatory historical work history is never explained” 
(Van Evera 1997: 92-3). This is especially true for a topic like environmental export 
credit politics which, until now, lacked both comprehensive description and analysis.  
2.4 Conclusion 
The discussion of costs and benefits has established the core categories for 
comparison that will be used throughout this dissertation: power and rule content. These 
categories are relevant for both domestic standard-setting and international 
harmonization. Different power positions of industry and NGO actors affect the political 
costs of regulatory reform and harmonization. Institutions which channel, enable, or 
constrain power are important in estimating an actor’s effective power. While power and 
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institutions mostly affect political costs, regulatory costs are largely a product of rule 
content. High adaptation costs can make regulatory reform unlikely even if it comes with 
political benefits. At the same time, the absence of regulatory costs does not make reform 
likely if there are no political benefits to be had. However, economic costs and benefits 
(which are in turn part of political costs and benefits) also depend on rule content. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that a change in rules would not affect political costs and 
benefits. The question is: into which direction and to what extent? If costs and benefits 
from rule change are not net positive, nothing will change. There is clear bias towards 
maintaining the status quo.  
For the consideration of overall costs and benefits, political costs and benefits and 
rule content are all independent variables. Rule content, however, is the only factor of 
these over which rule-makers have close control. When designing rules, rule-makers 
react to perceived political costs and benefits. This means that rule content, in fact, 
depends on likely political costs and benefits. In another words: rules reflect the interests 
of the powerful. 
This chapter first showed the lack of analytical literature dealing with ECAs and 
environmental standard setting. It then continued to develop a theoretical framework for 
such analyses. This framework consisted of two components; one dealing with 
environmental rule-making and the other with regulatory harmonization. As the 
references between these parts indicated, neither component can be assessed without 
considering developments in the other dimensions. The final section on cost-benefit 
analysis brought both aspects together in a formal model of regulatory harmonization that 
considers political costs and benefits that arise in environmental rule-making as well as 
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regulatory costs that result from harmonization. With these considerations in mind, this 
dissertation now proceeds to analyzing the greening of international finance as the first 
trend under consideration before turning to regulatory harmonization as the second force 
behind common environmental policies for ECAs. 
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Chapter 3: Spread of Environmental Policies for International 
Finance 
This and the following chapter address the proliferation of environmental policies 
among international finance as the first trend affecting environmental standard setting 
among ECAs. The second trend towards regulatory harmonization is the subject of 
chapters five and six. This chapter provides a historical account of environmental policy 
development among ECAs, the World Bank, and private banks and compares these 
policies with regard to their creation and substance. The next chapter then analyzes the 
obstacles to standard setting that affected ECAs but did not affect rule making among the 
other international finance institutions which both responded to environmental critiques 
with the creation of environmental policies much faster than ECAs did.  
The World Bank and private banks are covered as important benchmarks for 
evaluating ECA politics. These institutions financed similar projects, encountered similar 
environmental problems in their operations, and were subject to very similar NGO 
campaigns. Still, environmental policy development occurred in different trajectories and 
at different speeds. The next chapter will explore how different power relationships 
among the involved regulatory communities have led to the different modes of 
environmental policy development discussed here. Given the similarity in project 
portfolios and public demands for change, why were some ECAs slower than others, and 
all of them so much slower to respond to the environmental challenge than the World 
Bank and even private banks? This is the guiding question for this first set of empirical 
chapters. 
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Environmental standards for export credit agencies did not evolve in a political 
vacuum. They are the result of a broader NGO campaign advocating the “greening” of 
international financial institutions. Over the last two decades, we have witnessed the 
proliferation of environmental policies among providers of international finance. Under 
the pressure of an international NGO campaign, with the support of the U.S. government, 
the World Bank Group and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) adopted 
environmental rules for their operations. A second wave of NGO activity then forced 
private banks to adopt a comparable set of policies known as the Equator Principles, to 
which their large-scale project finance business is subject. Export credit agencies had 
been the target of environmental NGO activity since the early 1970s but they did not 
adopt environmental policies until the late 1990s. ECAs responded to similar challenges 
much slower than the World Bank or even private banks. The overall result has been a 
proliferation of related policies (rooted in the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act’s 
environmental review logic) among many providers of international project finance. This 
has developed out of widespread concern about the past environmental performance of 
such projects. 
3.1 U.S. NGO Campaigns and the Greening of International Finance 
Export credit agencies, multilateral development banks, and Equator Principle 
financial institutions (EPFIs) now all follow substantially similar guidelines when 
evaluating environmental impacts of projects which they consider financing. This 
overarching international financial regime regulating environmental review of projects 
and providing performance standards for supportable projects is a rather recent 
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phenomenon. It took ECAs much longer than the World Bank or even private banks to 
arrive at this point. 
Much of the large-scale infrastructure development of the 1960s and 1970s not 
only promoted economic development, but also resulted in unintended environmental 
problems. The World Bank became the first international target of a coalition of activists 
in the early 1980s who criticized the Bank for environmental problems and unjust 
resettlement policies that were the consequence of Bank-sponsored colonization projects 
in Brazil and dam projects in India. The Polonoroeste and Narmada dam projects 
showcased the need for the consideration of environmental and social consequences up 
front. The Bank started to react to NGO concerns once the activists managed to exert 
considerable influence through the U.S. Congress so that the U.S. government threatened 
to withhold funding for the World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA). The 
combined pressure of NGOs and the U.S. government resulted in slow and step-wise 
development of World Bank environmental policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Today, the World Bank policies are considered strong and serve as the international 
benchmark for other organizations’ environmental rules. The World Commission on 
Dams (WCD) and the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) are recent World Bank 
initiatives that have defined internationally acceptable practices in dam and mining 
development (Gutner 2002; Horta 1996; Rich 1994; Wade 1997). 
A second target of the same coalition of NGOs that pressured the World Bank to 
develop its environmental rules were private banks. Using name-and-shame tactics, 
NGOs branded banks active in international project finance as environmentally 
irresponsible because they made loan decisions without having rules in place to consider 
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the environmental impacts of projects financed by them. In this regard, the private bank 
campaign was similar to the World Bank and ECA campaigns. However, this campaign 
was not aimed at governments but rather at consumers at customers of these banks. 
Banks responded to this challenge to their brand name reputation fairly swiftly by 
adopting the Equator Principles (EPs) as a private sector version of World Bank policies. 
The EPs apply to the project finance business of those banks that have adopted this 
voluntary industry code. 
Export credit agencies had been subject to NGO pressure since the early 1970. 
These are public or semi-public national agencies which serve as lenders or insurers of 
last resort to support exports by domestic firms into high-risk markets. Prominent ECAs 
include the United States Export-Import Bank, the British Export Credit Guarantee 
Department (ECGD), French Coface, and the German Hermes guarantees. While their 
operations include everything from short-term buyer credit for export of goods to support 
for exports of ships and aircraft to cover for infrastructure development, the discussion 
here is concerned with their long-term business which includes the very same types of 
projects the World Bank got in trouble for earlier: dams, pipelines, mining, pulp-and-
paper plants among other types of large infrastructure projects.  
Components are often sought from producers headquartered in many different 
countries. Exporters supplying components to such projects seek support from their 
domestic ECA. ECAs cover the political and commercial risks involved in the export 
transactions, and thus provide insurance against non-payment by the project developer – 
a key requirement for exporters so that they can seek financing from banks. Some ECAs 
also operate as banks and provide both cover and financing. Financing is needed to cover 
79 
the period between delivery and payment of the supplied project components. This cover 
becomes especially important in project finance arrangements when payment may only 
occur years later once the project has become operational and generates revenue (for 
ECA politics in general see: Evans 2005; Walzenbach 1999). The following section 
provides on overview of the NGO campaigns targeted at the World Bank, ECAs, and 
private banks. 
3.1.1 The 1970s: Advocacy groups target domestic U.S. institutions in lawsuits 
seeking to extend NEPA to U.S. actions beyond its borders 
After the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969, 
which established environmental review procedures for federal U.S. government 
agencies, advocacy groups engaged in a protracted battle over the applicability of NEPA 
to U.S. government actions with effects beyond U.S. borders. NEPA itself was not clear 
as to whether it applied only to domestic activities, or whether it also covered activities 
by the U.S. government beyond its borders (Sierra Club v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission 1974; Environmental Defense Fund v. U.S. AID 1976; Sierra Club v. 
Coleman 1976; NRDC v. Ex-Im 1979; NRDC v. NRC 1981). Most internationally active 
government agencies preferred a narrow interpretation of NEPA, while environmental 
activist groups demanded that these “internationally active agencies” perform the same 
environmental reviews of their activities as were required of domestic agencies. 
Litigation ebbed off when President Carter issued an Executive Order in 1979 that sought 
to clarify and limit the reach of NEPA (The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's 
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Environmental Impact Statement Requirement 1975; Renewed Controversy 1977; 
Forthcoming CEQ Regulations 1978; Peirce 1979; Allegra 1980; Pincus 1981).6 
Environmental advocacy groups sued a number of government agencies not 
conducting environmental reviews as postulated by NEPA for their external activities. 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its pesticide program was 
one of the first targets (Environmental Defense Fund v. U.S. AID 1976). The lawsuit 
resulted in the creation of environmental policies for USAID based on the procedures 
established in NEPA. Later, these policies were to become the template for the World 
Bank (IBRD) environmental guidelines which in turn served as the model for the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), export credit agencies, and private bank Equator 
Principles.  
Two lawsuits were targeted at Ex-Im: in Sierra Club v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission, the court ruled that the Commission needed to conduct an Environmental 
Impact Statement for its nuclear power export process, but that Ex-Im would not need to 
conduct environmental reviews of projects themselves as this would result in a 
duplication of efforts (Sierra Club v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 1974). In 
response, the NRDC sued Ex-Im in January 1977 to establish environmental review 
procedures under NEPA. This second suit was pending at the time of Ex-Im’s 1979 
reauthorization, and the NRDC later agreed to settle once Ex-Im introduced its first 
environmental review process in 1979 (Peirce 1979).  
                                               
6 Currently, a lawsuit brought forth against Ex-Im by a coalition of NGOs is pending in which the plaintiffs 
argue that through their impact on the global climate all fossil fuel projects facilitated by Ex-Im affect the 
U.S. territory and therefore ought to be subject to a full environmental review conforming with NEPA. 
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Congressional action on environmental rules for Ex-Im was prompted by a 
controversial September 1976 memo to Heads of Agencies on Applying the EIS 
Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad from the President’s Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) (42 Fed. Reg. 61068-69). This memo sought to clarify the 
applicability of NEPA to international federal actions, rather than solving the uncertainty 
created by unclear language in NEPA and the pending lawsuits, it sparked an inter-
agency dispute over the applicability of NEPA to actions beyond U.S. borders. CEQ draft 
regulation dating from January 1978 further intensified controversy among federal 
agencies and Congress (for agency comments on the CEQ draft see: United States 
Congress 1978b: 86-127).  
The Senate bill for Ex-Im’s 1979 reauthorization contained an amendment 
proposed by Senator Adlai Stevenson III that would have exempted Ex-Im from its 
obligations under NEPA, with the exception of environmental effects within the United 
States (United States Senate 1978; United States Congress 1978b; Peirce 1979). Both Ex-
Im chairman Moore and C. Fred Bergsten as the responsible Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for International Affairs were critical of this initiative (United States Congress 
1978a: 126-7), and in the end, the amendment was not signed into law. 
The uncertainty around the external applicability of NEPA continued until 
President Carter set guidelines for the applicability of NEPA to federal agencies by 
Executive Order No. 12114 in 1979 (for a recent review see: Schiffer 2004; for the legal 
discussion preceding the Executive Order see: Renewed Controversy 1977). However, 
even Carter’s EO did not succeed in resolving conflicts surrounding the applicability of 
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NEPA until implementation guidelines were issued by the CEQ under environmental 
champion and NRDC founder Gus Speth.7 
Following this order, Ex-Im only had to subject its nuclear business and any other 
projects that would have an environmental impact on U.S. territory to the stringent 
review under NEPA. For its remaining business, Ex-Im established the “Concise 
Environmental Reviews” stipulated in the Executive Order, which amounted to little 
more than a “boiler plate form added to project documents” (Evans 2000). Peirce argues 
that “this pervasive emphasis on administrative discretion is the executive order’s most 
significant departure from the position taken by the draft regulations” (Peirce 1979: 266). 
The review process remained largely unchallenged until the 1992 reauthorization.  
3.1.2 The 1980s: NGO campaign targeted at the World Bank results in World 
Bank environmental policies 
Indigenous rights groups had been criticizing the World Bank for the effects of its 
projects on tribal people since the 1970s. However, their protests resulted in no tangible 
political response until early 1983, when a group of Washington-based activists started 
planning a campaign aimed at “greening” an influential international organization. 
Activists chose to target their campaign at the World Bank for strategic reasons: (i) the 
Bank was well-known; (ii) they could use Congressional appropriations for Bank funding 
as an effective lever; and (iii) the Bank was conveniently located in Washington (Rich 
1994). Their campaign strategy was to highlight instances of poor environmental 
performance in highly visible Bank-funded projects, and to use these in lobbying for 
                                               
7 Interestingly, Gus Speth was also NRDC plaintiff in a number of these lawsuits and later founded the 
World Resources Institute (WRI) which still plays a key role in the NGO campaign to green international 
financial institutions. 
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environmental policy improvements at the Bank. The first project chosen was 
Polonoroeste, a colonization project in the Brazilian Amazon region. This project 
entailed a combination of poor environmental planning and considerable negative impact 
on the livelihoods of tribal peoples. Thus, it was to be advantageous to generate public 
outrage over the Bank’s activities. Towards the late 1980s, the NGO campaign also 
featured the Narmada dam project in India, which involved a similar combination of 
environmental impacts and forced resettlement. Activists used this project to follow up 
on Bank commitments made in response to the Polonoroeste campaign that did not 
appear to have a considerable effect on Bank operations (Gutner 2005b, 2005a; Nielson 
and Tierney 2003, 2005; Rich 1994). 
From 1983 to 1987, NGOs managed to put the Bank’s environmental record on 
the U.S. Congressional agenda in some 20 hearings, and this resulted in support for the 
campaign from both a number of influential Congressional committee chairs, and from 
the U.S. Treasury. Congress threatened to cut or withhold World Bank funding a number 
of times, should the Bank fail to respond to U.S. demands for environmental policy 
reforms, and ultimately did withhold funding, when the Bank did not cooperate to the 
extent deemed acceptable. By the end of the 1980s, U.S. pressure had resulted in the 
establishment of a central environment department, the creation of environmental 
divisions within the Bank’s regional departments, and the adoption of environmental 
assessment procedures (Bøås 2001; Park 2005b). 
In 1989, the Pelosi amendment institutionalized U.S. environmental policy 
regarding MDBs. The Pelosi amendment required that from 1991 on, U.S. Executive 
Directors (EDs) in MDBs could vote in favor of projects only if (i) their preparation 
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included sufficient environmental assessments, and if (ii) these assessments had been 
available to the EDs, U.S. federal agencies and the interested public for at least 120 days 
before a decision was to be made. Prior to the amendments, consultation periods varied 
among MDBs, but were generally shorter than 120 days. The Pelosi amendment 
effectively uploaded the NEPA consultation period requirement up to the international 
level, only six years after NGOs had started to target the World Bank (Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Park 2005b; see also Bøås 2001). 
In addition to environmental assessment procedures which reflect NEPA 
provisions, World Bank rules also contain substantial decision criteria that go beyond a 
simple uploading of NEPA to the Bank. The environmental policies of the IBRD consist 
of a number of general and sector-specific policies contained in its operations manual. 
The Bank also developed the Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook (PPAH), 
which provides both quantitative and qualitative information regarding acceptable 
pollution levels as well as mitigation strategies. Following U.S. pressure, environmental 
rules and procedures were designed to include broad transparency provisions and 
opportunity for public comment on projects and policy development. In the 1990s, 
continued NGO and U.S. government pressure increased the transparency of World Bank 
environmental assessments and led to the establishment of an independent inspection 
panel to examine complaints regarding the Bank’s operations. The inspection panel acts 
on requests from the public, and investigates whether approved projects conform to the 
Bank’s policies (Fox and Brown 1998; Clark, Fox, and Treakle 2003). 
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3.1.3 The late 1990s: NGOs rally around common environmental rules for ECAs 
At the initiative of Senator Timothy Wirth (D-Colorado), Section 105 
“Environmental Policy” was inserted into the Senate version of the 1992 reauthorization 
bill for Ex-Im in order to provide “a permanent statutory authority for environmental 
policies and procedures currently being carried out by the Bank” (United States Senate 
1992). The House version did not contain any such environmental provisions. The 
environmental provisions ultimately survived the conference committee unchanged and 
appeared as Section 106 in public law 102-429, and were signed by President H. W. Bush 
on 21 October 1992. The reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank contained among 
other provisions a section establishing environmental requirements for Ex-Im: 
Directs the Bank, for any transaction involving a project for which support of $10,000,000 or 
more is requested and certain environmental concerns exist, to establish procedures to take 
into account the potential benefits and adverse environmental effects of the goods and 
services which it may support under its lending and guarantee programs. Authorizes the 
Board to withhold financing for environmental reasons or to approve financing after 
considering the potential environmental effects of a project. Encourages the Bank to use its 
programs to support the export of goods and services that have beneficial effects on the 
environment or mitigate potential adverse environmental effects. (United States Congress 
1992b) 
Prior to the 1992 reauthorization, however, Ex-Im had no authority to withhold 
financing out of environmental reasons. The 1992 standards requirement also moved the 
question regarding the applicability of NEPA to Ex-Im operations off the political agenda 
by establishing the basis for an in-house environmental review process (personal 
communication with Peter C. Evans, 26 June 2004). 
The Congressional mandate came as a result of a more than 20-year-long quarrel 
over the applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to activities 
outside of U.S. borders. In retrospect, the Wirth amendment did much more than 
providing “a permanent statutory authority” for what Ex-Im was already doing: it resulted 
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in the development of the first set of comprehensive environmental review procedures 
and standards for project evaluation for an export credit agency anywhere. 
Ex-Im policies were implemented in 1995 and required projects to be screened for 
their potential environmental impact. More detailed assessments are required for those 
projects likely to have a significant environmental impact. Summaries of the completed 
assessments are then made available for public comment by Ex-Im. In addition to 
establishing this review procedure and the associated transparency provisions, Ex-Im 
policies also establish qualitative and quantitative criteria for project evaluation. Projects 
failing to meet these environmental requirements can be denied Ex-Im support if they are 
not brought into compliance. 
The imposition of environmental requirements set a precedent for other export 
credit agencies. Ex-Im’s environmental policies were the first comprehensive set of 
national environmental standards for an export credit agency (ECA) anywhere. This 
unilateral step resulted in disadvantages for U.S. exporters seeking Ex-Im support, whose 
exports had to comply with Ex-Im’s environmental policies. Foreign competitors, on the 
other hand, could gain ECA support without those projects having to adhere to 
environmental standards. 
3.1.4 2000 on: NGOs target private financial institutions 
The shift of NGO attention from MDBs to private banks has been part of a 
deliberate strategy. The protagonists of the IBRD campaign, including Bruce Rich of 
Environmental Defense, also became leading figures in the international ECA campaign 
of the 1990s. The NGO community started brainstorming about the next targets for their 
financial institutions campaign in the late 1990s. A historical overview by the BankTrack 
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network (BankTrack 2005) mentions 1996 as the year the private financial institutions 
campaign was born. This was when NGOs started their Quantum Leap project to make 
campaigners financially literate by the following year. A number of reports and papers 
from that time showcase the reasoning behind the targets and campaign strategies later 
chosen. Investing in the Future: Harnessing Private Capital Flows for Environmentally 
Sustainable Development (French 1998) by the World Watch Institute and Go with the 
Flows? (Seymour 1998) by the World Resources Institute, as well as an activists guide 
(Ganzi and World Resources Institute 1998) prepared the community for targeting private 
banks. 
In addition to this expansion of the international financial institutions (IFI) 
campaign, the Rain Forest Action Network (RAN) started targeting Citigroup for its 
financing of environmentally controversial politics. While the IFI campaign relied on 
traditional lobbying and litigation, RAN specialized in private politics, that is, the 
targeting of corporations with the intent to influence their environmental behavior. What 
the campaigns have in common is the goal of establishing environmental policies for 
institutions active in international project finance. 
For the World Bank and ECA campaigns, Congressional budget and statutory 
authority was an important tool. Changes in MDB policies were possible when Congress 
could threaten to withhold U.S. contributions to these organizations. With regard to Ex-
Im, Congressional power is even more immediate, as the Bank’s charter needs to be re-
authorized by Congress periodically; its very existence is effectively at the mercy of 
Congress. Gaining leverage on private sector entities obviously requires different tools 
and strategies. NGOs mounted a campaign aimed at the banks’ reputation by publicizing 
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environmentally problematic projects and by threatening consumer boycotts. In this case 
of international project finance, this strategy was complicated by the fact that many of the 
target banks specialized in commercial banking and that these banks were, therefore, 
largely immune to threats of consumer boycotts. However, one of the industry leaders, 
Citigroup, is also involved in private banking worldwide, with an especially strong 
presence in the U.S. credit card market. Not surprisingly, Citigroup was chosen as a first 
target, as it combined vulnerability through its private customer business with significant 
impact on international project finance. 
The NGOs in the BankTrack campaign (and its predecessor campaign “Focus on 
Finance”) played a key role in prompting financial institutions to adopt the Equator 
Principles (for a detailed discussion see chapter four). In January 2003, parallel to the 
World Economic forum, NGOs launched the Collevecchio Declaration as an appeal to 
private financial institutions to acknowledge their responsibility in fostering social and 
environmental sustainability by making six concrete commitments to (i) sustainability, 
(ii) 'Do No Harm', (iii) responsibility, (iv) accountability, (v) transparency, and (vi) 
sustainable markets and governance (BankTrack 2003).  
The Equator principles address a few of the concerns highlighted in the 
Collevecchio Declaration, but they fell short of NGO demands, especially with regard to 
accountability and transparency provisions, where banks continued to invoke commercial 
confidentiality to fend off any such demands. BankTrack monitors equator banks and 
their implementation of the principles. Aside from the lack of monitoring and 
accountability provisions in the Equator Principles, NGOs criticized their limited 
applicability: project financing only of projects greater than $50 million. While this 
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captured about 97% of the project finance market, it did leave out other forms of 
financing and thereby entire sectors (e.g. mining) not usually financed through project 
finance. 
The NGO Rainforest Action Network (RAN) pressed Citigroup, through a two-
year campaign of consumer boycotts and protests, to set a new industry standard by 
committing to environmental standards that exceeded the Equator Principles, of which 
Citigroup had been a key promoter. Beyond the Equator Principles, Citigroup’s Enhanced 
Environmental Policy defined “high-caution” zones, such as critical natural habitats and 
areas in which indigenous people live, and established tropical forests as “no-go” zones 
where no logging activity was to be supported. The policy also included an explicit 
section on how to prevent the support of illegal logging, an investment strategy for 
sustainable forestry and renewable energy, and on reporting greenhouse gas emissions of 
financed projects (Citigroup 2004; Lobe 2004; Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup 
2004).  
A few months after Citigroup’s commitment, Bank of America also announced an 
environmental policy that defines “no-go” zones and set ambitious greenhouse gas 
emission targets for its project finance operation. As in Citigroup’s policy statement, this 
step was a reaction to the pressure and resulting reputational risk generated by the RAN 
campaign (Rainforest Action Network 2004). Similar to the Equator Principles, 
Citigroup’s and Bank of America’s enhanced policies did not provide for outside 
compliance monitoring. 
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3.1.5 U.S. NGO campaigns and the greening of international finance 
Ex-Im, the World Bank, and private banks were all targets of campaigns 
orchestrated by the same group environmental NGOs. The goal of forcing these financial 
institutions to adopt environmental policies for their operations was the same for all 
campaigns, while the strategies to achieve these goals differed. Lobbying Congress 
proved successful to green the World Bank and Ex-Im. Private banks were targeted 
through name-and-shame tactics that threatened to undermine bank’s brand name 
reputations. All three institutions eventually adopted environmental policies, but at 
different speeds. Six years passed between the formation of the World Bank campaign 
and passing of the Pelosi amendment that institutionalized environmental review and 
transparency requirements for the World Bank. Private banks adopted the Equator 
Principles less than five years after they became the targets of the U.S.-based NGO 
campaign. Ex-Im, however, managed to weather NGO demands to create an 
environmental review process for some 20 years until its 1992 reauthorization. The 
campaigns and their influence on environmental rule-making are analyzed in chapter 
four. 
3.2 Developmental Activism and the Hermes Critique in Germany 
Environmental concerns regarding export credits were first voiced by European 
NGOs working on development issues. In Switzerland, the Berne Declaration and the 
Swiss Coalition of Development Organizations successfully lobbied for legislation that 
required application of the principles and guidelines of Swiss development policy to 
export credits to low-income countries (Fues 1994). This 1980 amendment of Article 1, 
Paragraph 2 of the federal law on the Swiss ECA Exportrisikogarantie (export risk 
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guarantee; ERG) marks the first incorporation of non-trade concerns into ECA policy in 
Europe. The law stipulates that the principles of Swiss developmental policy need to be 
taken into account for exports to poor developing countries (Kuoni 2004: 232). For the 
Swiss ERG, this was the first time that non-governmental groups other than trade 
associations – in this case trade unions and developmental groups – exerted considerable 
influence on Swiss export promotion policy (Kuoni 2004: 66). 
The Swiss discussion around ERG’s 1980 revisions foreshadowed German 
discussions on Hermes reform, as it pitted those favoring the inclusion of developmental 
concerns into export credit policy against those who argued that such rules would hinder 
the swift and effective use of ERG as an instrument of economic policy. The question of 
primacy of job creation over developmental goals was raised also as early as 1980 (Kuoni 
2004: 233). The amendment as adopted in 1980 was a compromise, as it limited the 
consideration of development policy concerns to poor developing countries as opposed to 
all developing countries, as proponents of the amendment had originally demanded 
(Kuoni 2004: 234). German development NGOs took up the issue around the same time. 
3.2.1 The 1980s: Greens put Hermes on the legislative agenda 
When the German Greens first entered the Bundestag in 1983, political action 
followed. A 1985 inquiry (Große Anfrage) into the issue (Deutscher Bundestag 1985) 
was followed by a steady stream of inquiries (Kleine Anfragen), fielded by Green 
members of parliament. Until 1990, when the Western Greens failed to win enough votes 
to return to the Bundestag, they kept the issue of reforming Hermes (the German ECA) 
on the parliamentary agenda. However, with no access to the executive agency, and with 
little leverage in the Bundestag, they could achieve little beyond keeping the issue alive. 
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Responding to a Green parliamentary inquiry, the German government asserted as early 
as 1985 that “the consideration of ecological and developmental aspects occurs as part of 
the evaluation of an individual project’s supportability based on available information 
and development policy objectives” (Deutscher Bundestag 1985), but no formal rules and 
basis existed for these considerations. After the 1990 elections and the subsequent 
departure of the West German Greens from the Bundestag, key staffers of the Green 
faction took up the issue outside of parliament. Barbara Unmüssig, former staffer to 
Uschi Eid and Ludger Volmer, joined the environmental think-tank WEED (World 
Economy, Ecology & Development), and Thomas Fues, who was behind most 
parliamentary inquiries on the issue from 1983 to 1990, worked with various NGOs, 
including GKKE, Eurodad, and WEED on Hermes reform from a developmental 
perspective. The Chinese Three-Gorges Dam project also served as a catalyst for ECA 
reform in Germany. Whereas it was the first project not receiving support from the U.S. 
Ex-Im Bank on environmental grounds, the German ECA was the first agency to support 
the export of turbines for the project. NGOs seized this opportunity and used the 
controversial project as a focal point in the campaign (personal communication with 
German activist, 17 July 2003). 
Their efforts broadened the NGO community working on Hermes reform to 
include Urgewald, Germanwatch, and others which built up the issue’s political salience 
over time. This eventually led to formal political recognition in the 1998 red-green 
coalition agreement; this called for a reform of Hermes along “ecological, social, and 
developmental criteria” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and SPD 1998: 48). Inclusion in the 
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coalition agreement was also aided by the NGOs’ close ties to Green politicians drafting 
the coalition agreement (personal communication with German activist, 17 July 2003). 
3.2.2 1998 on: Hermes is moving 
The rather bold policy statements on Hermes reform in the 1998 coalition 
agreement between the Greens and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) are less a product 
of conviction than of favorable negotiation dynamics. When the SPD negotiators 
responsible for trade and economic issues worked on other sections of the agreement, 
language pertaining to export credits slipped into the foreign policy and development 
sections of the agreement, because negotiators in these areas did not recognize the issue’s 
political relevance (interview with Bundestag staffer, 27 January 2004). Thus, the text on 
Hermes in the coalition agreement marked the first (or only?) victory of Green 
environmental concerns over SPD economic interests. 
Starting in 1995, exporters were required to supplement their application for 
Hermes export credit guarantees for projects exceeding DM 25 million with an informal 
memorandum outlining any environmental project externalities that they were aware of. 
As the format and scope of this memorandum was left mostly to the exporter’s discretion, 
one can hardly speak of an environmental standard, as there were neither established 
environmental criteria, nor any environmental review process. Hermes decisions were 
based on these exporter-supplied memoranda and information sourced from German 
diplomatic representations in buyer countries (Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 1998). 
1995 was also the year in which U.S. Ex-Im environmental policies went into effect, 
which introduced both a formal environmental review process and environmental criteria 
for cover decisions. 
94 
Advocacy work by environmental NGOs and their lobby work – especially 
WEED and Urgewald – resulted in higher salience of the issue, but it did not result in 
active policy-making by the new government in this realm. Still, it did prompt the inter-
ministerial coordination committee (IMA)8 to first initiate timid environmental reform in 
summer 1998 – even before the elections, which brought the red-green coalition to 
power. This reform roughly coincided with the OECD Export Credit Group’s adaptation 
of a Statement of Intent concerning environmental policies among OECD ECAs. The 
new guidelines refined the memorandum requirement by requiring applicants for Hermes 
coverage to answer five questions when preparing the memorandum: 
1. Does this project bear significant environmental aspects? 
2. Project surroundings: In what kind of surrounding or environment is the project 
located? Is this a specifically protected or threatened environment? 
3. Are there environmental requirements by the buyer country? If so, what are they and 
is it guaranteed that these requirements will be followed? 
4. Has there been or will there be an Environmental Impact Assessment conducted? If 
so, by whom and which standards are applied (local, German, or e.g. World Bank 
standards)? 
5. Will this project substitute environmentally harmful installation, productions 
processes, or products? 
These questions are to be answered in general terms, i.e. without technical specifications, in 
so far as they are relevant for the project and known to the exporter. (Hermes 
Kreditversicherungs-AG 1998)  
The June 1998 requirement could hardly pass as an environmental standard either, 
as established environmental criteria or an environmental review process were still 
lacking. The requirements were enacted to “document to the outside, that environmental 
aspects are considered in the decision-making process” (Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 
1998) – most likely with a view towards the emerging OECD deliberations on the issue. 
                                               
8 Hermes guarantees are administered by a consortium Euler Hermes Kreditversicherung and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers under the authority of the economics ministry. Decisions for coverage are made 
by a committee including representatives from the ministries of economics, finance, economic cooperation 
and development, and the Foreign Office. 
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The inter-ministerial coordination committee still held wide discretionary power. 
Question 5 above hints at the political discourse on environmental standards that existed 
at that time. For industry the debate was mostly about exportation of environmentally 
superior technology, in which Germany was considered a world leader. Consequently, 
stricter standards were viewed unnecessary, as German exports by themselves would 
advance environmental objectives (Drillisch, Unmüßig, and Zúñiga 1998). 
In early spring 2001, negotiations between the coalition factions and the Ministry 
of Economics resulted in draft environmental guidelines for Hermes credit guarantees, 
and prompted further parliamentary debate. All parties presented their own bills, calling 
for some extent of reform in the Hermes instrument. The exception was the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP), which favored the status-quo and called for an exclusion of 
explicit environmental requirements from Hermes guidelines (Deutscher Bundestag 
2001b). While the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, the reformed East German 
socialists) presented the broadest – and at the same time most unrealistic – proposal 
calling for far-reaching inclusion of NGOs and stakeholders in the decision process, a list 
of project types to be excluded, and promotion of environmentally innovative technology. 
The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) coalition presented 
a scenario (Deutscher Bundestag 2001a) that closely resembled the final outcome of the 
reform process. The SPD/Green majority bill used rather weak language in calling for the 
consideration of human rights in the decision process and the reporting of problematic 
and large-volume cases to the economics committee (in addition to the budget committee 
which had been the only parliamentary body to have some degree of oversight of Hermes 
credits). Furthermore, the bill called for strict adherence to the new guidelines – 
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especially with respect to sensitive exports, such as nuclear power generation, arms, 
dangerous chemicals and large dam projects. Higher transparency was to be negotiated 
within the OECD framework (Deutscher Bundestag 2001c). This weak majority coalition 
bill was a clear indication of the parliamentary faction’s weak standing vis-à-vis the 
Ministry of Economics (Schmid 2001). Ironically, the CDU and FDP bills reflected 
positions held by the ministry and industry associations (Hagelüken 2001) thereby 
strengthening the ministry’s position vis-à-vis the coalition that legitimized it.  
In retrospect, the Greens now attribute the weakness of the outcome partially to 
the lack of power and influence of the Green parliamentarians in charge of the issue prior 
to the 2002 elections. Faced with opposition from an influential group of trade specialists 
within the SPD faction and an economics ministry that had been dominated by the non-
interventionist FDP for some 20 years, these green members of parliament did not have 
enough clout to bring about more decisive change (interview with Bundestag staffer, 5 
January 2004). 
The current environmental “Guidelines for the Consideration of Ecological, 
Social, and Developmental Criteria for Granting Export Guarantees of the Federation” 
were passed by the interministerial committee for export credit guarantees (IMA) on 
April 26, 2001. This step again coincided with a milestone in OECD deliberations. 
Similar to standards applied since mid-2000, they included: 
• The screening of projects with a volume of € 15 million and more, and a 
significant German share; 
• review for cases in which the screening indicated the need for further 
investigation. More information may be requested from the buyer. Other 
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analyses such as information from other ECAs and buyer/seller provided 
assessments may be considered; and 
• classification of projects into three categories: A, B, and C – with category 
A containing projects that have considerable environmental impacts. 
While WEED’s and Urgewald’s advocacy work was rather successful in terms of 
media coverage and political action – though more symbolic than substantial – it did not 
generate the broad public support for stricter environmental rules needed to define the 
political cost calculus in ways conducive to substantial reform. All parties in Parliament 
took up the issue in inquiries into the government, calls for action, and policy statements 
on reform. However, parliament proved to be a weak negotiation partner; the government 
– especially the Ministry of Economics – played a highly successful two-level game 
(Putnam 1988). They did this by referring to the OECD negotiations on environmental 
standards for export credits as the relevant international benchmark, and at the same time 
slowing the OECD process to bring about low international standards. In this way the 
Economics Ministry successfully retained ownership of the reform process, and in the 
end, largely dictated the standards. Parties in parliament did not see – or ignored? – their 
own opportunity to set the stage for the OECD negotiations by clearly defining 
acceptable negotiation results. 
German ECA politics have been mostly reactionary. The United States initiated 
broad domestic environmental standards; German politics, on the other hand, has only 
addressed environmental policies for Hermes when internal and external pressures 
required action on the topic. The domestic discourse was dominated by the importance of 
easy access to export credits for job creation; U.S. calls for thorough environmental 
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screening prior to granting cover, and a publicly transparent approval process appeared as 
an attempted assault on German industry’s competitiveness that needed to be fended off. 
Twenty years of FDP domination in the Economics ministry also provided for a great 
deal of inertia that worked against the greening of Hermes guarantees. 
After considering the impact of U.S. and German NGO campaigns on 
environmental standards setting for international finance, the next section discusses the 
content of these rules in detail. Beyond the mere existence of environmental rules, their 
specific provisions are also the products of competing demands on the rule-makers. 
3.3 Environmental standards for international finance 
Environmental policies of the World Bank, ECAs, and EPFIs share common roots 
and history. All are based on the environmental review procedures established by the 
U.S. National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 and all were promoted by a similar 
group of NGOs. However, the policies are not identical, and they differ especially with 
respect to compliance mechanisms and the degree of transparency incorporated into these 
rules. The World Bank Group has become very transparent in its operations and has 
established its Inspection Panel as an independent body to monitor compliance with Bank 
policies. Transparency provisions among ECAs vary and so do domestic compliance 
mechanisms. Private banks are the least transparent financial institutions discussed here. 
The Equator Principles require only that stakeholders are granted access to environmental 
reviews, and compliance monitoring is limited to reviews of project documents by 
independent experts hired by the financial institutions themselves. There is no formal 
authority or secretariat to administer the Principles. In fact, even the hosting and 
maintenance of the Principles internet site (http://equator-principles.com/) is a 
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contentious issue, as member institutions are concerned about the bureaucratization and 
formalization of the Principles (personal communication with Christopher Wright, 2 
March 2007). Still, NGOs use the little information available to pressure banks into 
improving their compliance with the Principles. 
The following sub-sections discuss each of these policies in detail to allow a 
comparison of their provisions and thus provide benchmarks to evaluate ECA policies. 
3.3.1 World Bank policies 
World Bank environmental policies are contained within the Bank’s operational 
manual and deal with a number of general and sector-specific aspects of operations. Both 
qualitative and quantitative standards for project performance as well as mitigation 
strategies are contained in its Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook (PPAH). 
Where it once was criticized for its secretive operations, the Bank has now become a 
fairly transparent organization that not only makes its reports publicly accessible, but also 
uses consultation procedures in both project and policy development. Stakeholders are 
involved in designing projects and their input is also sought when the Bank revises 
current policies and develops new ones. The World Bank has coupled its disclosure 
policies with institutionalized compliance mechanisms. Thus, outsiders such as NGOs 
can not only monitor Bank operations, but can also trigger review mechanisms in those 
cases where operations do not comply with rules. The Bank’s inspection panel enables 
the affected public with an effective means to initiate independent reviews of problematic 
projects. The panel is a strong compliance mechanism that allows the public to file 
requests for investigations into potential violations of Bank policies in project 
development and implementation (for detailed discussions of the World Banks’ 
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environmental policy development see Gutner 2002; Horta 1996; Rich 1994; Wade 
1997). The effectiveness of the Bank’s policies and especially its inspection panel remain 
contested (Park 2007; Gutner 2005a; Clark, Fox, and Treakle 2003). 
Beyond its own operational policies, the Bank now serves as an international 
standard-setter: its policies serve as models for other organizations, and it has taken over 
a leading role in the development of the international regime governing the 
environmental performance of infrastructure development. The World Commission on 
Dams and the Extractive Industries Review were convened by the Bank to develop 
international guidelines for use in dam-building and mining projects. Over time, the 
World Bank has evolved from an “environmental laggard” to an “international leader,” 
raising the bar for acceptable environmental and social performance of projects. 
Thus far, I have equated the term “World Bank” with the most prominent part of 
the World Bank Group, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD). However, in addition to the IBRD and the International Development 
Association (IDA), both of which provide direct financing for projects, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
are also part of the Group. The IFC’s environmental policies have slowly evolved from 
World Bank policies. Initially, the IFC applied World Bank environmental policies which 
did not match well with its different type of business. This was highlighted by a 
controversial dam project in Chile in the early 1990s, which led to the subsequent 
adaptation of the Bank’s safeguard policies to IFC business (Park 2003). The IFC has 
recently replaced its safeguard policies from 1998 with new environmental and social 
standards. Its new policies represent a shift from a process-oriented approach to one 
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focused on outcome. This change also delegates environmental review responsibilities 
from the financial institution to its client – analogous to the ECAs’ and EPFIs’ 
procedures. Building on the previous safeguards, these standards were expanded to 
include labor rights, human rights, community health and safety, and greenhouse gas 
emissions; the new policies also incorporate expanded disclosure requirements which 
have resulted in increased transparency of IFC operations (see International Finance 
Corporation 2006). 
The IFC policies are not only relevant in this comparison because of their 
modification to better match IFC operations, but also because the IFC played a crucial 
role in facilitating the development of the Equator Principles. ECAs also follow policy 
development at the IFC since this organization best resembles their own operations. 
3.3.2 Equator Principles 
The World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) helped to give 
birth to the Equator Principles, which established a common framework for private 
financial institutions to address environmental and social risks in project financing (see 
Amalric 2005; Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006). Initiated at a meeting in London in 
October 2002, the Principles’ early adopters and promoters included ABN AMRO, 
Barclays, Citigroup, and WestLB. The Equator Principles served the dual purpose of both 
managing reputation risk stemming from controversial projects and integrating 
environmental and social concerns into overall credit risk management. Similar to World 
Bank rules and Common Approaches, the Equator Principles required environmental 
assessments and stakeholder consultations for projects likely to harm the environment. In 
July 2006, the Principles were updated and expanded from their initial 2003 version to 
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include monitoring and reporting requirements among other changes (The "Equator 
Principles" 2006). 
Figure 3.1 The Equator Principles 
The Principles require that similar to IFC guidelines (see The "Equator Principles" 2006): 
1. projects are categorized based upon the IFC environmental and social screening criteria; 
2. for all category A (significant adverse environmental impact) and category B (less 
adverse environmental impact) projects the borrower completes an environmental 
assessment; 
3. environmental assessments evaluate projects based on IFC environmental standards or 
host-country standards in high-income OECD countries; 
4. for all category A and some category B projects an action plan and environmental 
management system is prepared; 
5. for all category A and some category B projects stakeholders are consulted and are 
provided with access to the environmental assessments; 
6. for all category A and some category B projects the borrower establishes a grievance 
mechanism for groups and individuals from project-affected communities; 
7. for all category A and some category B projects independent experts review the 
assessment, action plan, and consultation process as well as assess compliance with the 
principles;  
8. for all category A and some category B projects the borrower covenants to comply with 
the principles; 
9. for all category A and some category B projects an independent environmental expert is 
appointed to verify monitoring; and 
10. EPFIs report on their implementation of the principles at least annually. 
 
Private financial institutions have been the latest group of financial institutions to 
have adopted a similar set of environmental policies for their project approvals in project 
finance transactions. The Equator Principles (see Figure 3.1) are the weakest re-
incarnation of NEPA provisions discussed here. World Bank rules are written into its 
operational policies. The Equator Principles are simply a list of ten principles concerning 
project evaluation which leaves implementation completely to the adopting institutions. 
Still, the list of principles invokes the same environmental review logic as contained in 
ECA rules: classification according to likely environmental impact, environmental 
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assessment of projects with considerable environmental impact, and consultation with 
stakeholder groups. 
Since 2006, the Principles have applied to all project finance transactions of $10 
million or more. Being a voluntary industry code, financial institutions adopt the 
Principles with an announcement and a declaration of intent to integrate them into their 
operations. However, the adoption is entirely voluntary, and no authority monitors 
implementation or requires reports from adopting institutions. Without a body dedicated 
to administering the Principles, performance monitoring by participating institutions or 
by outside actors can rely only on information made available by the adopting 
institutions. On the project level, independent experts are to evaluate the environmental 
review process and assess compliance with the Principles, but their work is limited to 
providing input to the financial institution, and this information is unlikely to become 
publicly accessible. Institutions adopting the Principles are to require their clients to 
provide environmental assessments to their stakeholders and EPFIs are required to report 
annually on their implementation of the principles. However, no further transparency 
requirements exist and formal accountability chain ends at the level of the individual 
financial institution; this is quite typical for industry self-regulation (for a discussion of 
the UN Global Compact see Hemphill 2005).  
Still, even limited information disclosure practices provide an implicit compliance 
mechanism by raising the reputational risk of non-compliance (see also Overdevest 
2005). Despite the secluded nature of banking operations, NGOs have been successful in 
identifying projects with EPFI involvement that conflict with the Principles. Similar to 
the Common Approaches, the lack of a formal compliance mechanism is mitigated by 
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NGOs’ name-and-shame tactics which induce compliance by raising the reputational 
risks of noncompliance (for NGO critiques see BankTrack 2006; Chan-Fishel 2005; 
Missbach 2004). 
3.3.3 Ex-Im standards 
Current Ex-Im guidelines require that applications for long-term financing are 
filed with a one-page Environmental Screening Document which includes project 
information (size, new project/rehabilitation/expansion), information about the location 
of the project (protected areas), and the type of project (sector or industry). Based on this 
rather superficial information, environmental experts at Ex-Im assign the project to one 
of four categories of environmental impact: 
A – Large Greenfield Projects or Projects located in, or impacting a Sensitive 
Site: “require submission of an EIA” 
B – Expansions, Upgrades and Projects having Limited Environmental Impact: 
“impacts are site specific;” Ex-Im only “require[s] submission of 
environmental information sufficient to establish whether or not the project 
meets relevant host-country environmental guidelines and applicable 
international guidelines.” For expansions it requires “environmental 
information that focuses on the environmental effects associated with the 
actual expansion or upgrade.” 
C – Categorical Exclusions: “excluded from further review because they are 
likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts” 
(http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/environment/envproc.cfm) 
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N – Nuclear: nuclear projects are classified into and reviewed according to five 
subcategories which differentiate among the type of reactor (U.S. or not) and 
the type of export (commercial reactors and components, fuel rods, research 
reactors, or services). Environmental review is not required for fuel rods 
supplied to operational reactors or exports “not identified with the physical 
operation of any particular project or facility.” 
(http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/nuclear/envnucp.cfm) 
Depending on a project’s classification, Ex-Im will require the applicant to supply 
additional environmental information in subsequent steps. These steps differ depending 
on the type of financing for which the exporter applied. In all cases, Ex-Im requires an 
Environmental Impact Assessment for Category A projects, and for Category B projects 
sufficient environmental information for evaluating compliance with host country and 
applicable international rules. In addition to information supplied by the applicant, Ex-Im 
can also draw on information provided by third parties such as U.S. government agencies 
or MDBs. EIAs for category A projects are made available to the public on Ex-Im’s 
website at least 30 days prior to making a final commitment. Comments and information 
provided by interested parties as part of this public comment period are also considered 
by Ex-Im staff in project evaluation. Projects are examined for compliance with host 
country standards and those international standards referenced in the Common 
Approaches. Applicants have the opportunity to provide additional information if input 
from third parties gave rise to environmental concerns. Ex-Im monitors projects for the 
duration of Ex-Im’s support through review of project documents and site visits 
(http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/environment/envproc.cfm). The current policies 
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are largely similar to those that were in place prior to a revision in July 2004 that 
removed inconsistencies between the category labels used by Ex-Im and those referenced 
in the Common Approaches. Prior to the U.S. adoption of the Common Approaches, Ex-
Im also applied its own standards based on World Bank guidelines: in other words, 
guidelines similar to those prescribed by the OECD agreement (United States General 
Accounting Office 2003). 
3.3.4 Hermes standards 
Current German guidelines were passed by the interministerial committee in July 
2001 while Revision 6 of the Common Approaches was being negotiated. In this sense, 
they represent an early implementation of that version of the Common Approaches which 
was implemented and adopted by all ECG Members except Turkey and the United States. 
Since 2004, these policies have been applied side-by-side with the Common Approaches, 
but the Hermes guidelines have not been updated to incorporate the revised OECD 
agreement. Key differences to Ex-Im policies include the lack of ex-ante transparency, 
limitations on transparency after commitment, a higher threshold of EUR 15 million, a 
less rigorous EIA requirement for category A projects, limitation of the evaluation to the 
German export component to a larger project, and an exclusion of nuclear technology 
from support (Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 2001; United States General Accounting 
Office 2003).  
Applications for support of exports greater than EUR 15 million must include a 
memorandum in which the applicant describes the project in a detailed fashion. The 
application form implies the inclusion of information on “financing, infrastructure, 
economic relevance, environmental impacts including information on the project location 
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– e.g. industrial area, Greenfield, sensitive area -, on environmental assessments (if 
available), on environmental standards, and on positive environmental impacts such as 
the consequences of upgrades, etc.” (Antrag auf Übernahme einer Exportkreditgarantie 
für ein Ausfuhrgeschäft; http://www.agaportal.de/pdf/antrag_b_g.pdf; accessed 12 
October 2007). 
For exports greater EUR 15 million (which also represent a significant 
contribution to the overall project), information provided in the memorandum is used to 
screen the application for likely environmental impact. Smaller projects may also be 
screened if “concrete information” such as location within a sensitive area suggests 
potential environmental impacts (Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 2001). The screening 
process primarily determines whether the project meets sector-specific requirements, or 
whether more information for an in-depth analysis is needed. 
If the initial screening indicates environmental relevance, more environmental 
information is sought from applicants. Such information requirements are balanced with 
an exporter’s share of a project. Exporters who contribute a relatively small share of a 
large project are only required to supply proportionally little information, irrespective of 
the project’s overall impact. The reasoning here is that exporters who supply only small 
components to a large project may not have access to much project information, and their 
position may also not allow them to exert much influence on project design. Additional 
information may also be sought from other ECAs scrutinizing the same project. At this 
stage, information requests to the exporter are limited to specific questions on the project 
at hand. If environmental studies/assessments were submitted as part of the application, 
they are also examined for plausibility. 
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The information gathered in the screening phase is used to evaluate the project’s 
compliance with host country standards, which in turn, are also benchmarked against 
international standards. It is also categorized into one of three categories of 
environmental impact. Category A requires “an exhaustive description of all relevant 
environmental aspects, – possibly through an environmental assessment or studies,” 
while “plausible criteria for environmental relevance or generally acceptable information 
is sufficient” for Category B projects (Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 2001: 5; United 
States General Accounting Office 2003). This is a point where German and U.S. 
standards clearly diverge: Ex-Im requires an EIA for all Category A projects, while 
German exporters are allowed to submit environmental information in various formats 
that do not necessarily address all aspects of an EIA, such as the consideration of 
alternatives or consultation with stakeholders. The German guidelines merely suggest 
that the exporter should encourage and facilitate consultation with affected stakeholders; 
they do not make this a requirement (Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 2001).  
If environmental problems are to be expected, the applicant is asked to mitigate 
those in cooperation with the project developer. The goal is to bring a project into 
compliance with standards rather than deny it support. However, the size of the 
contribution relative to the overall project is also considered, suggesting more flexibility 
with the environmental performance of large projects with small German contributions 
(Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 2001). 
The German guidelines mention the consideration of ex-ante transparency in 
OECD negotiations, but provide for the publication of project information only after the 
commitment of guarantees, provided the applicant agreed to publication. The relevant 
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section of the application form reads: “We consent to the publication of this project after 
the final submission of the application: exporter/financial institution, type of 
good/project, size, host country, credit term.” Immediately following this statement the 
form suggests in bold typeface: “Please delete this paragraph if you do not consent” 
(Antrag auf Übernahme einer Exportkreditgarantie für ein Ausfuhrgeschäft; 
http://www.agaportal.de/pdf/antrag_b_g.pdf; accessed 12 October 2007). Thus, OECD 
transparency requirements only apply if an exporter does not opt out by striking out this 
statement. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a historical outline of environmental rule development for 
international finance and introduced the rules. The trend towards environmental rules is a 
very apparent one. However, this trend has not affected ECAs to the same degree it has 
affected MDBs and private banks.  
Ex-Im managed to resist NGO pressure until its 1992 reauthorization. Compared 
to the 20-year effort to green Ex-Im, the World Bank and private bank campaigns were 
very fast-paced. The Pelosi amendment requiring the World Bank to conduct 
environmental assessments and making them publicly available was passed in 1989, six 
years after the start of the World Bank campaign. Private banks adopted the Equator 
Principles in 2003, less than five years after they became the targets of the U.S.-based 
NGO campaign. German Hermes credit guarantees even withstood serious environmental 
reform until 2001 despite having been subject to similar NGO pressure. 
In addition to amount of time that passed by until these institutions adopted 
environmental policies, the scope of environmental reform is also of concern. All 
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institutions now screen, categorize, and review projects for environmental impact. 
However, their rules differ with respect to the transparency of the review process, the use 
of decision-making criteria, and the existence of compliance mechanisms (see Table 3.1).  





Decision criteria Compliance 
mechanism 
World Bank 120 days Yes PPAH, Safeguards Inspection panel 
Equator Principles None Unspecified annual 
reporting 
requirement 
IFC standards None 
Ex-Im 30 days Yes World Bank 
PPAH, Safeguards 
None; courts 









Clearly, the diverging content is related to the demands made on the financial 
institutions. World Bank rules are the result of a concerted push by NGOs and the U.S. 
government and are the most comprehensive ones, including extensive transparency 
provisions, firm decisions criteria, and a compliance mechanism to trigger independent 
reviews. The Equator Principles build on these rules, but neither require transparency of 
environmental reviews nor provide a mechanism to enforce compliance with the rules. 
Ex-Im’s environmental policies are also derived from World Bank rules and then updated 
to match the OECD Common Approaches. German environmental rules for Hermes 
guarantees were derived from the Common Approaches, but OECD rules were adopted to 
only the minimal extent necessary to quell domestic demands for such rules, while 
retaining flexibility with regard to transparency and the use of firm decision criteria. Both 
sets of ECA rules do not provide for compliance mechanisms, but they are enforceable 
through the respective legal systems. 
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This brings us back to this section’s guiding question: Given the similarity in 
project portfolios and public demands for change, why were some ECAs slower than 
others, and all of them so much slower to respond to the environmental challenge than 
the World Bank and even private banks? The comparison presented here also begs an 
explanation of the variations in rule content. The next chapter will analyze the dynamics 
leading to this situation by applying the comparative categories of power and rule content 
developed in chapter two. 
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Chapter 4: Obstacles to Environmental Rule-Setting 
Despite similar trajectories, environmental policy development among 
international financial institutions occurred over very different time horizons. The 
Equator Principles were adopted after only 5 years from the time NGOs started targeting 
private banks with their campaign. The World Bank was also fairly responsive to 
demands made by the U.S. government and an alliance of NGOs. It took a quarter 
century, however, for ECAs to develop environmental standards for their operations. 
NGOs had put this issue on the agenda in the early 1970s, but we did not see substantial 
changes in ECA policies until the mid/late 1990s. The guiding research question for this 
discussion is: Given the similarity in project portfolios and public demands for change, 
why were some ECAs slower than others, and all of them so much slower to respond to 
the environmental challenge than the World Bank and even private banks? 
This chapter compares environmental policy development among international 
financial institutions guided by the comparative categories of power and rule content (see 
chapter two). The following analysis shows how different power constellation in 
domestic ECA standard-setting made rule development much more difficult for ECAs 
than for the other financial institutions. The U.S. Ex-Im Bank is the outlier among ECAs 
because of its vulnerability to political demands that is a result of its dependence on 
regular reauthorizations. Differences in power constellations also help explaining varying 
rule content. The type of adopted rules reflects the relative power of the various demands 
made on the financial institutions. The first section addresses power relationships before 
turning to rule content in the second section. 
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4.1 Power 
The power competing groups wield determines their ability to influence the rule-
setting process. From the perspective of the rule-setter this results in political costs and 
benefits that need to be considered when designing rules. The more power a particular 
actor has the greater is his ability to create political costs and benefits. Disregarding a 
powerful actor’s interests creates political costs, satisfying them results in political 
benefits. Rule-setters seek to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs in 
designing new rules. Institutions channel, enable, and constrain power. Thus, the 
following analyses of power relationships are prefaced by discussions of institutional 
arrangements that privilege or constrain certain actors in exercising their power on the 
rule-setting process. 
This analysis builds on Fuchs’ framework for assessing business power in global 
governance (see chapter two and Fuchs 2006). She suggests taking a threefold approach 
to studying power: instrumental, structural, and discursive power. In this view, 
instrumental power is exercised when A “can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do” (Dahl 1957). Structural power precedes exercises in instrumental power in 
the sense that the structural power of actors may impact whether issues and concerns ever 
reach the public policy agenda, and the kind of salience attached to them. In Fuchs’ 
words: “Proponents of structuralist concepts of power argue that the material structures 
underlying behavioral options and allocating indirect and direct decision-making power 
need to be analyzed to get a comprehensive assessment of the distribution and exercise of 
power” (Fuchs 2006: 6). Thus, structural power defines the policy space by defining both 
issues and non-issues as well as by delineating the range of acceptable solutions to policy 
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problems. Discursive power as the third face in this framework, then, is prevalent even 
prior to the exertion of instrumental or structural power. Such approaches “adopt a 
sociological perspective on power relations in society. According to this view, power is 
seen to be a function of norms, ideas, and societal institutions” (Fuchs 2006: 9). Norms 
and ideas precede interests – and thus also exercise of instrumental and structural power – 
in that they enable the development of issues and interests by providing their content. 
Thus discursive power, which is also the most difficult to analyze – is located at the top 
of the power hierarchy in this framework. But discursive power is also the least 
immediate form and actors may seek to transform it into more direct forms of 
instrumental and structural power by channeling it through intermediate actors (see 
chapter two). 
The following pages consider power relationships in greening international 
finance in four different ways. (i) Through name-and-shame tactics, NGOs exercised 
their discursive power and framed debates over environmental policies in such a way that 
the desirability of rules per se was not put into question; only the specific of rules were 
contested. (ii) Through oversight of the World Bank and ECAs, governments had the 
power to create policies for these institutions. (Thus, these entities were, in effect, 
delegated by governments to exert leverage over clients.) (iii) Through control over 
access to project financing, financial institutions wielded structural power over project 
sponsors by either granting or withholding support. (iv) Through the adoption of 
comprehensive environmental policies, the World Bank, the Equator Principle banks, and 
Ex-Im established far-reaching environmental norms which provided these institutions 
with new sources of discursive power. 
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4.1.1 Power and NGO strategies 
Common to all three types of financial institutions is that NGOs publicized 
projects with negative environmental impacts which were supported by these institutions. 
They questioned whether commercially viable projects were then worthy of support when 
they included considerable environmental externalities. In framing projects with negative 
social and environmental impacts as morally repulsive, institutions were branded as 
“greedy” and “irresponsible” when they supported them and when such financial 
institutions had the power to prevent such projects by not providing financing. 
These frames challenged traditional development norms centered on economic 
viability and projects’ contribution to economic growth. NGOs could then tie their 
interpretation to emerging norms as sustainability which expanded the economic 
development discourse to “sustainable development” (World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987). Notions of environmentally sustainable 
development in particular suggest that environmental externalities need to be 
internalized, and that disregarding environmental impacts in the short-run amplifies their 
impacts and imposes their costs on future generations. 
The criticisms were then cast directly at the financial institutions, where these 
challenges resonated only to a limited degree. However, NGOs also used the same 
discursive practices to co-opt other actors with more immediate power over the financial 
institutions; NGO discursive power traveled through other actors with more immediate 
means of control over the campaign targets, which, in turn, controlled clients’ projects. 
By framing the activities of the World Bank and ECAs as morally unacceptable 
(see for example Berne Declaration et al. 1999; Norlen et al. 2002; Rich 2000) in national 
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policy discourses, civil society could bring governments to their side in order to exert 
their instrumental power towards environmental reform at these state controlled financial 
institutions. In states with political opportunity structures open to environmental activists 
(Dryzek et al. 2003; Kitschelt 1986; Schreurs 2002), NGOs could also exert instrumental 
power by lobbying legislatures and governments (for example Blackwelder 2001). 
With regard to private banks, name-and-shame tactics were designed to influence 
popular opinion rather than political actors. Given their structural dependence on 
customers, banks need consumers who may take their business away from banks with bad 
reputations. Governments which are structurally dependent on banks for economic 
prosperity were considered less relevant in influencing banking industry practices. Taken 
together, all three campaigns were driven by NGOs branding financial institutions for 
environmentally irresponsible behavior. The effects of the campaigns, however, were not 
direct. NGOs’ discursive power was channeled through states and consumers resulting in 
a transformation into more immediate forms of instrumental and structural power over 
financial institutions and their clients.  
In addition to this input side perspective, the costs of adopting environmental 
policies are also analyzed. Governments could task MDBs to develop environmental 
policies almost free of cost: there were no strong domestic interests to oppose such 
policies. Private banks had to balance the prospect of losing consumer business with 
potential losses in project finance business. However, improved risk management through 
the consideration of environmental risks also produced benefits in the form of lower risk 
exposure. ECAs on the other hand, had been created to support powerful domestic 
industries. Restricting their access to government support could not come without 
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political costs. With the exception of private banks under certain circumstances, client 
country considerations are not relevant. Governments consider client interests relevant in 
neither MDB nor ECA standard-setting, because client country interests are not 
represented in domestic politics in donor states. 
4.1.1.1 Power and the delegation of rule-setting 
Environmental regulation of finance providers occurred in a delegated fashion: 
pressured by NGOs exercising their discursive power (see Fuchs 2006; Park 2005a), 
states, MDBs, and private banks established environmental conditionalities for access to 
finance. This pattern of delegation becomes especially apparent in the cases of MDBs and 
ECAs: instead of seeking international environmental standards for infrastructure 
development, governments tasked MDBs and ECAs with developing policies that 
restricted access to support if certain environmental performance criteria were not met. 
Regarding Equator Principles (EPs) for private banks, ECA standards, and IFC policies, 
these standards did not directly affect project design, but instead put pressure on project 
developers to (re-)design their projects in such ways that the projects complied with the 
standards. As Haufler observes, this “turn to using financial leverage over companies to 
effect change in other countries is less costly, more competitive, and potentially more 
effective than other options” (Haufler 2005). 
The relevant power relationships are those among rule-makers, their constituents, 
and the financial institutions. Client country interests are largely irrelevant in rule-setting. 
While client countries are represented as members on MDB boards, their power is very 
limited due to the prevailing modes of representation which favor donor countries. 
Private banks are primarily concerned with their commercial and private customers. At 
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times, commercial clients’ interests may align with client country interests, but this does 
not give them a strong position in influencing rule-making. ECA rules are set 
domestically and this precludes the representation of interests from other polities by 
definition. 
Consequently, all three sets of rules are dominated by the interests of the 
providers of finance, and only take into account the interests of receivers in terms of 
providing for a better environment as an unspecified common good. Material interests of 
the clients (e.g. costs associated with preparing environmental assessments or providing 
mitigation measures) are externalized. In all three cases, establishment of the policies was 
possible because of diffused costs and concentrated benefits. The reputational benefits of 
having implemented environmental policies went exclusively to the providers of finance, 
whereas the costs generated by these policies were borne by the receivers. This was 
possible, because client country interests were not represented in donor country policy-
making and violating their interest therefore bore no political cost. 
4.1.2 World Bank 
As an international organization, the World Bank’s principals are its member 
states. In contrast to most international organizations, however, the Bank is not governed 
by the one-state-one-vote principle. Instead, representation is organized by the 
shareholder principle: the more a state has paid into the Bank’s capital stock, the larger is 
its role in Bank governance. This means that the World Bank is dominated by the 
advanced industrialized countries, and especially by the United States. The Bank has 
always been presided over by an U.S. national per an informal rule that among the 
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Bretton Woods organizations, the Bank is headed by an American, while the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) is under European leadership. 
In addition to the institutionalized influence of the U.S. executive director on the 
Bank’s board, this instrumental influence is further strengthened by the Bank’s structural 
dependence on regular replenishments for its International Development Association 
(IDA). IDA makes loans to the poorest countries free of interest. Therefore, it is not self-
sustaining like the IBRD which can cover the costs of operations and inflation through 
interests earned on its loans. IDA, on the other hand, generates losses by design that need 
to be compensated for through recurring replenishments. 
The United States has exploited this source of structural power in its quest for 
environmental reform at the Bank. Not content with the progress of environmental 
reforms at the Bank, it withheld IDA support on occasion to drive the Bank towards 
further environmental reform. Even if the U.S. government instrumentalized its structural 
power base only on a few occasions, its structural power over the Bank cannot be 
overstated. 
The principal-agent literature on environmental reform at the World Bank (Gutner 
2005b, 2005a; Nielson and Tierney 2003, 2005; Nielson, Tierney, and Weaver 2006) 
starts from exactly this premise: delegation of the rule-setting task to the Bank by a 
mighty principal. Gutner and Nielson et al. then analyze what the effects of this 
delegation are. Their assessments of the effects of Bank policies diverge, but this school 
argues jointly that recipient states, which are also member states, and thus – albeit weak – 
principals, had little impact on policy development. Their structural power, however, 
became relevant in implementation, exposing World Bank agency slack. The strong force 
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towards environmental policies is somewhat countered by the World Bank’s need to 
continue lending. In this sense, client countries hold additional structural power over the 
Bank (Weaver 2007). Critics charge that it is exactly this pressure on operations that 
undermines the implementation and application of its own safeguard policies in project 
design. World Bank staff may be driven more by a project-approval culture rather than 
being guided by Bank policy (Park 2005a; Rich 1994). 
As the premier provider of international finance for development projects in many 
countries, the World Bank wields considerable structural power over its client countries: 
only projects that conform to Bank policies are to receive support. Project developers 
need to take the Bank’s policies into consideration during project design in order to not 
jeopardize their ability to gain support. 
Besides establishing these policies in response to pressure by NGOs and 
governments (see also Weaver 2007), the Bank has also assumed a leading role in 
developing international environmental policies (see also Vetterlein 2007). The World 
Commission on Dams and the Extractive Industries Review are independent expert 
panels initiated by the Bank, and which have evaluated the Bank’s and other financial 
institutions’ involvement in these sectors, resulting in recommendations for future 
hydropower and mining projects. These recommendations now provide a reference point 
for such projects, and are likely to become the relevant international norms in these 
sectors.9 
Hence, the Bank’s environmental policies are not only a manifestation of the U.S. 
government’s instrumental and structural power and the source of the World Bank’s own 
                                               
9 The Bank has been less ambitious, however, in adopting the committees’ recommendations. 
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power over clients, but they also comprise the basis for its discursive power in the realm 
of sustainable development. The Bank’s environmental safeguard and operational 
policies have become internationally-accepted benchmarks for environmental governance 
of international financial institutions. ECA policies, as well as the Equator Principles, are 
derived from this role, and the World Bank Group’s IFC has been an important facilitator 
in the adoption of the Equator Principles. This trend increases the Bank’s discursive 
influence beyond the projects it finances itself – it also provides the international standard 
for financial institutions (Park 2005a, 2007; Reed 1997). 
This source of discursive power became evident in my discussions with U.S. 
bureaucrats working on ECA reform. When asked why the U.S. government would push 
for the incorporation of World Bank standards into harmonized ECA policies, they 
suggested that the virtue of these policies being World Bank policies was that it made 
them morally superior to any nationally framed harmonization pitch, because they are 
policies for the “world” (personal communication with U.S. official, 25 June 2003; 
interview with three U.S. officials, 7 July 2004). 
4.1.3 Private banks 
The NGO Rainforest Action Network (RAN) pressed Citigroup, through a two-
year campaign of consumer boycotts and protests, to set a new industry standard by 
committing to environmental standards that exceeded the Equator Principles, of which 
Citigroup had been a key promoter (Citigroup 2004; Lobe 2004; Rainforest Action 
Network and Citigroup 2004). A few months after Citigroup’s commitment, Bank of 
America also announced an environmental policy that defines “no-go” zones and set 
ambitious greenhouse gas emission targets for its project finance operation. As in 
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Citigroup’s policy statement, this step was a reaction to the pressure and resulting 
reputational risk generated by the RAN campaign (Rainforest Action Network 2004). 
These policies were the results of NGOs exerting their discursive power directly at 
private banks and through consumers who wield structural power over banks.  
Citigroup’s and Bank of America’s reactions can be explained as strategies to 
manage reputational cost (Levy 1997). Both banks are not only active in international 
project finance, but also operate considerable personal banking in the United States 
which NGOs could target with boycott campaign. Bank of America is among the largest 
banks on the East Coast, and Citigroup is a national market leader in the credit card 
business, in addition to its worldwide personal banking operations. Their brand-name 
reputation was put at risk by the NGO campaign. Damage to this very valuable asset in a 
market with little product differentiation meant that banks had to act quickly and 
comprehensively. 
Another explanation may have to do with lessons learnt from the World Bank 
campaign, and to a lesser extent, from the ECA campaign. Here, financial institutions 
were unwilling to adopt policies promoted by NGOs, but in the end, had to concede to 
orchestrated pressure. Throughout the 1980s, the World Bank found itself reacting to 
outside demands and showed little environmental initiative of its own. By moving ahead 
with the Equator Principles, the private banks took ownership of the environmental 
standard-setting process and reversed the burden of proof. Instead of needing to 
demonstrate green behavior, they were in a position where NGOs had to point out 
deficiencies in the principles and their application. This is quite different from the 
defensive stance that was taken by the World Bank for most of the time. This equipped 
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EPFIs with a source of discursive power in environmental standard development. These 
financial institutions now consider themselves a stakeholder in World Bank policy 
development (Mulder et al. 2004) and also provide the international reference standard 
for private sector environmental regulation in finance. 
Equator Principle banks used their structural power over other sectors to set 
environmental standards for project finance. At the same time, the Equator Principles are 
an example for the exercise of discursive power. Initially pressured by an NGO campaign 
over the poor environmental performance of projects in their loan portfolios, which 
threatened to undermine their consumer lending business, banks seized the initiative by 
establishing the Equator Principles, and took ownership of their further development. 
Though they are still closely scrutinized and criticized by NGOs, they are less vulnerable 
to NGO attacks since having assumed ownership. However, this new-found source of 
discursive power may prove fragile when conflicts between “doing good” and their 
primary mission of generating profits occur. 
4.1.4 ECAs 
Similar to World Bank and private bank policy development, client countries did 
not have the power to bring their interests to consideration in ECA politics. This is 
because ECA standards are transdomestic in nature. These standards are domestic 
regulations aimed at domestic exporters. Their impact, however, occurs elsewhere: in 
effect, environmental conditions in another polity are being regulated. Furthermore, since 
the exporters need to make environmental impact information available to their ECA, 
project sponsors need to conduct environmental impact assessments, even if their 
domestic regulations provide for no such requirement. By means of these environmental 
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standards, advanced industrialized countries project their environmental regulations into 
other polities (see also chapter seven). 
In most states, these rules were devised without input from those polities in which 
the standards have the most direct impact. For many developing countries, environmental 
concerns are secondary to the establishment of infrastructure. While it is generally 
accepted that donors have a say over what is acceptable or unacceptable in terms of social 
and environmental externalities of development projects, this does not apply to ECA 
supported projects. By definition, ECAs provide support at market or near-market 
conditions, and supported projects are usually either of a commercial nature, or they are 
funded with little or no aid. As such, it is not surprising that project sponsors and 
recipient country governments are concerned about a loss of autonomy and control if the 
exporting countries’ ECAs require environmental impact assessments and potentially 
costly modifications to the projects’ design, despite compatibility with the recipient 
countries’ regulations. After all, costs that result from the compilation of assessments or 
from modifications to the projects are borne either by the project sponsor or by the 
recipient country. 
Recipient country concerns are not relevant for ECA policy-making, since they 
are not represented in seller country domestic politics. What does matter are the demands 
made on ECAs by domestic stakeholders, most importantly industry receiving 
government support through export credits and societal groups criticizing ECA 
operations. 
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The following two sections provide detailed discussions of U.S. and German ECA 
politics guided by the question of why these ECAs responded differently to similar 
environmental challenges. 
4.1.4.1 Ex-Im 
As a federal agency, Ex-Im is subject to oversight by the Treasury Department. In 
this organizational context, it would be fairly immune to politics beyond the executive. 
However, Ex-Im is a sunset institution and its charter needs to be renewed by Congress 
periodically. This makes Ex-Im subject not only to executive politics, but also to politics 
in the legislature. Given U.S. style interest group pluralism, this means that any interest 
group can lobby in ECA politics. Groups can bring their demands into Congressional 
lobbying and onto legislators’ agendas. The only requirement for groups to exercise this 
sort of instrumental power is finding support by a legislator. Once a groups has linked up 
with a Representative or Senator sympathetic to their cause, they can exercise direct 
instrumental power irrelevant of group composition and orientation. 
This feature allows U.S. environmental groups a level of access to ECA politics, 
which their German counterparts can only dream about: they can exercise instrumental 
power through a body which has complete control over Ex-Im. Congressional power over 
Ex-Im is a direct consequence of its need for statutory renewal. The U.S. Export-Import 
Bank exists at the mercy of Congress. Its charter needs to be reauthorized periodically 
and each reauthorization affords critics with an opportunity to modify Ex-Im’s mission or 
to simply retire this organization. A consequence is that Ex-Im becomes tasked with 
additional purposes to its primary mission of job creation through export promotion. U.S. 
lawmakers can write additional missions into Ex-Im’s charter and thus employ the 
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organization as a Congressional foreign policy instrument. At the same time, this direct 
legislative oversight makes the U.S. ECA very open to innovation; the environmental 
policy requirement written into Ex-Im’s 1992 reauthorization was only possible due to 
openness of Ex-Im’s reauthorization process. 
4.1.4.1.1 Power relationships 
The range of powerful competing demands on Ex-Im becomes obvious when one 
considers the missions the U.S. ECA is expected to accomplish: create jobs, serve foreign 
policy objectives, support small business, and protect the environment. These are 
demands that are made in similar form on German Hermes guarantees as well. In the 
United States, however, all of these proved successful, whereas the power constellations 
surrounding Hermes have rendered many such concerns less influential. The U.S. 
Congress has a history of tasking Ex-Im with foreign policy and other goals, restricting 
access to Ex-Im support based on these criteria rather than on prudent financial 
considerations. At times, such missions can stand in conflict with Ex-Im’s primary 
purpose of job creation through exports. In the individualistic U.S. legislature, the 
political benefits of furthering non-trade policy objectives, such as preventing the transfer 
of missiles from Russia to China (see below), may outweigh the political costs of 
hampering U.S. exports to Russia. This is not to say that business is powerless in U.S. 
ECA politics, but its structural power is not as pervasive as it is in Germany, since 
competing constituent interests can exert instrumental power in U.S. ECA politics. 
Export credit agencies almost everywhere have critics demanding stricter 
environmental requirements. Some ECAs are further challenged by a more fundamental 
critique seeking to abolish them altogether. These ‘corporate welfare’ critics claim that 
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ECAs distort markets and provide hidden subsidies to national champion industries, and 
thereby inefficiently allocate public funds. An ECA facing ‘corporate welfare’ critics 
may choose to appease and align with the environmental critics who usually want to 
retain and redirect this interventionist instrument. This coalition-building behavior makes 
ECAs facing multi-faceted critique, more open to environmental concerns than ECAs 
which have only to deal with environmental critics. Dryzek et al. (2003) make a similar 
argument about states’ reactions to social movements. Citing environmental initiatives by 
the Nixon administration, they argue, that states are more likely to include activists and 
their goals when their own legitimation is challenged than when they are left 
unchallenged. A variant of this behavior appears to be the case in regards to U.S. Ex-Im 
policy. 
Table 4.1 Top 10 U.S beneficiaries of Ex-Im Bank loans and long-term guarantees FY2000 (Lukas and 
Vásquez 2002) 
U.S Company  Revenues*  Total (Loans and 
Guarantees)* 
Percentage of Total 
Boeing Co.  51,321  3,384  43.1 
Bechtel International  14,300  1,475  18.8 
Varian Associates Inc.  704  674  8.6 
United Technologies1  26,583  334  4.3 
Willbros Engineers  314  200  2.5 
Halliburton Co.2  11,944  172  2.2 
Raytheon Engineers & Constructors  16,895  150  1.9 
Enron Development Corp.  100,789  132  1.7 
General Electric Co.  129,853  127  1.6 
Schlumberger Technology Corp.  10,034  87  1.1 
TOTAL   6,735  85.9 
GRAND TOTAL  362,737  7,844  
* In millions of U.S dollars. 
Sources: Export-Import Bank, 2000 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Export-Import Bank, 
2000); and the 2000 annual reports from each of the listed companies. 
Notes: (1) The figure for United Technologies includes loans and guarantees for Sikorsky 
Aircraft Corp., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of United Technologies. (2) The figure 
for Halliburton Co. includes loans and guarantees for Brown and Root International, Inc., 
which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Halliburton Co. 
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Every five years, when the Ex-Im Bank is reauthorized by Congress, it needs to 
defend itself against ‘corporate welfare’ critics, most prominently represented by the Cato 
Institute (Wayne 2002; personal communication with German activist, 17 July 2003, see 
for example: Lukas and Vásquez 2002) as well as environmental critics. Corporate 
welfare critics charge that ECAs benefit mostly large corporations which could do 
without such support and that they therefore represent an inefficient and redundant 
government expenditure. Table 4.1 illustrates Ex-Im’s portfolio concentration, which is at 
the center of this critique: most of Ex-Im’s cover is afforded for exports of a few large 
corporations. German Hermes Kreditversicherung, on the other hand, faces neither 
parliamentary reauthorization nor ‘corporate welfare’ critics. Thus, Hermes has little 
incentive to appease its environmental critics from whom it is also institutionally 
shielded, while the Ex-Im Bank must carefully balance its opponents to avoid a 
potentially strong coalition of corporate welfare critics and environmental critics that may 
undermine its very existence. In response to the corporate welfare critics, Ex-Im has been 
repeatedly tasked with the development of SME programs, most recently in its 2006 
reauthorization (Hammer 2006). 
Trade interest groups did not lobby against Ex-Im’s 1995 environmental policies. 
However, once they had been adopted, the administration considered it its responsibility 
to re-level the international playing field through harmonization. An industry lobbyist 
explained that Ex-Im’s policies did not pose considerable problems to industry and that 
industry did not lobby for international harmonization. The lobbyist attributed the 
administration’s harmonization initiative as driven by environmental advocates in the 
Clinton administration (interview with U.S. lobbyist, 7 July 2004). At the same time, 
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bureaucrats felt that they had an obligation to seek harmonization in order to level the 
playing field. They referred to a pact to seek international harmonization that was struck 
with U.S. exporters before Ex-Im’s environmental policies were implemented in 1995 
(interview with three U.S. officials, 7 July 2004). Structural business power is certainly 
not absent, but instead of controlling the agenda, business concerns merely inform 
implementation and mitigation of regulatory externalities. 
Being the first OECD country to have broad environmental policies for its ECA in 
place provided the U.S. government with considerable discursive power in this realm. It 
could frame the international harmonization initiative on its own terms and compelled 
other OECD governments to concede, that environmental regulation of export credits was 
indeed possible. Besides this morally advantageous position, early leadership also 
promised to reduce future adaptation costs from harmonization. The outcome of 
harmonization can be expected to most clearly resemble the initial proposal when 
compared to all other parties’ policies. Making a proposal on its own terms, thus enabled 
the U.S. government to tilt harmonization negotiations in its favor (see also Ochs and 
Schaper 2005). 
4.1.4.2 Hermes 
German Hermes export credit guarantees are organized very differently than U.S. 
export credits. They are administered by a consortium of private firms for the German 
federal government. Oversight is exercised by the Ministry for Economics, but the 
Bundestag has almost no control over the instrument. The corporatist setup including the 
Economics Ministry, the consortium of Euler-Hermes/PWC, and German trade 
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association, especially the powerful industry peak association Bund der Deutschen 
Industri (BDI), lends itself to industry capture. 
Parliamentary (§70 Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages) and executive rules (§24 
Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien, Teil II (GGO II)), regulate the 
role of experts and associations in policy-making. According to those provisions, these 
individuals and groups have a right to be heard in Parliament, and the Executive can draw 
on their expertise in drafting and implementing legislation. In practice, this means that 
the executive and legislature can decide whom to give access to deliberations and whom 
to exclude. 
Generally, the German state makes use of corporatist arrangements more in 
administrative procedures than in policy-making processes. However, in instances where 
fundamental policy challenges have the potential to trigger conflict, the government seeks 
to include relevant actors in policy formulation so as to base the new policy on a broad 
consensus. Analytically, this mode of politics falls short of ‘Konkordanzdemokratie’ 
(Lane and Ersson 2000), but certainly goes beyond the standard practice of other 
parliamentary systems; Reutter labels this as the ‘middle way’ (Reutter 2001: 75). He 
states that “though Germany was never considered a strongly corporatist country, the 
significance of associations for the political system’s capability to steer and integrate can 
hardly be overestimated” (Reutter 2001: 96).  
The executive almost exclusively – especially the Ministry for Economics and 
Technology – defined access to and the scope of negotiations for environmental standards 
for Hermes gurantees. The inter-ministerial committee (IMA) serves as an almost perfect 
example for a tight policy community. Composed of representatives from the ministries 
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for Economics, Finance, Economic Cooperation, and the Foreign Office, it resisted 
demands by the Minister for the Environment to be represented in this group. Economic 
peak associations, e.g. the Association of German Industry (BDI), have long secured 
influence by providing experts for the committee, but the policy community proved 
closed to environmental and social NGOs until the adoption of the 2001 standards. And 
even now, their role appears to be weaker than that of trade interests, which have 
successfully captured Hermes. Industry associations are formally included in 
deliberations to bring their expertise to the table, environmental NGOs are not. 
4.1.4.2.1 Power relationships 
Capture of Hermes is aided by the structure of Hermes clientele: Over a third of 
the total volume of guarantees is granted to a few large companies, resulting in a close-
knit relationship between the export credit agency and these firms. A phenomenon typical 
for export credits agencies; in the United States in 2001, “more than 60 percent of the 
U.S. Export-Import Bank’s loans and loan guarantees went to just three corporations, and 
almost 90 percent went to just ten” (Goldzimer 2002: 11). This means the industry wields 
considerable structural power over ECAs in either case. Developing policies against the 
preferences of national champion industries like Boeing in the United States or Siemens 
in Germany must always be politically costly. However, the corporatist policy 
community around Hermes guarantees also provides firms with privileged access to the 
IMA controlling German export credits and thus grants industry direct instrumental 
power over Hermes environmental policy development. Environmental and 
developmental NGOs, on the other hand, were largely barred from direct access. 
132 
German industry speaks with a unified voice when it comes to keeping access to 
export credits open and free of environmental restrictions. BDI, the German industry’s 
peak association, maintains close ties with the Economics Ministry. The association 
represents companies ranging from Siemens to SMEs, which use Hermes guarantees to 
facilitate their exports, regardless of company size. In a corporatist arrangement, the 
inter-ministerial committee also draws on associations’ expertise for cover decisions in 
the committee. In the United States, industry interests are more fragmented. Ex-Im’s 
largest client Boeing (see Table 4.1 for concentration of export credits among Ex-Im’s 
clients) has little to fear from environmental conditionalities attached to U.S. export 
credits, while smaller companies do not possess as much leverage. In Germany, Siemens 
and SMEs are equally affected, and can join forces against environmental standards for 
Hermes. Furthermore, Siemens’ hydro, nuclear, and other power operations are directly 
affected by environmental rules which specifically target large-scale infrastructure 
development. The influential German industry coalition managed to frame the debate on 
environmental standards for Hermes guarantees in terms of a zero-sum game: the 
environment vs. jobs. In the United States, the Coalition for Employment through 
Exports (CEE) lobbies for Ex-Im clients’ interests, but it is only one lobbying group 
among many in the pluralist U.S. system and has therefore nowhere as much power as the 
BDI wields in Germany. While the pluralist U.S. system limits access for special interest 
groups to the policy-making process, the corporatist German system explicitly co-opts 
such societal groups into the policy process. 
Industry’s structural and discursive power becomes apparent when analyzing the 
German policy debate on environmental standards for export credits. By 2001, NGOs had 
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managed to frame the debate in such a way that the desirability of some sort of 
environmental policy for Hermes guarantees was largely accepted. However, industry 
had also managed to establish job creation as another important discourse in discussions 
about Hermes reform. Thus, two intertwined discourses dominated the Hermes debates. 
The prominent issue was the importance of Hermes guarantees for job creation. As 
Germany ranked second in exports worldwide, a third of German jobs was said to depend 
on exports, and “Hermes secure[d] more than 216,000 jobs per year, many of them in the 
high technology sector”, according to a Prognos study (Weidig et al. 2000) cited by 
Economics Minister Müller. This argument, used heavily in the support of the Hermes 
instrument and thus often against stricter environmental standards, made Hermes appear 
more important for German industry than it was. While Germany did rank second in 
export volume world-wide, its relative export dependency was not as high. In fact, many 
smaller countries exported a higher share of domestic production. Here, the Economics 
Ministry and industry were successful in shaping the discourse and raising the political 
cost for any reform attempts that might complicate access to Hermes financing for 
exporters. 
Table 4.2 clearly demonstrates that the political discourse on the question of the 
importance of exports for the German economy provided a skewed interpretation of 
reality. While Germany may depend on exports to a larger degree in absolute terms when 
compared to other OECD nations, its relative export orientation comes in at only around 
16th within an OECD field of 24.10 Steinreiber (2002) showed that the hypothetical 
                                               
10 Not surprisingly, Australia, the United States, and Japan share the last three places and it is these 
countries that have been most active in raising environmental and/or transparency standards for export 
credit agencies. 
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elimination of export credits in Germany would result in a loss in GDP of 0.4% - 0.6%, 
whereas a small country like Austria would lose 1.1% - 1.8% of its GDP. 










Luxembourg 118.36 1 127.53 1 137.78 1 155.86 1 
Ireland 79.8 2 86.59 2 88.74 2 94.87 2 
Belgium 74.61 3 75.12 3 75.61 3 86.29 3 
Netherlands 61.08 4 60.95 4 60.56 4 67.23 4 
Austria 41.85 6 43.53 7 45.58 5 50.13 5 
Sweden 42.67 5 43.7 6 43.52 7 47.18 6 
Norway 40.88 7 36.92 11 38.95 10 46.61 7 
Switzerland 39.62 9 40.27 9 42.19 9 46.35 8 
Canada 39.95 8 41.92 8 43.53 6 46 9 
Korea, Rep. 34.73 13 49.72 5 42.34 8 44.79 10 
Denmark 36.45 12 35.78 12 37.87 11 43.77 11 
Finland 39.07 10 38.79 10 37.83 12 42.91 12 
New Zealand 28.64 15 30.03 15 31.32 14 36.74 13 
Iceland 36.89 11 35.53 13 34.65 13 34.71 14 
Germany 27.92 17 29.01 16 29.71 16 33.73 15 
Portugal 30.42 14 30.85 14 29.81 15 31.9 16 
Spain 26.75 18 27.25 17 27.49 17 29.99 17 
France 25.5 20 26.11 20 25.94 19 28.55 18 
Italy 26.37 19 26.35 19 25.54 20 28.36 19 
United Kingdom 28.56 16 26.61 18 26.27 18 28.11 20 
Greece 19.69 22 19.84 21 20.56 21 24.98 21 
Australia 20.27 21 18.94 22 20.02 22 22.85 22 
United States 11.71 23 11.07 23 10.75 23 11.24 23 
Japan 10.74 24 10.67 24 9.99 24 10.76 24 
Source: World Development Indicators 2003 (World Bank 2003). Rank ordering added by 
the author. 
The Economics Ministry and industry were also successful in defining the job 
security discourse. The Prognos study (Weidig et al. 2000) estimated that the Hermes 
instrument would secure 140,000 – 216,000 jobs (on average, 1995-99). The Economics 
Ministry and industry usually referred to the high end of this range – even exaggerating 
this figure as cited above. However, neither the Greens, the PDS, nor the NGOs 
attempted to debunk these arguments which could have possibly strengthened their 
positions in the policy process. 
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The second discourse regarded the appropriateness of environmental standards for 
Hermes guarantees. Here, the Economics Ministry and business interests also attempted 
to redefine the discourse. They did not succeed, however, in framing the debate as one on 
the export of environmentally beneficial technology. The environmental NGOs were 
critical in structuring this discourse as one concerned with the cumulative environmental 
impacts of projects to which German exports contributed. At the heart of the matter was 
the question about whether the appropriateness of environmental standards for export 
credits is one that accepts environmental and economic concerns as fundamentally linked, 
or whether one sees them as opposing concepts. While the former notion can be linked to 
a holistic view of the world, i.e. the New Environmental Paradigm, the latter represents a 
more traditional productionist view, i.e. the Dominant Social Paradigm (Milbrath 1984). 
In examining the discourses, I conducted a content analysis of statements by 
representatives of the four parties represented in Bundestag, the Economics Ministry, the 
Association of German Industry (BDI), and the NGO coalition, Hermeskampagne. 
Statements found in the record of the 14th Bundestag’s 183rd session (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2001e) provide the sources for the party and Economics Ministry statements. 
As these are prepared statements outlining the parties’ positions, similar documents were 
chosen for the NGO and BDI positions. Alexander Böhmer, the BDI’s ECA expert, 
contributed an article to the BDI’s Info-Service bulletin in March 2001 (Böhmer 2001) 
and the Hermeskampagne network of German NGOs working on the topic issued a “Call 
to Parliamentarians” (Hermeskampagne 2001) in January 2001. Key terms such as 
“environment,” “sustainability,” “export promotion,” and “efficiency” were counted and 
coded according whether they were used in a neutral/descriptive fashion, supportive of 
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the dominant social paradigm, or used in such a way that favored the new environmental 
paradigm. Table 4.3 summarizes the results of this examination. 
Table 4.3 Paradigmatic orientation of parties, economics ministry, NGOs, and BDI 
  
Number of references 
in statement 
Relative support for 
Dominant Social 
Paradigm 
Relative support for 
New Environmental 
Paradigm 
Gudrun Kopp, FDP 10 90 % 0 % 
Alexander Böhmer, BDI 25 44 % 0 % 
Siegmar Mosdorf, BMWi 16 25 % 6 % 
Rolf Hempelmann, SPD 43 35 % 20 % 
Siegfried Helias, CDU/CSU 40 25 % 40 % 
Hermeskampagne 71 1 % 42 % 
Carsten Hübner, PDS 17 0 % 53 % 
Angelika Köster-Loßlack, 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 23 0 % 67 % 
 
While all analyzed statements made references to environmental, social, and 
developmental concerns, these references displayed varying support for either paradigm 
or neutrality. Clearly, the need for some sort of environmental standard was generally 
accepted; the contentious issue remained to what extent these standards could be allowed 
to jeopardize economic interests. While all statements referred to environmental, social, 
and developmental concerns, statements by the Greens, the PDS, and the NGOs 
completely left out questions relating to job creation through Hermes and to international 
competition, while these issues took a central position in the statements by SPD, 
CDU/CSU, FDP, BMWi, and BDI. CDU/CSU, FDP, and BMWi (actors who can be said 
to be relatively close to a position promoting industry interests) engaged in both the 
economic and the environmental discourses, whereas the Greens and the PDS who are 
closer to the NGOs on this issue only engaged in the environmental discourse and did not 
challenge the other parties’ definition of economic trade-offs. 
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Industry pulled all stops in its crusade against environmental standards to Hermes. 
In addition to its solid instrumental and structural power over export credit policy, it also 
managed to introduce job creation as the primary concern into the discourse over Hermes 
policy. NGOs, on the other hand, did not have sufficient power to influence this policy 
making process considerably beyond defending environmental protection as a desirable 
goal. Their allies in the Bundestag, the Greens and the PDS, did not even dare to debunk 
the pre-dominant job-creation discourse. The alliance with the Greens, who were part of 
the ruling coalition at that time, should have given NGOs indirect instrumental access to 
Hermes policy making, but overpowering industry interests meant that even the Green 
environmental and foreign ministries were weary to pick a fight with the economics 
ministry on this issue. 
4.1.5  Assessing power relationships 
Power has been exerted in two directions: NGOs successfully pressed for 
environmental policies and financial institutions used their new policies to re-position 
themselves in the debate over environmental standards. NGOs targeted financial 
institutions to adopt environmental policies through channels that allowed them to 
instrumentalize their discursive power: through the U.S. government in the World Bank 
case, through national governments in the ECA case, and through consumers with regard 
to private banks. Though all showed vulnerability vis-à-vis these strategies, the resulting 
environmental policies provided three of these actors – the World Bank, Equator banks, 
and Ex-Im – with an additional source of discursive power which they now wield with 
respect to defining standards of acceptable environmental performance. Table 4.4 
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summarizes the manifestations of structural and discursive power discussed on the 
preceding pages. 
Table 4.4 Financial Institutions and manifestation of power 
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All sets of standards rely on financial providers’ structural power to pass 
regulatory tasks on to the recipients of finance. This concentrates the benefits of 
regulation on the side of the providers, whereas the costs are borne by the recipients. As 
such, using financial leverage as a regulatory instrument is highly efficient from the 
perspective of the regulator.  
Furthermore, all of these finance providers were subject to similar pressures. They 
were all targets of concerted NGOs campaigns, and were all subsequently exposed to a 
proliferation of environmental norms promoting the integration of environmental 
objectives into business decisions – a.k.a. NGOs’ discursive power which was channeled 
through chains of other actors. This channeling occurred with different degrees of 
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effectiveness. It was highly effective for promoting environmental reform at the World 
Bank, private banks, and Ex-Im. German Hermes credits, however, proved to be well 
shielded from NGO influence beyond their discursive power. This is in line with 
Carbonell and Stephen’s (2003) hypothesis that ECAs with great institutional autonomy 
are less prone to change than those with less autonomy. 
What differs among the three sets of policies is the length of chains of delegation 
in regulating environmental impacts of development projects. It is longest for ECAs and 
shortest for private banks. Pressured by NGOs, governments tasked their ECAs to devise 
environmental policies. The effectiveness of these policies, in turn, relies on exporters to 
use their role in implementing the project to pressure the project developer to bring the 
project into compliance. Equator banks, on the other hand, have direct influence on the 
project developer to make the project compliant with their policies. The World Bank 
standards occupy a middle position with regard to the length of this chain of delegation: 
governments required the Bank to develop environmental policies which affected both in-
house project development as well as required clients to plan their project in line with 
Bank standards and policies. 
Much more interesting than the process by which these policies proliferated and 
their operating mechanisms are their implications for the institutions’ power sources. 
While the German government failed to assume ownership of the environmental reform 
process and reap the benefits of an increased power base, the World Bank, Equator 
Banks, and Ex-Im fared much better. By comprehensively engaging the issue of 
environmental policies, they have established themselves as authorities on this question 
and set the benchmarks against which they themselves will be judged. This gain in 
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discursive power may not be instrumental in regular operations, but it increases the 
legitimacy of these policies as much as it helps to improve the institutions’ standing. 
The Bank’s environmental safeguard and operational policies have become the 
internationally accepted benchmark for environmental governance of international 
financial institutions. ECA policies as well as the Equator Principles are derived from this 
standard and the World Bank Group’s IFC has been an important facilitator in the 
adoption of the Equator Principles. Similarly, the Equator banks now have ownership of 
the further development of these policies. Though they are still closely scrutinized and 
criticized by NGOs, they are less vulnerable to NGO attacks since assuming norm 
ownership. However, this new found source of discursive power may prove fragile when 
conflicts between “doing good” and their primary mission of generating profits occur. 
The World Bank has solved this challenge by re-defining its primary mission to 
sustainable development. It remains to be seen how the Equator Banks will manage this 
tension. Ex-Im’s policies put it into a position where the U.S. government could team up 
with NGOs to push for change at other OECD ECAs. Ex-Im turned from being a target 
into being an ally of NGOs and gained partial ownership of the reform process. 
This section has shown how targeting financial actors allowed NGOs to transform 
their rather weak discursive power base into instrumental power over business actors in 
other sectors. The preceding discussion has demonstrated that financial leverage was not 
applied directly, but that civil society actors rather utilized a chain of power relationships 
to effect change in infrastructure project design. Along these chains of leverage, power 
was transformed from NGOs’ own discursive power base to structural power over project 
developers. Though power has thus morphed into a more immediate kind, this chain may 
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also amplify countervailing forces during the implementation of these rules, potentially 
weakening them.  
Through the provision of project financing, financial institutions wield structural 
power over project sponsors. When project developers expect the involvement of ECAs, 
the World Bank or Equator banks, they design projects with the financial institution’s 
rules in mind. This is a decision made by business whether to get involved with an 
environmentally problematic project, and whether to seek support from a “greened” 
financial institution for such a project. This decision is impacted by the likelihood of 
success for such an application as well as by the financial institution’s transparency 
provisions. Projects which are likely to fall into a category of high environmental impact 
are subject to publication of their environmental reviews for World Bank and ECA 
support. In this process, the identity of a business associated with a problematic project 
may become public and create reputational risks in addition to competitors learning about 
the firm’s intents through the available environmental information. Thus, transparency 
provisions create an incentive not to seek support from greened institutions for morally 
hazardous projects which are likely to spark public opposition. In effect, this is an 
instrumentalization of the policies’ discursive power: firms need to consider the effects of 
being branded “environmentally unfriendly.” Transparency provisions for Equator banks 
are weaker which also reduces reputational risks for clients. However, this is where 
NGOs continue to exert considerable pressure on EPFIs (BankTrack 2006; Chan-Fishel 
2005) and it would not be surprising if transparency provisions in future modifications of 
the Principles were tightened, thus equipping Equator policies with additional structural 
power akin to the World Bank and ECAs. 
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Through name-and-shame tactics, NGOs can exert direct discursive power over 
financial institutions or utilize other actors’ more immediate forms to effect change. In all 
three instances of standard-setting, NGOs discursive power was transformed into 
structural power over project developers. In the case of ECAs, NGOs pressured 
governments and legislatures, which in turn mandated ECAs to devise such policies. By 
requiring environmental assessments from exporters, they in turn need to rely on 
exporters to furnish this information and to work with project developers to implement 
any project modifications. It is apparent that given the delegated authority along this 
chain, governments – ECAs – exporters – project developers, any effects can be only 
rather indirect. The impact that any single ECA or group of ECAs can have on project 
implementation further depends on the relevance of ECA support for the project in 
question, i.e. that ECA’s structural power with regard to the specific project. If financing 
of a project would likely fall apart without ECA cover, project developers are more likely 
to be responsive to environmental requirements by ECAs than if ECA support is not 
crucial for project success. In cases where ECA support is not essential, ECAs 
furthermore find themselves caught between the competing mandates of promoting 
domestic exports and protecting the environment. These power chains are shorter for the 
World Bank and EPFIs. The World Bank can work directly with project developers as 
can Equator banks. Neither needs to utilize exporters as yet another intermediary. Equator 
banks were subject to NGOs’ direct discursive power (with some of it channeled through 
consumers), whereas the World Bank campaign instrumentalized state leverage over this 
international organization. Similar to ECAs, the World Bank’s and EPFIs’ influence on 
project design hinges on the relevance of their financing. The fewer alternative sources of 
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finance are available to the project developer the greater is the structural drive towards 
green projects. The impact of NGOs’ transformed discursive power depends on the 
availability of alternatives to “green” financing (chapter seven and Wright and 
Rwabizambuga 2006). 
Through the adoption of comprehensive environmental policies, the World Bank, 
Equator Principle banks, and Ex-Im established far-reaching environmental norms which 
provided these institutions with new sources of discursive power. In addition to the 
effects on bank business, one cannot ignore the leadership role Equator banks have 
assumed with respect to setting a new banking standard. Their comprehensive response to 
criticism by NGOs which was facilitated by the IFC has enabled them to take ownership 
of the discussions relating to the environmental performance of projects supported by 
them. Analogous to the World Bank, their adoption of environmental rules has equipped 
them with a source of considerable discursive power: they are setting industry standards 
against which all actors in the field are evaluated. Thus, they wield not only structural 
power over their clients, but also discursive power over peer institutions, including those 
that have not adopted the Equator Principles. Instead of defending the application of 
environmental criteria to project evaluation, non-adopters need to justify why they choose 
not to sign onto the emerging industry standard. Being the first ECA to have a 
comprehensive environmental policy allowed Ex-Im to define the terms of the 
international harmonization game which will be analyzed in the following chapters. 
What sets ECAs apart is that recipients of their support have a powerful position 
in domestic politics. World Bank client countries have little control over this institution, 
whereas donor countries are very powerful due to the distribution of votes according to 
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contributions and the Bank’s dependence on regular IDA replenishments. Private bank 
clients also have little power of these financial institutions beyond the banks’ structural 
dependence on clients. Given the scarcity of capital, this is not a strong source of 
structural power, because banks are more likely to find new clients for their services than 
vice versa. This means that ECAs are the only group of financial institutions that are 
subject to substantial client power. The next section explores how these varying power 
relationships are related to the content of environmental rules. 
4.2 Rule Content 
The theoretical framework developed in chapter two suggests that both power 
held by those making demands on rule-setters and rule content matter in determining the 
costs and benefits of new rules. Political benefits can offset regulatory costs and vice 
versa. Realizing that rule-setters need to satisfy competing demands for environmental 
reform and unhindered access to finance, this section analyzes rule content and how it has 
been impacted by these competing demands. Rule content is the only aspect rule-makers 
have close control over. Since they are reacting to perceived political costs and benefits 
of rules, we can consider rule content to depend on political costs and benefits. 
Given the predominance of the U.S. government’s and NGOs’ power over World 
Bank rule-setting, the rules governing environmental performance of World Bank 
supported projects reflect primarily the interests of these actors. However, World Bank 
rules evolved over time with the Bank initially responding to demands for environmental 
policies and procedures with small and incremental reforms that did little to satisfy U.S. 
and NGO demands. In repeated reform rounds, pressure by the Bank’s largest 
shareholder and NGO resulted in increasingly more ambitious rules. This minimalist and 
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incremental process was less driven by client country concerns than by a desire to 
minimize adaptation costs at the Bank. The delegation of the rule-setting task made 
regulatory costs irrelevant to the principal governments. However, these costs did matter 
for the World Bank as the agent; the logical consequence was foot-dragging by the Bank 
in rule-making and agency slack in implementation until the creation of the inspection 
panel for fire-alarm oversight. The Bank’s environmental policy history has been covered 
in the literature and a detailed evaluation of the change in rule content over time is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. What seems clear from existing accounts is that 
client states did not have the power to influence this environmental reform process 
considerably and that rules therefore represent U.S. government preferences (see for 
example: Danaher 1994; Farooqi 1993; Fox and Brown 1998; Rich 1994; Reed 1997; 
Thorne 2004; Brown 2002; Wade 1997; Horta 1996; Park 2007; Nielson and Tierney 
2003, 2005; Gutner 2005b, 2005a; Clark, Fox, and Treakle 2003). 
With the inclusion of qualitative and quantitative criteria for making project 
decision and the creation of the inspection panel to monitor compliance, World Bank 
rules go much further than U.S. NEPA provisions and USAID rules. NEPA merely 
requires the assessment and consideration of environmental externalities of supported 
projects. Once such a review has been conducted, NEPA establishes no environmental 
performance criteria. Even a highly environmentally damaging project can receive 
federal support, as long the potential for environmental damage and mitigation strategies 
have been assessed properly before deciding on support. World Bank rules go beyond 
this purely procedural requirement: the Pollution Prevention and Abatement Handbook 
(PPAH) prescribes limits to acceptable environmental impacts. These rules not only 
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detail how to assess environmental impacts but also provide criteria based on which 
under-performing projects need to be turned down.  
Another innovation in World Bank rules is the inspection panel, which allows 
affected people to trigger investigations concerning the compliance of operations with 
Bank rules. In national contexts, this function is typically provided by the court system. 
For an international organization, like the World Bank, it is unusual to have a mechanism 
in place so that individuals can bring their grievances forward. 
Both, PPAH and inspection panel clearly represent the principal’s interest to 
reduce agency slack. Neither the establishment of clear-cut decision criteria nor a 
provision for hearing citizens’ grievances are in the interest of client countries seeking 
uncomplicated access to finance. Regulatory costs also make them unattractive from the 
perspective of the adopting institution. They are, however, a clear manifestation of the 
principals’ dominance over decision-making at the Bank (see Gutner 2005b, 2005a; 
Nielson and Tierney 2003, 2005). 
The Equator Principles were sketched out in very short time. Possible 
explanations can be found in the low-profile nature of the principles which do not 
prescribe specific procedures beyond requiring classification of projects and subsequent 
environmental management plans for certain categories of projects. Combined with the 
complete lack of compliance mechanisms, adopting banks would face only minimal costs 
from the adaptation of the principles, regardless of whether or not they intended to 
implement them. The Equator Principles were designed so that participating banks could 
derive reputational benefits from having instituted environmental policies while at the 
same time minimizing adaptation costs. Adopting financial institutions declare to adhere 
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to the principles while the implementation is mostly left to the banks themselves. This 
allows them to design internal rules and procedures that only require minimal changes in 
operations and thus minimize adaptation costs.  
Addressing environmental risks was also important to banks from a risk 
management perspective. Identifying environmentally problematic projects and removing 
them from their portfolios allowed banks to reduce their overall risk exposure. The key to 
success laid in the correct level of environmental standards: strict enough to sort out bad 
projects, but lenient enough not to jeopardize too much business volume. 
4.2.1 Ex-Im 
The lawsuits of the 1970s presented Ex-Im with a formidable challenge: 
implementation of NEPA’s review procedures to all its transactions. Given the 
administrative burden an adoption of NEPA rules would have resulted in, it is not 
surprising that Ex-Im, just as any other internationally active agency, sought to escape 
this requirement. USAID developed its own set of “NEPA-light” rules early on to escape 
further criticism. Ex-Im, however, weathered the lawsuits of the 1970s with few 
concessions. The 1979 compromise required of Ex-Im to conduct concise environmental 
reviews, but it did not have to follow NEPA rules with the exception of nuclear projects 
and such projects affecting the domestic U.S. environment. The fairly unspecific concise 
reviews provided Ex-Im with a considerable degree of administrative discretion and 
helped to lower adaptation costs (Peirce 1979). 
Initially this appeared to be a highly beneficial bargain. Ex-Im could pacify NGO 
criticism with minimal changes in rules and procedures. In other words, political benefits 
came at low regulatory cost. However, in contrast to USAID, the question of stricter 
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environmental rules for Ex-Im never completely left the political agenda. The 
environmental policy requirement in Ex-Im’s 1992 reauthorization was a direct 
consequence of the still lingering criticism. At that point there was considerable pressure 
to develop policies that would contain both substantial standards and transparency 
provisions (interview with U.S. lobbyist, 7 July 2004). 
The 1992 reauthorization also introduced Ex-Im’s authority to withhold financing 
out of environmental reasons; a provision that was explicitly and prominently mentioned 
in the reauthorization bill’s passage establishing the environmental policy requirement. 
This provision brought with it a substantial innovation. Not only did Ex-Im rules contain 
transparency provisions and environmental review modeled after NEPA, but by allowing 
for the negation of support based on environmental project performance, the new Ex-Im 
rules also required criteria to differentiate supportable projects from those not worthy of 
help by Ex-Im. To that point, no other domestic agency had comparable evaluation 
criteria. Only the World Bank, after which Ex-Im policies were molded, had similar rules 
contained in the PPAH. Given the propensity towards litigation in the United States, such 
unambiguous decision criteria were important so that Ex-Im decisions could withstand 
legal challenges, but they also complicated access to export credits. Since the United 
States did not have an explicit industrial policy, such limitations were considered 
unimportant (interview with three U.S. officials, 7 July 2004). These rules were only 
possible because of industry’s limited structural power over Ex-Im policy development. 
The 1995 policies mandated screening and categorization of projects followed by 
a review of those projects with significant environmental impacts including the 
solicitation of public comments for the impact assessment. Cover decisions were to be 
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made based on qualitative and quantitative criteria that were loosely derived from World 
Bank policies. Neither environmental review nor transparency were substantial regulatory 
innovations for Ex-Im. While screening, categorization, and assessment of all supported 
exports was a change in operations, Ex-Im already possessed the required regulatory 
tools since it already (and still does) conducted full-blown NEPA-compatible 
environmental reviews for its nuclear business and those projects affecting the U.S. 
domestic environment. Implementation of the 1995 standards required an adaptation of 
this already established review process in a lighter form, but it did not require any 
substantial regulatory reform beyond modifying project review procedures. The political 
benefits of environmental reform could be harvested at limited regulatory cost. 
World Bank policies were chosen as the reference standard fro Ex-Im since they 
were generally recognized, easily obtainable, and they promised to keep bad projects out 
of Ex-Im’s portfolio (interview with three U.S. officials, 7 July 2004). The choice of 
reference standard was not guided by concerns of its effects on business beyond the 
motivation to purge problematic projects. This is quite different from German Hermes 
politics, where the government’s preference for certain international standards to be 
referenced in the Common Approaches was driven by the restrictions one or another 
international standard could impose on supportable exports.  
The introduction of clear-cut decision criteria was a substantial innovation over 
prior environmental policies among U.S. federal agencies. However, the similarity of the 
World Bank environmental review process with its roots in the U.S. NEPA and Ex-Im’s 
own NEPA-inspired review process meant that the World Bank standards were fairly 
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compatible with Ex-Im’s procedures. Even this innovation did not entail significant 
adaptation costs. 
Ultimately, decisions about U.S. export credits were made by Ex-Im’s board. The 
board could approve exports credits even if the project did not meet the relevant 
environmental criteria. Early on, the board used its discretion quite widely to approve 
projects that did not meet individual requirements, especially those pertaining to NOX 
emissions. By 1999, most applications for support were in compliance with Ex-Im’s 
policies. The only two projects that were formally turned down were the Three Gorges 
Dam (prior to the implementation of the 1995 policies) and the Camisea pipeline. 
Nevertheless, a number of projects were withdrawn by the applicants before final 
decisions were made by the board. These included inter alia the Turkish Ilisu dam (which 
is now supported with German Hermes credit guarantees), hardwood forestry in Peru, and 
a mine in Papua New Guinea (interview with three U.S. officials, 7 July 2004). The 
discretion left to the Ex-Im board created a safety valve to deviate from established 
policies when necessary. Clearly, this can also be interpreted as a cost-limiting measure. 
Their freedom of choice over support application allows the Ex-Im board to side-step its 
own established criteria when refusing support to an exporter could result in significant 
political costs. 
Ex-Im’s environmental policies were designed in a away to provide the political 
benefits of addressing the environmental challenge and reducing its exposure to 
problematic projects without requiring costly regulatory changes. Beyond the domestic 
immunity from further environmental challenges, Ex-Im’s environmental policies also 
provided this agency with a good bargaining position for international harmonization of 
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ECA policies. The combination of early domestic leadership with rules and procedures 
similar to the international ones used by the World Bank, meant that Ex-Im could attempt 
to upload its policies to the international level and expect them to survive largely 
unchanged through harmonization. 
4.2.2 Hermes 
Similar to Ex-Im policy development, Hermes rule-setting was guided by a 
strategy of providing sufficient political benefits while minimizing regulatory costs. Until 
2001, all Hermes rules regarding the environment only addressed the application process, 
but not decision-making as opposed to Ex-Im rules which contained detailed 
environmental review procedures and decision criteria. Starting in 1995, applicants for 
Hermes guarantees were required to supply an informal memorandum on the 
environmental effects of the project for which support was sought. With the scope and 
format left entirely to the applicant, this requirement imposed relatively small compliance 
costs on the exporter and next to none on the ECA. No formal rules existed for the further 
treatment and usage of the memorandum. In 1998 the memorandum requirement was 
specified by introducing five questions which applicants were to address in their 
submissions. Purpose of this was “document to the outside, that environmental aspects 
are considered in the decision-making process” (Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 1998). 
By establishing low-profile procedural rules for the content of applications, that did not 
deal with internal review and decision processes, policy-makers obviously hoped to gain 
the political benefit of having new environmental rules in place without committing 
themselves to changes which could bear substantial regulatory costs. 
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The 1998 modifications did not bring closure to the issue but rather helped to 
spawn even more pressure on Hermes. The new guidelines adopted in 2001 took their 
cues from the OECD negotiations on the Common Approaches which had produced a 
draft set of common rules for ECAs at that time. In a substantial departure from prior 
German practice, the domesticated OECD draft rules established procedures for 
screening, classification, and review of environmental impacts and also linked cover 
decisions to international standards. In this respect, the new rules represented a major 
innovation for the administration of German export credits requiring considerable 
adaptations in internal procedures. Nevertheless, the new rules also contained 
considerable flexibility. Environmental reviews of category A projects did not require full 
environmental impact assessments in all cases and instead of tying cover decisions to 
specific standards, a benchmarking process was established in which project performance 
was compared to a range of international standards without requiring compliance with 
either one.  
Compounding political pressures stemming from domestic critics and 
international harmonization in the OECD Export Credit Group required the German 
government to adopt environmental rules for Hermes that were compatible with those 
being negotiated in Brussels. At the same time, the government sought to limit political 
costs of implementing these rules by maximizing flexibility in their terms. The result was 
a set of provisions that by-and-large resembled U.S. and OECD rules, but allowed to 
minimize the impact of these rules on export support. Given the restriction to OECD-
compatible regulation, the new rules created considerable regulatory costs, but their 
provisions were nevertheless designed in a way to best balance political costs and 
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benefits stemming from industry and NGOs. Flexibility in apparently rigorous rules was 
the key ingredient in meeting competing demands. For category B projects, for example 
“plausible criteria for environmental relevance or generally acceptable information [wa]s 
sufficient” for environmental review (Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG 2001: 5; United 
States General Accounting Office 2003). Similarly, stakeholder consultation (typically a 
key ingredient in environmental impact assessments) was merely suggested, not required, 
or even expected. Finally, the passage concerning transparency on the application form 
instructed the applicant: “Please delete this paragraph if you do not consent” to making 
your EIA public (Antrag auf Übernahme einer Exportkreditgarantie für ein 
Ausfuhrgeschäft; http://www.agaportal.de/pdf/antrag_b_g.pdf; accessed 12 October 
2007). 
When compared to Ex-Im rules, German provisions appear fairly similar at first 
view. Both sets of rules were built around screening, categorization, review, and 
decisions using established standards. However, below the surface, German rules are 
much weaker. They do not provide for ex-ante transparency and exporters can even opt 
out of ex-post transparency. German rules apply to projects beyond a higher threshold of 
EUR 15 million and evaluation is limited to components supplied by German companies 
rather than entire projects. Coupled with the flexibility discussed above, they represent a 
considerably weaker incarnation of U.S. rules. This weakness appears to have been 
brought about by two compounding factors: industry’s structural power opposing 
environmental rules and high adaptation costs to fully implement U.S. style procedural 
rules and transparency provision. This latter aspect will be discussed in detail in chapters 
five and six in the context of regulatory harmonization. 
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One key difference between German and U.S. regulatory cultures concerning 
ECA politics is the range of policy objectives export credits are expected to serve. While 
German politics has limited Hermes credits to be employed for export promotion and 
industrial policy concerns only, U.S. policy-makers have tasked Ex-Im with additional 
missions. The inclusion of language in Congressional reauthorizations of the Ex-Im Bank 
that pursues goals not directly related to trade is common-place in the United States. The 
1992 reauthorization which established Ex-Im’s environmental policies, for example, 
also included provisions prohibiting assistance to “Marxist-Leninist countries” and to 
countries which violated human rights (United States Congress 1992a). In 1997, the 
Export-Import Bank Authorization bill provided for a prohibition of transactions 
involving Russian firms, in case Russia were to transfer SS-N-22 Sunburn or SS-N-26 
Yakhont missiles to China (United States Congress 1997). 
German Hermes credits were granted in connection with other political 
objectives, but Hermes’ only political mandate has been domestic job creation through 
export promotion. Examples of politically-minded export credit deals include the German 
government’s support for the construction of a Transrapid maglev train connection in 
Shanghai, and the extension of the Hermes program to Pakistan at a time when an 
international coalition was created for a post-Taliban government in Afghanistan.  
In addition to a grant of Euro 100 million, the German government provided Euro 
500 million in Hermes export guarantees to the Chinese for the construction of a 
Transrapid connection between downtown Shanghai and the Shanghai airport (Eichels 
Baustelle in Shanghai 2002). The Transrapid case is a good example of a combination of 
both diplomatic and economic reasoning behind credit guarantees. Diplomatically, it 
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improved relations between Germany and China, and at the same time, helped to 
establish hitherto experimental technology on world markets. In the Pakistani case, 
diplomatic reasoning certainly played the predominant role (Ehrlich, Thornhill, and 
Bokhari 2001). 
Nevertheless, these politically motivated cases of export promotion fall short of 
the U.S. practice of tasking the ECA with programmatic political objectives or defining 
exclusion criteria on political grounds. The sole exception to this rule are the 
environmental conditions attached to Hermes credits: both the establishment of an 
environmental review process and the adoption of the nuclear exclusion criterion are 
uncharacteristic of the sectorally-conceived Hermes instrument. 
The only aspect where German rules markedly exceed the U.S./OECD reference 
standards is the exclusion of nuclear technology from support with export credit 
guarantees. This is owed to the SPD/Green coalition’s joint interest in phasing out 
nuclear power production and the absence of major domestic producers of nuclear 
technology. Siemens’ remaining nuclear power plant business is considered conventional 
since it supplies conventional technology only. The only ambitious aspect of German 
environmental ECA standards can be found where political benefits can be had without 
compromising support to exporters. 
Since 2004, domestic Hermes policies are implemented side by side with the 
Common Approaches, but the government has thus far refrained from adapting the 2001 
standards to the new OECD rules – most likely out of concern over additional regulatory 
costs and a loss of flexibility that could be politically costly. 
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4.2.3 Assessing rule content 
Environmental rules adopted by the financial institutions discussed here all reflect 
the power of competing demands made on these institutions. World Bank rules almost 
exclusively represent the interests of the U.S. government as its most powerful principal. 
Detailed environmental review procedures coupled with firm decisions criteria, broad 
transparency, and a strong compliance mechanism substantially green this institution and 
limit agency slack in implementation. Private banks were subject to NGO’s discursive 
power and consumer pressure. Their Equator Principles employ similar review 
procedures and decision criteria as World Bank rules, but they lack transparency 
provisions and a compliance mechanism to monitor and enforce them. This is a result of 
the banks taking ownership of the rule-making process and devising rules to their liking 
instead of being forced to adopt a particular set of rules. Ex-Im environmental policies 
were also adopted from World Bank rules. Similar to the Equator Banks, Ex-Im was free 
to develop its own rules, provided that they fulfilled the requirements of its Congressional 
mandate. World Bank rules originated from domestic U.S. rules and were thus a good fit 
with Ex-Im regulatory culture. Given its prior experience with environmental review 
under NEPA for a subset of its projects, the imported World Bank rules did not provide a 
fundamental challenge on the operational level. Nevertheless, the incorporation of firm 
decisions criteria was a substantial innovation over strictly procedural NEPA rules. 
Discretion held by Ex-Im’s Board helped to soften the impact of these new rules on 
project decisions, but this innovation was only possible due to limited opposition by 
industry. Environmental rules for German Hermes guarantees were created in reaction to 
environmental criticism of Hermes. Minimal and incremental reforms were meant to 
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appease critics without substantially interfering with operations. This holds true even for 
the 2001 standards which were derived from the OECD Common Approaches and for the 
first time introduced procedural rules for the review process, established limited 
transparency of cover decisions, and referenced international standards for these 
decisions. Nevertheless, they represent the weakest possible interpretation of the OECD 
rules owed to the overwhelming structural power of industry over the rule-making 
process. 
4.3 Conclusion 
Given the similarity in project portfolios and public demands for change, why 
were some ECAs slower than others, and all of them so much slower to respond to the 
environmental challenge than the World Bank and even private banks? In providing an 
answer to this chapter’s guiding question, both power relationships and rule content 
matter. All financial institutions were subject to similar demands by environmental critics 
and all institutions needed not consider the interests of recipient countries much. This 
leaves competing demands made on the institutions from industrialized countries as 
explanatory factors.  
World Bank reform is a fairly simple case: the Bank bowed to the demands of its 
most powerful principal, the United States. However, even this direct exertion of 
instrumental power resulted in a step-wise reform process. Confronted with U.S. power, 
the Bank sought to minimize adaptation costs with limited reforms which resulted in 
additional pressure from the U.S. government when these reforms were considered 
insufficient. A ratcheting process eventually resulted in rules to the principal’s liking. The 
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U.S. demands did not encounter substantial opposition beyond the Bank’s attempts to 
minimize adaptation costs. 
Similar to the World Bank reform process, NGO demands for environmental rules 
among private banks were only offset by the institutions’ own interests to limiting the 
impact of rules on operations. Provided with the experiences of the World Bank and ECA 
reforms, banks did not challenge the drive towards environmental rules, but rather took 
ownership of the reform process and developed the Equator Principles as rules best 
compatible with their business models. 
Contrary to the World Bank and private banks, client interests play an important 
role in domestic ECA politics. ECAs were created to assist exporters and these exporters 
have an interest in keeping their access to government support free of restrictions. Thus, 
the power wielded by business benefiting from export credits is important in ECA rule-
making. However, the power of these actors differs among states depending on sectoral 
composition of ECA portfolios and institutional factors. A greater share of German 
export business receiving export credits is subject to environmental rules than is the case 
for U.S. exports. Additionally, German industry has privileged access to ECA policy-
making, whereas U.S. business needs to compete with other groups for influence through 
Congress. 
The impact of ECA rules on domestic industry explains the slower reform pace of 
ECA reform when compared with World Bank and Equator bank policy development. 
Different ECA portfolios and institutional contexts explain the varying speed and scope 
of reform among Ex-Im and Hermes. Ex-Im reform was also aided by prior experience 
with environmental review under NEPA, whereas the establishment of environmental 
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rules in Germany was hindered by a very sectoral conception of export credits that did 
not favour the incorporation of objectives other than export promotion and industrial 
policy.  
The impact of these domestic policy histories on establishing common rules for 
ECAs is considered in the next two chapters. Chapter five surveys harmonization among 
ECAs and chapter six then turns to analyzing the harmonization processes. 
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Chapter 5: Regulatory Harmonization 
One consequence of ExIm’s new environmental policies, implemented in 1995, 
was the disadvantage to U.S. exporters seeking ECA support vis-à-vis their competitors 
from other countries which did not have to comply with similar rules. The unilaterally 
implemented policies amounted to a hurdle in access to ECA financing that only ExIm 
clients faced. From 1994 on, the U.S. government sought to re-level the playing field for 
American exporters by initiating international negotiations on a common baseline for 
ECA environmental policies across the OECD. Negotiations on the OECD 
Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported 
Export Credits were slow and finally led to an agreement on a set of procedural policies 
and benchmarks in 2003 after an earlier draft agreement was not supported by the United 
States and Turkey in 2001. 
The Common Approaches established environmental review procedures and 
referenced international standards, including World Bank criteria, as benchmarks in 
project evaluation. They followed the same logic as World Bank policies: projects need 
to undergo environmental assessments, results of the environmental reviews are made 
available for public comment and support decisions need to take projects’ environmental 
performance into account. The Common Approaches now provide harmonized 
environmental review procedures among OECD ECAs and have re-leveled the playing 
field to some extent (Görlach, Knigge, and Schaper 2007; Knigge et al. 2003). 
Given the trends towards market integration among the leading industrialized 
nations, the eventual agreement on common environmental policies for ECAs is not too 
surprising. However, this process took almost a decade from the point when the United 
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States raised the issue of harmonizing environmental rules for export credits in G7 and 
OECD forums. Considering the low relevance of ECAs for trade (less than 3% of exports 
are facilitated by them), why has harmonization been so slow and cumbersome? This is 
especially surprising because an established and proven group was tasked with 
developing these policies. The OECD Export Credit Group (ECG) has negotiated export 
credit rule harmonization since the 1960s and has succeeded in squeezing once rampant 
subsidization out of export credits. The Arrangement on Export Credits managed to 
bridge fundamental disagreements about the proper level of subsidization despite 
countervailing economic interests by influential players. Still, agreement on 
environmental terms has been difficult to achieve. 
This and the next chapter argue that the answer lies in domestic political costs and 
benefits that result from the content of the harmonized rules. Harmonizing financial terms 
of export credits has allowed ECAs to escape a costly subsidy race. By establishing 
common guidelines for the interest rates, premiums, and terms offered by ECAs, 
governments could provide their exporters with competitive support conditions while at 
the same time operating their ECAs cost-neutral. A lack of harmonization would have 
resulted in ever greater public costs of export credits. Diverging environmental standards 
for export credits, on the other hand, facilitated access to export credits in states with 
lower environmental standards without driving up the cost of officially supported export 
credits. That meant that governments had an incentive to maintain lower standards than 
their competitors in an effort to provide their national exporters with a competitive edge 
in international competition over environmentally problematic projects.  
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The unilateral strict U.S. standards, however, created grounds for the United 
States to seek harmonization on the basis of its domestic rules, contrary to the preferences 
of the other OECD countries. The United States pressed for binding international 
standards and a transparent review process, while the German government blocked these 
aspects of common rules throughout most of the negotiations by preferring to maintain 
the status-quo over new procedural rules. Flexibility regarding the international standards 
used in project evaluation and a provision allowing the retention of environmental 
information for select projects prior to a coverage decision, made it easier for Germany 
and a few other states to accept binding standards and ex-ante transparency.  
In negotiating ECA harmonization, the German Red-Green government emerged 
as the key laggard in creating common environmental policies. It was not the creation of 
environmental rules themselves, but rather the institutional compatibility of certain 
aspects of these rules that made an agreement difficult. These institutional obstacles to 
harmonization are discussed in detail in chapter six. 
This chapter begins with an account of the establishment of common financial 
rules for ECAs in the Arrangement. This discussion exemplifies the ECGs’ long history 
in harmonizing ECA policies that should have been highly conducive to establishing 
common environmental rules in a swift manner. The second part of this chapter then 
turns to the harmonization of environmental policies which has been much more difficult 
to achieve than one would expect given the lower stakes involved as compared to ceasing 
subsidization through export credits. The specifics of proposed rules encumbered 
agreement more than anything else. 
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5.1 Negotiating export credit financial terms 
Prior to the current concern with environmental standards, OECD members 
harmonized the financial aspects of export credits throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s (Moravcsik 1989). Competition among ECAs had led to a situation in which 
increasingly favorable terms offered by ECAs resulted in products being sourced in a 
particular country not because of product properties but rather because of the export 
credit terms offered by the exporting country. Export support had turned into heavy 
export subsidization and placed a strain on public budgets without resulting in 
proportional domestic economic gains. OECD member states negotiated the Arrangement 
on Export Credits to provide for a level playing field for national export credit agencies 
and exporters. Ultimately, buyers were to base their purchase decisions on the good itself 
rather than on the terms of the ECA support facilitating its export (Moravcsik 1989). 
 Subsidies affect the prices of products and can consequently distort trade. While 
traditional subsidies affect both domestic and export prices, subsidized export credits 
affect only foreign prices. As their purpose is geared more towards giving domestic 
exporters an edge in international competition than correcting market failures (which 
would affect domestic markets also), they are more controversial among states than 
traditional subsidies. Furthermore, their role may be obscured by the salience of import 
restriction despite their potential for greater impact on trade (Moravcsik 1989: 173). 
Export credits have been subsidized in three different ways, including through grant 
elements, subsidizing interest rates, and increasing repayment terms (thereby shifting 
risks to the lender). Initially, subsidization of interest rates served as the most prominent 
support mechanism; governments would raise funds at low cost on financial markets 
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using their superior credit ratings and then provide export credits at these or even below 
these rates utilizing government budgets to cover the spread.  
Prior to the establishment of the Arrangement, ECAs competed over interest rates 
and repayment rates. The Parties to the Arrangement then dealt with the use of tied aid 
(the inclusion of a grant element export financing packages). Current challenges include 
the use of market windows (semi-public financial institutions offering unsubsidized credit 
below market rates because of their ability to raise funds on government terms) and 
untied aid (grants which are not required to be spent on exports from the donor country 
but that are dispersed with this expectation in conjunction with export credits). Moravcsik 
suggests that “even modest government credit subsidies can be decisive” since 
products/services, aid, and export credits are evaluated as a package (Moravcsik 1989: 
176-7). 
Compliance with the Arrangement has been remarkably high compared to the 
performance of other OECD agreements. In a recent article, Janet Koven Levit argues 
that the Arrangement has performed so well because of being “elastic (its soft form 
permits experimentation and revision), pragmatic (its processes redefine compliance in a 
way that accommodates ECA practice with the Arrangement’s rubric), measured (it 
embraces consensus decision-making without diluting its rules with generalities and 
platitudes), and […] dialogic (the camaraderie of the Participants groups and the 
Arrangement’s unique processes assure that the Arrangement remains a vibrant and 
progressive discussion)” (Levit 2004: 68). Peter Evans, on the other hand, argues that 
Members comply with Arrangement provisions because they have an interest to do so. In 
his view, export credits are a private good to which the Arrangement as a cartel of 
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suppliers regulates access. Compliance with the Arrangement thus occurs both out of an 
interest to keep the cartel functioning and to avoid a costly race for more favorable 
financing terms (Evans 2005; see also Kohler and Reuter 1986).  
It appears that U.S. policymakers were less optimistic about compliance with the 
export credit regime (United States Congress 1994): The United States monitors other 
Members’ compliance with Arrangement provisions closely, and matches offers by other 
ECAs that do not comply with the Arrangement with funds from the “war chest” (Tied 
Aid Capital Projects Fund – TACPF), authorized by Congress for this particular purpose 
(Sheppard 2002). Although the Arrangement is not an OECD Act, it is incorporated into 
European Community law via a Council Decision, and thus enforced by the Commission 
among EU members (OECD 2001b). 
5.1.1 1934 – 1978: Pre-Arrangement disciplining of interest rates 
The British ECGD was founded in 1919 and most Western states followed suit 
through establishing their own ECAs by the 1930s. At the same time, they also founded 
the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers (Berne Union) as the 
international organization of ECAs in 1934 (see Aldcroft 1962). The need for 
harmonizing ECA terms arose only after World War II when industrialized nations 
increasingly sought to provide their exporters with assistance for exports to newly 
industrializing countries and were drawn into competition over their terms (see Marx 
1963). States initially addressed the issues through the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC – predecessor to the OECD), from 1960 on under the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and in various other arenas until 
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negotiations moved under the umbrella of the OECD in 1963 after GATT Member States 
ignored a ban on export credits below government cost (Moravcsik 1989: 179).  
An initial Understanding on Export Credits for Ships was worked out by an 
OECD working party between 1963 and 1969. 1963 also saw the creation of the Export 
Credit Group (ECG) as a new body within the OECD. The ECG agreed on a 
“gentleman’s agreement” for long-term export credits in 1974 once ECAs’ cost of funds 
were considerably affected by the oil crisis. This agreement established a minimum 
interest rate of 7.5 per cent for exports to wealthy countries (Streng 1976). In 1976, these 
rules were expanded in the Consensus which established maximum repayment terms, 
minimum downpayments, and prior notification for derogations in addition to minimum 
interest rates. The Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits of 
1978 formalized these guidelines (Duff 1981: 895-905). All of these negotiations 
occurred outside the Berne Union. Despite the creation of a new negotiation venue with 
no prior track record of fostering cooperation among ECAs, negotiations proved 
successful in limiting subsidization through export credits. 
Initially, states agreed to minimum interest rates and limits on repayment terms. 
However, fixed interest rates were more disadvantageous to states with low interest rates 
than to those with high internal interest rates since they could undo the competitive 
advantages of those economies with low domestic rates. Japan was hit especially hard in 
terms of competitiveness, where minimum interest rates resulted in an actual premium 
over commercial interest rates that had to be charged by Japan’s ECA. Ex-Im, on the 
contrary, had to subsidize a spread between Arrangement rates and its cost of borrowing 
which rose to over 5 per cent in 1980 (Duff 1981: 893). The spreads for Britain and 
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France amounted to 7.36 per cent and 8.7 per cent, respectively (Moravcsik 1989: 182). 
This situation was later remedied by linking ECA rates to commercial interest rates. 
Agreement was possible because the linkage of minimum interest rates with maximum 
repayment terms required concessions by those countries favoring subsidization through 
low interest rates (like France), and those favoring support through long repayment terms, 
like the United States which could rely on robust financial markets making long-term 
credits relatively cheap. 
5.1.2 1980 on: Expanding the Arrangement 
Work on linking interest rates for export credits to commercial ones was soon 
begun after agreement on the initial Arrangement, and in 1980, the Export Credit Group 
also started to review tied aid, which was the combination of export credits with grant 
elements. By 1983 compromise was reached on increasing the cost for tied aid by setting 
a minimum threshold of 20 per cent for tied and requiring advance notification for tied 
aid offers to competing ECAs; members signed on to a revised version of the 
Arrangement. The 1983 agreement also introduced an automatic adjustment of rates for 
low-interest countries mitigating their disadvantage under the old fixed interest regime. In 
1985 and 1987 the Arrangement was tightened again by raising the tied aid threshold to 
25 and then 35 per cent (Moravcsik 1989: 185-90).  
The 1987 Wallén Package replaced the matrix of subsidized interest rates with a 
mechanism linking rates to commercial interest rates for exports to relatively rich 
countries. This was further refined with the Schaerer Package in 1994, which finally 
abolished all remains of the old fixed interest system. Tied aid for relatively rich 
developing countries and commercially viable projects was outlawed in 1991 with the 
168 
Helsinki Package. In 1997, the Arrangement was re-written to incorporate the changes 
and additions in its 20-year history into a more accessible text (OECD 1998a). 
5.1.3 Assessing the Arrangement 
The Arrangement which was first adopted in 1978 is organized around three 
mechanisms: discipline, automaticity, and transparency. It creates reliable rules for 
financial aspects of export credits, links interest rates to developments on the commercial 
credit market, and requires ECAs to report to their peer agencies on their operations as 
well as on derogation from Arrangement rules in advance. By 1985, subsidies through 
export credits had been reduced to less than $1 billion (Moravcsik 1989: 178). A report 
by Ex-Im suggests that export credit negotiations typically go through five stages: 
1. Agreement to exchange information or establish transparency in order to provide the 
basis for work on a particular issue; 
2. Creation of a system or framework of rules that can lead to reductions in subsidy 
and/or further level the playing field; 
3. Establishment of a yardstick within the framework by which progress can be 
measured (e.g., charging market level interest rates or requiring a project to be 
commercially non-viable in order to allow tied aid); 
4. Moving the yardstick higher (i.e., requiring ever higher interest rates until zero 
subsidy is achieved, or increasing the minimum concessionality in tied aid); and 
5. The ongoing process of refining and adapting any rules as more knowledge becomes 
available and/or the world changes. (Export-Import Bank of the United States 2004: 
101) 
At the same time that participants to the Arrangement have been successful in 
creating discipline on interest rates, repayment terms, and tied aid, new challenges 
emerged when individual ECAs found ways to better assist their exporters. Among these 
challenges, untied aid and the use of market-windows has occupied the OECD Working 
Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees.  
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After the use of tied aid was rigorously reduced through Arrangement rules 
limiting the coupling of export credits with tied aid and enforced by use of the U.S. war 
chest to match any tied aid offers, a number of states started providing untied aid in 
combination with export credits. Since untied aid is governed by the less restrictive 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) rules, and thus need not be spent on 
products and services from the donor country, the practice is technically in-line with 
relevant international rules. However, even though untied aid can be spent anywhere, it 
may come with a strong understanding that it ought to be spent in connection with the 
export credits it has been provided with. States have used this strategy to facilitate 
exports without breaking the rules of the Arrangements. However, states not involved in 
this practice see it as an unfair export subsidy and as a circumvention of the tied aid rules 
in the Arrangement. 
Similarly as it did with tied aid, the United States had taken the lead in combating 
this practice. Following its step-wise approach, it first negotiated for reporting 
requirements for untied aid among ECAs and then achieved increased transparency in a 
November 2004 agreement. The 2004 rules stipulate transparency not only among ECAs, 
but also provide for the publication of information about tied-aid to the public at large in 
a two-year pilot-program. Under this agreement, untied aid offers are disclosed so that 
competitive international bidding may occur, and ex-post reporting includes the 
nationalities of winning bids (Export-Import Bank of the United States 2006: 46; OECD 
2005a). The Woking Party has yet to review the experiences from this pilot program 
Ex-Im has also been concerned about competition from market windows operated 
by the Canadian ECA Export Development Canada (EDC) and the German federal public 
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bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). Although both institutions are public, they 
both provide commercial-bank-style lending to their clients. Through these “market 
windows” they do not have to follow the disciplines established for official support, but 
clients at the same time profit from low interest rates which these institutions can provide 
due to their superior (government-backed) credit rating that reduces their own cost of 
money. Market windows have been on the OECD agenda since the late 1990s. However, 
the issue became less pressing after EDC bowed to U.S. pressure and re-organized its 
market-window business. Similarly, KfW was restructured after demands made by the 
European Commission to organize public German banks in a way to allow for more 
competition with privately owned ones. 
Squeezing subsidization out of ECA financial terms required more than two 
decades of negotiations and remains incomplete. This can be attributed partially to 
different conceptions as to what constitutes proper export promotion. For states favoring 
liberalized trade, such as the United States, ECA support should be limited to 
compensating for market imperfection, but ECAs should not subsidize their financing 
beyond matching terms that private finance would offer if it were to finance the 
transactions covered. For other states, like France, however, providing subsidies through 
export credits to domestic exporters is perfectly acceptable if it helps generate domestic 
production through exports. After all, providing generous export subsidies may be less 
costly than paying for increased unemployment in the absence of export-led growth. 
Finding a compromise on financial terms for export credits was ultimately about 
reconciling these diverging views on export credits and agreeing on terms that would 
strike a balance between export subsidization and free trade. As such, this harmonization 
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process occurred on the relatively undemanding level of standardizing terms and 
standards. Beyond compromising on the appropriateness of export subsidization in 
general, it only required agreement on thresholds and limits for the terms offered by 
ECAs. This step-wise approach of dealing with one aspect at a time has been highly 
successful. As we will see in the next section (and also chapter six), environmental 
standards for ECAs pose a much more formidable challenge as they require not only the 
harmonization of standards, but also compromises on fundamental approaches to 
governing export credits. 
5.2 ECA environmental rules 
The Arrangement clearly demonstrated that harmonization of ECA terms was 
possible. What is more, the discussions leading to the Arrangement and continuing 
cooperation to maintain and expand the agreement meant that the OECD Export Credit 
Group had build a solid foundation on which harmonization of environmental terms 
should have been easy to achieve. Nevertheless, negotiations on environmental terms 
proved very difficult despite the existence of a proven harmonization venue. 
Negotiations on environmental standards for ECAs were placed in the Export 
Credit Group by the G8 members after the 1997 G8 summit in Denver with its good track 
record of negotiating and maintaining the Arrangement. However, the group struggled 
from 1998 to 2003 to establish a common set of environmental standards. As it was the 
Arrangement’s goal to purge competition over financing terms, the aim of the Common 
Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits was to eliminate 
competition over environmental requirements (OECD 2005f: 4). Similar to provisions for 
minimum interest rates and limitation on bundling export credits with aid, the initiative to 
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establish common environmental rules for export credits came from the United States, 
which sought to level the playing field on Ex-Im’s terms. 
The OECD Export Credit Group is comprised of 29 of the 30 OECD member 
states (all except Iceland).11 Country delegations typically include ECA representatives as 
well as the responsible government departments, usually finance or economics. The U.S. 
delegation is headed by the Department of the Treasury and also includes Ex-Im 
representatives as well as a State Department official. Germany is represented by the 
economics ministry, Hermes employees, as well as a representative from the Foreign 
Office. As such, the ECG is a body dominated by technical experts. Stakeholders outside 
of the relevant government departments have little direct influence. The Export Credit 
Group conducts one short consultation session with NGOs per year, but does not allow 
for further involvement by stakeholders. 
The Export Credit Group is therefore a mix between a transgovernmental network 
of experts and intergovernmental negotiations. ECA specialists meet regularly and 
hammer out the details of agreements. However, these agreements can only come about 
when all members consent, and final endorsement is left to the OECD Council that needs 
to give its diplomatic stamp of approval. The formalized infrastructure of the ECG and its 
secretariat provide a robust framework for the rules and their implementation, but at the 
same time, this formality can slow negotiations on and experimentation with new rules. 
                                               
11 ECG members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and 
United States. See: http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,2340,en_2649_34181_21688824_1_1_1_1,00.html 
[accessed 19 July 2005]. 
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5.2.1 OECD environmental negotiations 
Ex-Im Chairman Jim Harmon first suggested environmental standards 
harmonization in the G7 ECA Chairperson Group soon after he took office in 1997. This 
unofficial group is regarded rather critically by the U.S. Treasury, which has the political 
authority over Ex-Im and heads the U.S. delegation in international negotiations on ECA 
matters. He was outvoted 6-1 by the other G7 ECA heads who opposed common 
environmental rules. After sharing this experience with President Clinton, the issue of 
environmental standards harmonization was put on the agenda of the 1997 G7 summit in 
Denver, over which the United States government, as host, had agenda control (personal 
communication with former U.S. official, 3 September 2003).  
5.2.1.1 1997 – 2000: Tasking the OECD ECG 
At the G7 summit, the U.S. concerns received political endorsement at the cabinet 
level, and the work of the OECD Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees 
was recognized in the final communiqué: 
Environmental Standards for Export Credit Agencies 
24. Private sector financial flows from industrial nations have a significant impact on 
sustainable development worldwide. Governments should help promote sustainable practices 
by taking environmental factors into account when providing financing support for 
investment in infrastructure and equipment. We attach importance to the work on this in the 
OECD, and will review progress at our meeting next year (G8 1997). 
However, the U.S. initiative was met with tremendous resentment in the OECD 
(personal communication with U.S. official, 25 June 2003; interview with three U.S. 
officials, 7 July 2004). The ECG was slow in taking up the new agenda, partially because 
members had little interest in pursuing the environmental issue, and partially because the 
group had been bogged down by negotiations on premia (personal communication with 
Swedish official, 3 September 2003). A Statement of Intent on Officially Supported 
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Export Credits and the Environment was issued in 1998, and then followed up by an 
Agreement on Environmental Information Exchange for Larger Projects in 1999. This 
pattern is in line with the first stage in Ex-Im’s five-stage model of ECA negotiations (see 
above). 
The 1998 Statement contained a list of six items, only two of which addressed the 
objective of establishing common environmental procedures; the remaining four covered 
restrictions and caveats that were to be taken into account. These included respect for the 
buyers’ countries sovereign right concerning implementation and enforcement of 
environmental rules, a call for cooperation with exporters, financial institutions and 
buyers’ countries, a requirement not to establish a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
exporters from non-OECD countries, and a recognition of commercial confidentiality. 
Given the clear G7 mandate, this list of reservations and qualifications can hardly be 
considered ambitious. By this point, the major stumbling blocks – which standards 
should be applied and how much transparency was possible – were already clearly 
manifested in the statement’s points on buyers’ countries rights and commercial 
confidentiality (OECD 1998b). The statement’s German interpretation was that the goal 
was neither to harmonize standards, nor to create a common evaluation system, but rather 
to ensure “measured and sufficient appreciation” of environmental aspects in national 
systems. Furthermore, the German interpretation stressed that the statement’s final point 
on confidentiality set clear limits to any transparency measures (Hermes 
Kreditversicherungs-AG 1998). Nevertheless, the OECD initiative did lead to the 
adoption of Germany’s 1998 environmental guidelines (for details see chapter three). 
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The 1999 agreement laid out rules for exchange of environmental information 
among the participating ECAs for projects in sensitive sectors involving multiple ECAs. 
This agreement enabled ECAs to share their views with other ECAs concerning the 
adequacy of environmental information available, but it did not spell out any 
requirements for the review process other than that the project sponsor had to provide an 
environmental impact assessment in those cases where (a) no EIA was available and (b) 
the involved ECAs agreed that such an assessment would be essential for project 
evaluation (OECD 1999a). At the May 1999 OECD Ministerial Meeting ministers  
welcomed the progress towards the OECD Agreement on Environmental Information 
Exchange for Larger Projects in relation to officially supported export credits and urged that 
the work continue with a view to strengthening common approaches and to report on 
progress made at the next Ministerial Council Meeting (OECD 1999b).  
The G8 was similarly unimpressed with progress in the ECG when it revisited the 
issue one year later than planned, and explicitly committed the OECD to the development 
of common guidelines at the Cologne Summit in 1999: 
32. We agree to continue to support the Multilateral Development Banks in making 
environmental considerations an integral part of their activities and we will do likewise when 
providing our own support. We will work within the OECD towards common environmental 
guidelines for export finance agencies. We aim to complete this work by the 2001 G8 
Summit (G8 1999). 
Development of common policies did not commence until the Spring of 2000, 
when the ECG adopted an Action Statement on the Environment in February and 
produced a detailed work-plan in April. The Action Statement stressed the development 
of national procedures for environmental assessment and suggested in only one out of six 
items to “explore ways to synthesise common elements and best practices […] in order to 
strengthen a framework of common approaches” (OECD 2000a). The ambitions of the 
Action Statement did not go beyond identifying common ground for a lowest-common-
denominator framework. Similarly, the work-plan detailed the Action Statement items 
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concerning the development of national procedures and sharing of experiences; it also 
established November 2000 as the deadline for completing these tasks (OECD 2000b). 
Development of common environmental guidelines as mandated in the G8 communiqué 
was apparently low on the ECG’s list of priorities. This was in line with Germany’s 
preferences which favored intensification of information exchange among ECAs, but not 
the establishment of hard standards or increased transparency (Benze et al. 2000: 6; 
Deutscher Bundestag 2000b: 2). It had been actively involved in formulating both the 
Statement of Intent and the Action Statement to these ends (Deutscher Bundestag 2000a: 
5). However, this position was diametrically opposed to the U.S. one, which favored both 
hard standards and transparency as outlined by Ex-Im Chairman Jim Harmon at the same 
time (Harmon 2000). 
5.2.1.2 2000 – 2001: Negotiating the Common Approaches 
The G8 remained unimpressed with progress in the ECG, and explicitly placed 
the consideration of MDB experience in the development of common environmental 
guidelines on the OECD agenda: 
68. Export credit policies may have very significant environmental impacts. We welcome 
the adoption of the OECD work plan to be completed by 2001. We reaffirm our commitment 
to develop common environmental guidelines, drawing on relevant MDB experience, for 
export credit agencies by the 2001 G8 Summit. We will co-operate to reinvigorate and 
intensify our work to fulfill the Cologne mandate (G8 2000). 
ECG members failed to meet the Summer 2001 G8 deadline, as Europeans and 
the United States could not agree on common recommendations. The U.S. demands for 
commitment to World Bank standards and increased transparency proved to be a major 
obstacle to agreement (Rademaker 2001; see also an op-ed by a former U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State: Sandalow 2001). The U.S. government had its embassies in OECD 
countries distribute a statement making this point very clear two weeks prior to the 
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Genova G8 summit and a day before ECG members were to declare their formal consent 
to the then current compromise document: 
First, the US Government (USG) cannot accept language that does not explicitly require 
projects supported by ECAs to comply with the same standards as that applied by the 
Multilateral Development Banks. [...] ECA-supported projects must meet the more stringent 
of host country or World Bank standards. [...] Second, the USG recognizes that transparency 
is an integral element to the process of evaluating the environmental effects of projects. 
Therefore, it cannot accept an agreement that does not contain provisions for the public 
release of environmental information on sensitive projects prior to the decision to support a 
project (quoted in WEED 2001). 
The Ex-Im chairman added later: “We are sticking our feet in the dirt and saying 
that we will not sign a toothless, empty agreement. […] We believe it is good 
environmental policy and good commercial policy that all nations, particularly the G-7 
countries, are obliged to follow at least World Bank standard environmental rules” 
(quoted in Dunphy 2001). At the 2001 Genova G8 summit, the group received an 
extension until the end of the year:  
29. We are committed to ensuring that our Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) adhere to high 
environmental standards. We therefore agreed in Okinawa to develop common 
environmental guidelines for ECAs, drawing on relevant MDB experience. Building on the 
progress made since last year, we commit to reach agreement in the OECD by the end of the 
year on a Recommendation that fulfils the Okinawa mandate (G8 2001). 
The ECG, aided by strong involvement by the British ECGD, in fact managed to 
develop Common Approaches Revision 6 by the end of 2001. Even these rules failed to 
fulfil the G8 mandate because they did not represent true agreement due to the lack of 
support by the United States or Turkey (Export Credits Guarantee Department 2001). The 
remaining ECG members nevertheless implemented Revision 6, despite lack of consent 
and monitoring – a feature unique to an OECD agreement which was therefore 
considered a milestone by the actors involved (personal communication with Swedish 
official, 3 September 2003). 
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Revision 6 could have sufficed as a symbolic political compromise: it established 
common environmental rules for ECAs, and thus fulfilled the G8 mandate while also 
retaining much discretion for ECAs in their national implementation. However, the 
United States denied its support because the recommendations were vague with respect to 
which standards should be applied in project evaluation, and neither did the rules provide 
for effective monitoring. Therefore, the U.S. government considered the Revision 6 
ineffective at levelling the playing field and establishing meaningful environmental rules. 
With respect to decision criteria, ECAs were required only to benchmark projects against 
international standards such as those of the World Bank or other weaker MDB rules, or 
even host country standards. Not meeting these would not automatically disqualify a 
project for ECA support. ECAs could also pick and choose international standards to 
their liking and thus approve problematic projects under standards that were the least 
problematic for a given project. Finally, weak reporting requirements (not requiring the 
disclosure of buyer country and project location) rendered effective peer monitoring 
among ECAs next to impossible (personal communication with U.S. official, 25 June 
2003, U.S. Faces Uphill Battle 2001; United Kingdom Parliament 2001: Column WA 
78). 
5.2.1.3 2003: Revising the Common Approaches 
Revision 6 of the Common Approaches included a mandate for assessment and 
revision in 2003. The Common Approaches were re-negotiated from September to 
November 2003 and were passed by the OECD Council in December of the same year. 
From 1 January 2004 on, the 2003 Common Approaches established the basis for 
national standard-setting among all OECD ECAs. Six years of negotiations had finally 
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lead to the second of five stages in ECA harmonization, the creation of a framework of 
rules. 
In Spring 2003, the United States floated a suggestion among ECG members to 
establish binding standards while providing the option to opt out from the application of 
these standards on a case-by-case basis, with prior notification to other OECD ECAs. 
Such a derogation clause would have been in line with other ECA rules under the 
Arrangement that allowed for intended violation of rules as long as prior notification was 
given to other ECAs so that they might offer support on similar terms. Still, this 
establishment of binding standards went beyond the benchmarking approach preferred by 
Germany; subsequently it was its opposition to the U.S. proposal that killed this initiative 
(personal communication with U.S. official, 25 June 2003). Although the German 
benchmarking approach used international standards as a point of reference, it did not 
require full compliance, and thus provided more flexibility in implementation. 
By Summer 2003, the United States had given up on binding standards as its 
primary negotiation objective and had put transparency at the top of its agenda. 
Concessions on standards could still lead to effective implementation if transparency 
would aid in monitoring and enforcing (personal communication with U.S. official, 25 
June 2003). This appeared to be a promising strategy, since Japan was also opposed to 
binding international standards after it just had established new domestic rules that might 
be put into question by new international rules (interview with German official, 5 
December 2003). However, increased transparency – especially ex-ante transparency – 
was even more contentious from the German perspective.  
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Members submitted their revision proposals to the ECG Secretariat, which then 
compiled a set of draft rules based on these suggestions. The resulting draft was quite 
ambitious and went beyond many members’ expectations. As far-reaching as it was, the 
draft established a good basis for negotiations, made agreement without polarization 
among groups possible, and required only two meetings and a written process to reach 
agreement (interview with German official, 8 January 2004).  
German preparation for the 2003 revisions of the Common Approaches took place 
outside of Parliament. Prior to fall 2003, the Economics Ministry almost exclusively and 
independently defined Germany’s foreign policy on ECAs. Little coordination took place 
with the Foreign Office, the Ministry for Development and Cooperation, and the Finance 
Ministry as the other agencies in charge. New personnel on task in the Foreign Ministry 
and the – technically not responsible – Environment Ministry asserted more involvement 
in the issue and initiated formal coordination meetings in preparation for the talks in 
Paris. The initial OECD meeting was marked by the Economics Ministry’s delegation 
head seeking to play his usual role of representing his agency’s position as the delegation 
position. In preparation for the second meeting, however, the other agencies’ opinions 
found their way into the German negotiation position and facilitated agreement 
(interview with German official, 30 January 2004). 
Japan emerged as a pivotal player between the U.S. preference for both binding 
standards and ex-ante transparency, and the German position seeking to avoid either. 
Japan wanted both mandatory EIAs and an accountability mechanism, but it was opposed 
to binding international standards that might conflict with its domestic rules. It thus sided 
with Germany on standards and with the United States on EIAs and transparency 
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(interview with German official, 5 December 2003). This weakened opposition to 
transparency within the ECG and paved the way for ex-ante transparency as preferred by 
the United States.  
At the same time, the Japanese sided with those nations wanting to retain 
flexibility. They handled categorization of projects rather loosely, leading to “big B” 
projects but relatively few projects in the highly environmentally sensitive category A 
which required environmental review.12 This approach was much to the liking of Hermes 
administrators who argued for scrutinizing the covered components rather than projects at 
large (i.e. transmission equipment supplied for a dam project rather than the entire dam). 
With Paragraph 12.3, the U.S. derogation suggestion found its way into the text of 
the Common Approaches, and thus made agreement on somewhat more binding 
standards possible. However, instead of requiring advance notice to the Secretariat as is 
the norm for derogation under the Arrangement, paragraph 12.3 of the Common 
Approaches requires only ex-post reporting: 
12.3 If a Member finds it necessary to apply standards below the international standards 
against which the project has been benchmarked, it shall report and justify the standards 
applied on an annual ex- post basis in accordance with paragraph 19 (OECD 2003b).  
Nevertheless, this tightened the range of applicable standards, and increased 
pressure on ECAs to ensure that supported projects comply with a clearly defined set of 
internationally accepted minimal standards (those of multilateral development banks, 
regional development banks, and other higher standards, such as EC ones). 
The German agreement to the Common Approaches during the second meeting in 
fall 2003 was an almost complete reversal of policy, which nearly included a switch of 
                                               
12 A German official asserted that Japan had not reported a single Category A at the time of the interview (8 
January 2004). 
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positions with the United States in the OECD negotiations. While the U.S. negotiation 
delegation was interested in closing the Common Approaches and moving the issue off 
the agenda, parts of the German delegation were considering to not support the Common 
Approaches because of perceived weaknesses in the negotiation results. By not 
supporting the agreement, the negotiations would have been kept open, possibly allowing 
for a tightening of flexibility clauses and elimination of loopholes. 
In fall 2005, special conditions for renewable energy projects were added to the 
Common Approaches that allowed for preferential financing terms for environmentally 
beneficial renewable energy development (for a review of these challenges see Schaper 
2004a, 2004b; United Nations Environment Programme 2004).  
5.2.1.4 2005-2007: Revising the Common Approaches again 
The most recent review of the Common Approaches was concluded with the 
adoption of their 2007 version on 12 June 2007 (OECD 2007c) – half a year later then 
scheduled, after the ECG had reviewed the 2003 Common Approaches since late 2005 
(ECA Watch 2006c). At the same time, the ECG was also caught in a deadlock on anti-
bribery measures when a coalition of Germany and Japan blocked an initiative 
spearheaded by the United States (Alden, Pilling, and Williamson 2006). With the ECG 
devoting much of its attention to anti-bribery measures, the 2007 updates to the Common 
Approaches were rather limited compared to the 2003 revisions. NGOs, in fact, actually 
consider the current Common Approaches a step back from their preceding version. 
The lack of ambition of the 2007 Common Approaches was most evident in the 
absence of modification to the benchmarking procedure used in applying international 
standards and in the limited change with regard to transparency provisions. Retaining the 
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benchmarking process as well as the possibility of derogation from international 
standards resulted in much flexibility for ECAs in applying standards for project 
evaluation – a practice which cannot be monitored effectively due to deficient 
transparency provisions.  
NGOs criticized ECAs mainly for retaining a derogation clause in the text that 
allowed them to opt out of the application of international standards if they reported to 
the ECG Secretariat on this ex-post in their annual reporting to the OECD (paragraph 13 
in the 2007 version; paragraph 12.3 in the 2003 Common Approaches). However, it 
appeared that NGOs only zeroed in on this clause in the 2005-07 review, despite it having 
been included in the earlier version. The approval of export credits for the Turkish Ilisu 
dam (see also Mossman 2007) around the time of the revised Common Approaches 
adoption by the German, Swiss, and Austrian ECAs especially put focus on the question 
of adherence to international standards – and thus on compliance with the Common 
Approaches – within the public agenda. Approvals of export credits to the Turkish dam 
had been pending for a number of years due to unresolved problems with the resettlement 
of affected local populations and the destruction of cultural heritage in the dam’s future 
reservoir site. The ECAs approved the dam with a list of 150 undisclosed conditions to be 
met by project sponsors; they refused, however, to make this list public (Strittmatter 
2007a, 2007b; Gottschlich and Kreutzfeldt 2007; Ahmia 2007). NGOs suspected that an 
approval of this project could be possible only by derogation from international standards 
(ECA Watch 2007, 2006b). The dam thus represented a clear example of why such a 
derogation clause should be purged from the Common Approaches.  
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Transparency provisions were updated slightly for Category A projects in that ex-
ante transparency clauses were stated more explicitly, but the continued limitation of ex-
ante transparency to 30 days prior to final approval of projects did not represent a major 
improvement over previous rules. Paragraph 16 of the 2003 Common Approaches 
required member ECAs to “seek to make environmental impact information publicly 
available (e.g. EIAs, summary thereof) at least 30 calendar days before a final 
commitment to grant official support” (OECD 2003b: 4). The updated version made this 
requirement more explicit in that it stipulates that members should  
disclose publicly project information, including project name, location, description of project 
and details of where additional information may be obtained, as early as possible in the 
review process and at least 30 calendar days before a final commitment to grant official 
support; and require that environmental impact information be made publicly available (e.g. 
EIA report, summary thereof) as early as possible in the review process and at least 30 
calendar days before a final commitment to grant official support. (OECD 2007c: 7) 
Thus, the new Common Approaches attach more urgency to the ex-ante 
publication of environmental project information, but they do not provide for substantial 
changes to the process. NGOs had argued that the established 30 days period was too 
short and should be extended to 90 days (ECA Watch 2006a). 
One significant extension over the 2003 approaches, representing common 
practice among many financial institutions, is the inclusion of all ten World Bank 
safeguard policies, as opposed to only the limited set of safeguards that were referenced 
in the previous versions. While the range of applicable World Bank standards has been 
extended, and the list of other applicable standards clarified, the Common Approaches 
still reference only the World Bank policies current at the time of adoption of the 
Common Approaches, rather than automatically including future changes as the Equator 
Principles for private financial institutions do (see chapter three). For project finance 
transactions, the equivalent IFC policies are to be applied. 
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NGOs asserted that a coalition of the German and Italian ECAs prevented 
agreement on a strengthened text in November 2006 (ECA Watch 2006c), which then 
resulted in the continuation of talks until April 2007. At that time, the ECG agreed on the 
version which was subsequently passed by the OECD Council on 12 June 2007. The 
agreement calls for yet another revision of the Common Approaches by 2010. 
The ECG praises the current Common Approaches as an important step towards 
increasing the awareness for the relevance of environmental considerations in export 
credit transactions among non-OECD countries (OECD 2007b). This reflects an old 
concern for competition from countries not bound by the Common Approaches. The 
Chinese Export Import Bank has made considerable inroads in Asia and Africa, 
potentially taking business from OECD countries (see chapter seven).  
The consultation process which led to the current text included presentations by 
non-OECD ECAs to the ECG, and thus represents in important step in bringing these 
agencies into the fold. At about the same time of these consultations, the Chinese ECA 
made their (rather ambiguous) environmental policies public, which have been said to 
have been in operation for a few years (see chapter seven). Thus, while the current 
Common Approaches can hardly pass as a strengthening of environmental review among 
OECD ECAs, they may actually be the first indication of a diffusion of such policies 
among ECAs beyond the major industrialized nations. 
5.2.2 Assessing Strategies 
After this discussion of the course of negotiations in the ECG, it is helpful to 
consider the strategies pursued by the United States and Germany, the pivotal players 
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negotiating internationally-harmonized rules for the consideration of environmental 
aspects in the approval process of officially supported export credits. 
5.2.2.1 United States 
The United States’ undeclared goal in negotiating the Common Approaches was 
to upload its domestic Ex-Im Bank rules to the OECD level. This entailed the adoption of 
procedural rules, establishment of standards for project evaluation, and transparency 
provisions. Referencing World Bank standards in this pitch for procedures, binding 
standards, and transparency equipped the U.S. position with legitimacy and a certain 
level of moral authority: it could not be bad if the World Bank was already doing it 
(personal communication with U.S. official, 25 June 2003). 
After an early initiative by Ex-Im Chairman Harmon in a technical G7 body had 
failed, the U.S. government worked to make environmental standards for ECAs a high-
level issue. The endorsement of environmental considerations in ECA cover decisions by 
the Denver G8 summit elevated the negotiation task from one conducted by experts on 
technical grounds to a topic with high political salience yet apparently limited substantial 
ramifications. This should have facilitated agreement by outranking technical concerns 
with high-level political ones.  
Though this initial initiative did not bear immediate fruit, the U.S. government 
nevertheless continued to display high-level commitment to the issue. The December 
2000 delegation to the ECG included Assistant Secretary of State David Sandalow and 
Ex-Im Member of the Board Dan Renberg, both of whom outranked all other delegations 
which are normally comprised of technical experts and mid-level bureaucrats. This “show 
of force” attached weight to the U.S. initiative, and the inclusion of Renberg (a 
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Republican), also underlined the U.S. insistence on strict guidelines under the incoming 
Bush administration, just shortly after Al Gore had withdrawn his claim for the 
Presidency. Sandalow was quoted on this occasion: “We thought it was important to 
come at the high-level to show our friends from the other 27 countries that we are still 
committed to reaching an agreement, and this issue has strong bipartisan support in the 
United States” (International Trade - U.S. Urges Talks 2000, interview with former U.S. 
official, 22 July 2004). 
Despite the political commitment to binding standards and transparency on the 
U.S. side, not all Europeans supported the U.S. position, and they refused to modify the 
Common Approaches’ 6th draft revision to meet U.S. demands. Consequently, the U.S. 
government decided to derail the agreement by not signing on to the draft document on a 
very high level (personal communication with U.S. official, 25 June 2003, Rademaker 
2001). 
Revision 6 had failed to meet U.S. demands with respect to both binding 
standards and transparency requirements. Specifically, the omission of the project 
location from the transparency requirement made it difficult for U.S. officials to identify 
projects and thus evaluate other ECA’s compliance with rules (personal communication 
with U.S. official, 25 June 2003). Subsequently, the United States switched strategies by 
offering some flexibility with standards while still insisting on transparency provisions. 
In spring 2003, the United States suggested adopting World Bank safeguard policies with 
the option of derogation from their application with advance notification to the ECG 
Secretariat. Such an approach would have been in line with established practice regarding 
the use of tied aid under the Arrangement. However, Germany rejected this proposal 
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(personal communication with German activist, 2 June 2003; personal communication 
with U.S. official, 25 June 2003). 
The United States increasingly tried to pressure the German delegation into giving 
up its blocking position. This was done both on the intergovernmental level by building 
coalitions in the ECG, and transnationally in concert with NGOs. The United States 
teamed up with other states against the recalcitrant continental European nations 
Germany, Austria, and Spain. These “divide-et-rege” coalitions included the United 
Kingdom and Japan among others. The U.S. government also maintained a good working 
relationship with the Washington-based NGO coalition that exerted pressure on the 
laggard countries through its local members.  
5.2.2.2 Germany 
Whereas the United States was actively leading international efforts to establish 
binding environmental standards and transparent approval processes for ECAs, the 
German strategy was mostly reactive: it sought to resist U.S. pressure and prevent the 
ECG from adopting either binding standards or transparent review processes.  
The German position was predominantly defined on a technical level by the 
responsible personnel in the Economics Ministry. These expert bureaucrats were largely 
immune to political considerations and perceived the quest for environmental policies as 
an attack on the effectiveness of their export promotion instrument. It appears that their 
strategy was to give in as much as necessary, but only as little as possible with respect to 
environmental standards, both domestically and internationally. Domestic standards 
remained considerably unambitious, despite clear political mandates to develop strong 
environmental rules for Hermes credits. Similarly, the German negotiation position in the 
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ECG was not affected much by the political discourse on the issue at the time (see 
chapter four). 
Support for environmental concerns in the OECD context was restricted to 
improvements in information exchange, but the Economics Ministry supported neither 
hard standards nor broad transparency (Benze et al. 2000: 6). In fact, it lobbied for the 
inclusion of host country standards in the Common Approaches’ Revision 6 to secure a 
standard to which compliance would be easy. Notwithstanding the fact that compliance 
with host country rules should be a minimum legal prerequisite in any case (personal 
communication with U.S. official, 25 June 2003), since such a standard merely implies 
legality in the host country. At the same time, there was considerable support among 
German politicians for adoption of World Bank standards and transparency, but this had 
little sway over the German delegation to the ECG (personal communication with U.S. 
official, 25 June 2003). 
The Economics Ministry was in fact playing a two-level game (Putnam 1988): it 
resisted political mandates for pursuing ambitious environmental rules within the ECG, 
while at the same time referring to the state of play in the OECD in response to demands 
for strict domestic rules. The Bundestag passed a resolution in Spring 2001 that the 
German administration should pursue the G8 Cologne mandate (“work within the OECD 
towards common environmental guidelines”) intensively, and that it should also increase 
transparency of ECA cover decisions by making project information publicly available 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2001c). This mandate is an almost perfect reflection of the U.S. 
position; however, German negotiators did not follow parliamentary directive. Even the 
conservative CDU/CSU (the opposition party at that time) suggested to take cues from 
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Ex-Im rules (Deutscher Bundestag 2001d: 16207). The CDU/CSU and the libertarian 
FDP, however, both argued for limited transparency through the OECD on an anonymous 
basis that would protect exporters’ interests. The 2002 coalition agreement explicitly 
established transparency and World Bank standards as government policy (Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen and SPD 2002: 85), but this too failed to inform the German negotiation 
position. Especially regarding transparency, the Economics Ministry’s argument in the 
OECD remained that they simply could not give in on transparency due to legal 
constraints and that the other parties simply lacked an appreciation for this obstacle. 
German negotiators maintained their position that ex-ante transparency was possible only 
with the exporters’ consent due to German commercial and administrative confidentiality 
rules (which also prevailed in other states with continental European regulatory 
traditions) (Dunne and Simonian 2002). 
The legal provisions usually cited in the context of commercial confidentiality are 
Paragraph 30 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz and Paragraph 203 Strafgesetzbuch 
(Strafgesetzbuch 2007). The section in the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 
(Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz 2007) stipulates that the government may not disclose any 
personal or commercial secrets, and Paragraph 203 establishes penalties for individuals 
(including bureaucrats in official capacity) who violate confidentiality. Thus, German 
bureaucrats cannot release their clients’ information to the public unless they are 
authorized to do so. German negotiators made this argument the center-piece of their 
negotiation strategy. However, as a German environmental expert contended, this 
strategy was less the consequence of insurmountable legal obstacles than an indication of 
a lack of political will among the ruling SPD-Green coalition to broadly tackle Hermes 
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reform. Related laws could have been changed in an encompassing reform package 
(personal communication with German activist, 17 July 2003).  
Similarly, Germany could have taken cues from Great Britain: instead of 
publicizing project information by the agency, the British ECGD requires its clients to 
publish environmental project information as a pre-condition for coverage (see also 
Görlach, Knigge, and Schaper 2007). Even German confidentiality rules would have 
allowed such an approach without modification of existing rules. Nevertheless, such a 
requirement was never implemented, and the German consent-to-publication-approach 
resulted in only 59 projects out of a total of 155 (38 per cent) environmentally sensitive 
projects from October 2001 to March 2003 to be included in Hermes ex-post reporting 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2003). Figures for ex-ante reporting were not available at the time 
of this writing, but can be expected to be similarly low.  
The tightly-knit Hermes policy community remained almost unchallenged in their 
control of defining the German position until 2003 when new personnel in the Foreign 
Office and the Environment Ministry sought to influence the German negotiation position 
in an interagency process (interview with German official, 30 January 2004). Prior to the 
inclusion of these agencies, the bureaucrats responsible in the Economics Ministry 
largely ignored the domestic political environment that was pre-disposed more positively 
towards environmental standards than the industry lobby that dominated issue definition 
in the Economics Ministry was. Reform became possible through a widening of the 
involved regulatory community (see chapter two). 
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5.2.3 Accommodating to regulatory imperialism 
With its rejection of Rev. 6, the U.S. government made its disappointment with a 
symbolic political compromise clear, and rather sought a substantial agreement with clear 
commitments and monitoring provisions that would make it possible to follow-up on the 
implementation of these commitments. The resulting 2003 Common Approaches limited 
the range of applicable standards and required transparency among ECAs and to the 
public, thus empowering NGOs to monitor implementation of the agreement’s rules. In 
the United States, regulations employing public transparency provisions are common 
practice; NEPA is built around similar rules. However, they are rather unusual in 
continental Europe. Thus, ECA standards can be seen as yet another example of 
spreading U.S. regulatory tools and ideas around the globe. 
This is not a new phenomenon. The Washington Consensus on Structural 
Adjustment may serve as another illustration. “Structural Adjustment” is a broad term 
that describes policy reforms ranging from removal of tariff barriers to privatization of 
state-owned enterprises to reforms in public spending. John Williamson lists ten elements 
generally regarded essential to a program of structural adjustment (Williamson 1990: 5-
35). This list of policy objectives, commonly referred to as the ”Washington Consensus,” 
represents a schedule of policy measures that Washington (i.e. the U.S. government and 
international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund) expects debtor nations to employ. This neo-liberal reform agenda guided 
World Bank and IMF lending for about 20 years, and was strongly influenced by the U.S. 
government; in a way it served as an expansion of U.S. free-market philosophy to 
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developing countries and was implemented by the multilateral financial institutions 
through their adjustment lending. 
Though unilateral leadership did not come for free to the United States, early 
leadership certainly paid a dividend in designing the international regime governing 
environmental aspects of ECA operations. U.S. exporters were disadvantaged from the 
implementation of Ex-Im rules in 1995 until the adoption of the Common Approaches in 
2003, but adaptation costs were borne mostly by the European nations, while the United 
States reaped the political benefits. This is the hallmark of successful uploading: little 
adaptation costs at home, but concentrated political benefits for the initiator.  
Since the voluntary implementation of Rev. 6 in 2002, ECG Member States have 
had experiences with environmental standards on a daily basis that contradicted many of 
the fears they initially held – be it that application of these standards helped them to 
better manage risk, or that they found ways of following the rules without substantially 
adapting their review procedures and cover practice. Adaptation to Rev. 6 may have thus 
facilitated agreement to the revised Common Approaches in 2003. 
Implementation of Rev. 6 certainly raised the bar for what an acceptable 
negotiation outcome would need to look like. Negotiators knew they had to arrive at an 
agreement that would be acceptable to all export credit group members – including the 
United States – but that at the same time had to exceed Rev. 6 in at least two aspects: the 
role of international standards and monitoring provisions. Only a few years earlier, ECAs 
could still dismiss environmental concerns as irrelevant to their business, but then the 
negotiations around and implementation of Rev. 6 resulted in a different discourse that 
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was concerned with the design of suitable environmental rules rather than with the more 
fundamental questions of their general appropriateness. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Considering the low relevance of ECAs for trade (less than 3% of exports are 
facilitated by them), why has harmonization been so slow and cumbersome? Given the 
ECG’s track record of successful harmonization of financial terms and the strong U.S. 
leadership, the slow progress and modest results of environmental harmonization are 
indeed surprising. In past harmonization negotiations, U.S. leadership was a strong 
predictor for success and the United States certainly put a lot of effort into harmonization 
of environmental policies for ECAs. The U.S. government repeatedly placed the issue on 
the high-level G-7/8 agenda despite countervailing European interests, it sent high-level 
delegates to meetings typically dominated by technical experts, and even coordinated 
with NGOs to build transnational alliances. Still, negotiations produced a non-agreement 
in 2001 that was turned down by the U.S. government at the highest level. 
When considering the content and implications of harmonized rules, the course of 
negotiations is less remarkable. The distribution of costs and benefits differed between 
harmonization of financial and environmental conditions. On a normative level, the 
Arrangement required agreement on the appropriateness of export subsidization whereas 
the Common Approaches meant agreeing on the suitability of environmental policies for 
ECAs. This is the only aspect of ECA harmonization where agreement could be expected 
to be easier for environmental and for financial rules. Proliferating environmental norms 
make it next to impossible to oppose environmental policies out of principle. However, 
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the intolerability of subsidization is certainly contested and French-U.S. disagreements 
over this had to be bridged in negotiating the Arrangement. 
Beyond these normative aspects, however, the Arrangement provided more 
benefits at lower cost to its Participants than the Common Approaches. Squeezing 
subsidies out of ECA support reduced public outlays and ended a costly subsidization 
race without affecting the relative competitiveness of domestic exporters considerably. 
This did result in some regulatory costs through the adaptation of terms and rules and 
also produced some political costs through less favorable terms for export support, but 
these were easily compensated by the benefits of lower deficits and a level playing field 
(see also Evans 2005). 
From the perspective of a state with weak environmental policies, common rules 
conversely, result in costs without providing any benefits. Giving in to demands for 
higher environmental standards means giving up a competitive edge for domestic 
producers without providing any tangible benefits. Upward harmonization, however, does 
entail costs. These include regulatory costs stemming from the creation of new rules and 
procedures as well as political costs resulting from foregone export opportunities. 
From this perspective it is not surprising that the U.S. harmonization proposal was 
not warmly received by the other ECG members. Not only did countries like Germany 
have a much narrower conception of the purpose of export credits which ran counter to 
the U.S. suggestion to use this export promotion instrument for transdomestic 
environmental policy, but the type of rules advanced by the U.S. government was also 
opposed in Europe. Especially, transparency provisions and binding standards were not to 
the liking of German negotiators from the Economics Ministry. Only when negotiations 
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after the failed draft Revision 6 in 2001 incorporated flexibility in these provisions did 
agreement become possible. This bargain was further facilitated by a broadening of the 
involved regulatory community on the German side to include the Foreign Office and the 
Environment Ministry. The next chapter will address these power relationships as well as 
the rule content of harmonization proposals in detail. 
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Chapter 6: Obstacles to Regulatory Harmonization 
Domestically, the United States has been a fore-runner in the establishment of 
environmental standards governing export credit agencies. It had more stringent domestic 
standards and has been the one country pushing for the international harmonization of 
export credit environmental standards within the OECD. Germany, on the other hand, 
opposed these developments, despite its strong Green Party. I argue that this distribution 
of roles is not a consequence of varying shades of “greenness”, but can be explained with 
reference to the compatibility of proposed rules with domestic institutional frameworks 
and regulatory cultures. This provides an opportunity to assess transatlantic 
environmental relations beyond the often too-hastily ascribed roles of “environmental 
leader” and “laggard” (e.g. Vogel 2003).  
Considering the low relevance of ECAs for trade (less than 3% of exports are 
facilitated by them), why has harmonization been so slow and cumbersome? This chapter 
suggests that the answer to this question lies in a combination of domestic power 
relationships and the content of proposed rules. Compared to domestic standard setting, 
which was analyzed in chapters three and four, the relationship between power and rule 
content changes direction. In domestic regulatory reform, rule content depends on 
prevailing power relationships. In harmonization, proposals for rule content are externally 
given and the likelihood of acceptance depends on the domestic costs and benefits of the 
proposed rules. Negotiations allow for some change to these rules, but governments’ 
control over rule content is reduced since rule content depends on bargains with other 
states. This is because our concern is primarily with the success of harmonization and 
only to a lesser degree with the exact terms of the harmonized rules. 
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Instead of assessing the full domestic costs and benefits of harmonization 
proposals, as a first cut, it is sufficient to examine the compatibility of proposed rules 
with domestic regulatory frameworks and cultures. This is because historically prevailing 
power relationships have become institutionalized in the rules of the game. Thus 
harmonization proposals that are not compatible with existing institutional arrangements 
are likely to call prior bargains and compromises into question. The higher the degree of 
required adaptation is, the higher are not only regulatory costs in implementing such 
rules, but also their potential to run counter to prevailing power relationships among the 
government and influential constituents. 
I argue that it is not the concept of environmental standards per se that made 
agreement in the OECD so complicated, but rather the issue of institutional fit for the 
proposed environmental standards. Domestic level issues of institutional fit are central to 
my argument. Depending on whether there exists a regulatory culture of procedural rule-
making affects a nation’s support for certain elements of the proposed environmental 
standards – especially those pertaining to the transparency of the environmental 
assessments and of the approval process. Similarly, states use their export credits to 
achieve non-trade policy goals to varying degrees. As I will elaborate in this and the next 
chapter, little institutional fit existed in at least three points: (i) the United States favors 
procedural rules which are incompatible with target-based regulatory culture in Germany; 
(ii) transparency of coverage decisions conflicts with German administrative law; and 
(iii) the explicit use of export credits for non-trade related policy objectives is 
commonplace in the United States, but not in Germany. 
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The primary concern of this chapter is with the challenge of negotiating 
harmonized rules. This focus sidelines another important aspect of regulatory 
harmonization: implementation. Domesticating internationally accepted rules has a 
profound impact on the meaning of provisions and can feed back into their further 
development (Bugdahn 2005). These concerns are addressed in chapter seven. This 
chapter proceeds by first analyzing rule content that would result in both considerable 
political and regulatory costs and then discussing domestic power relationships and how 
they were affected by the content of proposed rules. 
6.1 Rule content 
As is evident from the discussion of negotiations in chapter five, binding 
standards and transparency of the approval process were contentious issues in the 
harmonization process. These points were not only sticky because they affect the relative 
competitiveness of ECAs, but also because they pose differential challenges to the 
involved states’ regulatory frameworks. Originating within the U.S. context, both 
procedurally detailed rules and broad transparency in their application posed no problem 
for states with Anglo-Saxon regulatory cultures. Continental European states, on the 
other hand, found it much more difficult to accept rules that did not seem to fit with their 
own regulatory cultures, would have required considerable regulatory adaptation, and 
would have upset institutionalized political bargains. 
As mentioned in chapter two, U.S. litigious culture leads to rules and regulations 
to be challenged in the courts until a generally accepted interpretation and 
implementation is agreed upon and accepted in the legal system. Rules that contain few 
procedural details may be revised substantially in this re-interpretation process. Rules 
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which are rich on procedural detail, however, are much more likely to survive 
fundamentally unchanged. Thus, policy-makers have an interest in devising rules with as 
many procedural details as possible. 
In continental European regulatory systems, judicial review is not as common, 
and rules are typically written with little detail, assuming that the professional 
bureaucracy will implement them faithfully. This also provides the implementing 
bureaucrats with considerably more flexibility in implementation. While this is true 
throughout continental Europe, in a direct comparison among Common Law countries, 
even Britain follows a path that affords much more discretion for the implementing 
bureaucrats than the United States does (Vogel 1986). 
Similarly, transparency serves an important purpose in politically appointed 
bureaucracies where transparency provisions are the only means by which to evaluate 
performance of politically-minded administrators who may not always command the trust 
of the public, as they may often be guided by political considerations rather than by a 
professional ethos. For a state with an independent professional administration, one 
which does not suffer from the public mistrust towards government that is typical of the 
United States, transparency in administrative dealings may result in decreased efficiency 
and restricted flexibility in implementation. These are problems that apply similarly to 
U.S.-style politically appointed administrations, but with Weberian non-political 
bureaucracies (Weber 1977), European states do not have the same incentive to balance 
control and efficiency and can therefore forego increased control through transparency in 
favor of efficiency and flexibility in implementation. 
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The next sections apply the goodness-of-fit approach from EU compliance theory 
to transatlantic regulatory harmonization and then address the key institutional 
compatibility challenges individually: procedural rules, transparency, and incorporation 
of non-trade concerns. As the discussion on transatlantic negotiations in chapter five has 
already alluded to, agreement on common environmental policies was difficult because of 
the poor compatibility of rules proposed by the United States with continental European 
regulatory cultures. Compromise was possible only when loopholes were introduced into 
the text allowing European states to implement the Common Approaches without 
requiring major adaptation of regulatory frameworks. Thus, agreement became possible 
when harmonization was to take place on a symbolic rather than on a substantial level. 
6.1.1 Institutional compatibility as a goodness-of-fit component 
The goodness-of-fit concept has been a staple of EU compliance literature 
(Héritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996; Knill and Lenschow 2005, 1998, 2000) for a 
considerable time (for a review see Mastenbroek 2005; Mastenbroek and Keulen 2004). 
At its core, this theory suggests that the transposition of EU directives into member 
states’ law depends on the compatibility of rules prescribed by the EU with domestic 
legal and institutional contexts: the better a directive’s requirements “fit” with domestic 
legal and political traditions, the better it will be adopted. If the fit is poor, member states 
are less likely to transpose the rules in a faithful manner than to search for loopholes and 
ambiguities that allow them to implement the EU policies without considerable change to 
pre-existing national practices. Put differently member states seek to minimize adaptation 
costs. 
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Empirical evidence for this straightforward argument has been less conclusive 
then expected. Some directives have been implemented by member states despite the fact 
that they were required to implement major reforms, while other member states have not 
implemented rules that are highly compatible with their domestic contexts. In response, 
analysts have added auxiliary political hypothesis to account for the variation not 
explained by the main goodness of fit hypothesis (Mastenbroek 2005). 
The established goodness of fit approach considers compatibility of rules in 
various dimensions. Compatibility is assessed in both a policy and an institutional 
dimension and also with regard to formal and informal rules and practices (Mastenbroek 
2005: 1109), allowing for the consideration of regulatory culture beyond written rules. 
Institutional compatibility is the dimension considered here. In another departure from its 
application to EU politics, the treatment in this section is concerned only with the 
negotiation phase of regulatory harmonization, and not with the implementation of agreed 
rules which is covered in chapter seven. 
By limiting this analysis to the negotiations rather than including the 
implementation phase, the main problems which plague the goodness of fit theory in EU 
compliance are not an issue. Auxiliary political hypotheses are usually introduced to 
explain the political process of implementation: domestic actors play different games in 
implementation than do their governments’ representatives in negotiating EU policy in 
Brussels. In ECA politics, the number of levels and range of actors involved is much 
more limited: most ECA rules do not require parliamentary ratification; thus, legislatures 
are neither in a strong veto player position, nor can they considerably alter the substance 
of rules from what the international negotiators intended. Furthermore, the administrative 
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nature of ECA rules conflates the roles of both negotiator and implementer: the domestic 
rules are written by the same bureaucrats who negotiate the international guidelines. This 
reduces the regulatory community to those only directly involved with the formulation of 
relevant administrative procedures and removes the two-level game character of 
implementation which undermines the strength of the goodness of fit theory in EU 
compliance. At the same time, it also strengthens this theory by bringing the 
implementers’ concerns directly to the international negotiation table. Institutional 
compatibility of proposed rules should thus have a strong impact on negotiators’ 
acceptance of proposals. 
Institutional compatibility can thus serve as an important predictor for the 
likelihood of adoption of proposals in negotiations, and it is also relevant in the 
domestication of international agreements; that is, their adaptation in the process of 
domestic implementation (see chapter seven and Bugdahn 2005). By anticipating 
implementation challenges, negotiators who will implement the bargaining outcome 
themselves can define negotiation strategies and acceptable negotiation results in a much 
more detail-oriented fashion than negotiators who are not in control of domestic 
implementation. Negotiator-implementers are likely to shirk high adaptation costs and 
seek an agreement that is easy to implement. Furthermore, they will limit the range of 
acceptable results to those that they can implement themselves. That is, rules requiring 
modifications of the legal/institutional framework beyond their sphere of authority are 
unlikely to be considered acceptable; since such provisions would introduce an additional 
game level in the implementation process, bringing with them all the problems evident by 
the limitation of the goodness of fit theory in EU compliance. 
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We can observe this behavior on both sides of the negotiation table: German 
negotiators perceived little compatibility between what the United States was proposing 
and what they could actually implement with little adaptation of existing rules. American 
negotiators, conversely, needed an agreement that established common environmental 
review procedures since the Congressional mandate had removed authority over 
environmental policies for Ex-Im from their sphere of influence. They were limited to 
negotiating harmonized rules that would not put the nature of Ex-Im’s policies into 
question. In this sense, one could argue, U.S. negotiators did face a domestic ratification 
game which made their position even less flexible. 
6.1.1.1 Procedurality of rules 
Rules identical in content with respect to regulatory targets, objectives, as well as 
qualitative and quantitative evaluation criteria can still vary drastically with respect to the 
means and instruments used to achieve these objectives. Sidelining the choice of 
instruments for the moment, a key concern is whether rules prescribe objectives and 
sanctions for failing to achieve them (that is prescribing targets), or whether rules also 
determine the process for achieving these objectives. Target-based rules have the clear 
advantage of establishing goals while retaining flexibility in implementation, whereas 
procedural rules remove ambiguity from the implementation process by detailing the 
means of their execution. At the same time, target-based rules tend to reduce discretion in 
judging goal achievement and procedural rules pre-empt custom-tailored implementation 
strategies. Generally speaking, the United States is more pre-disposed towards procedural 
rules than Germany (for a related comparison among the United States and Britain see 
Vogel 1986). 
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Since the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, all U.S. federal 
programs and projects have needed to evaluate their environmental impact. Over time, 
environmental assessments and environmental impact statements have become deeply 
institutionalized within the United States. While much of environmental legislation in 
Germany has been adapted from U.S. domestic regulation, environmental impact 
assessments have only been implemented in Germany after an EU directive required 
implementation. Dryek et al. report:  
Famously, the German government took five years to transpose the EU’s 1985 
Environmental Impact Assessment directive into national law, and another six years to 
introduce the administrative provisions required for its implementation – largely because, as 
Kraak and Pehle (2001: 6) explain, the European directive ‘is comparatively blind when it 
comes to internal German administrative structures’. […] The European Commission has 
since sued the German government (successfully) over the inadequacies of the provisions it 
did manage to implement (Dryzek et al. 2003: 116). 
Demmke shares this assessment in his analysis of Germany’s role in European 
environmental policy development. He suggests that Directive 85/337/EEC, the result of 
a French initiative, was the first instance of European environmental rules proving 
themselves incompatible with German regulatory culture. Up to this point European 
provisions were very compatible with German command-and-control legislation. 
However, the procedural nature of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive was 
at odds with German regulatory tradition. Similarly, a number of directives passed in the 
1990s proved foreign to the German legal system, including the Environmental 
Information Directive 90/313/EEC (Demmke 1999). 
He suggests that pollution control measures and approvals of new substances 
governed by meeting command-and-control type requirements are much more in-line 
with German regulatory culture. This enabled Germany, for a long time, to upload its 
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rules onto the EU pollution control agenda, while other countries like Great Britain faced 
considerable adaptation costs (Demmke 1999: 57). 
These two directives serve as almost perfect examples for the difficulties 
encountered in harmonizing ECA environmental rules. Rules proposed by the United 
States would have established detailed procedural rules for assessing environmental 
effects of projects, and relied on public transparency provisions for monitoring and 
enforcement. The same two aspects were at the core of German difficulties with the EU 
environmental directives which established environmental review procedures and 
transparency of administrative acts. 
What in the United States stands as the norm appears to be at odds with German 
regulatory culture. Although it is a perfect fit for U.S. domestic institutions – especially 
the reliance on explicit policies and procedures – this set of rules is less compatible with 
the German preference for outcome-oriented measures and little procedural detail within 
its corporatist arrangements with industry. David Vogel (1986) identified related 
institutional differences between U.S. and British approaches in regulating industrial 
pollution. British administrators preferred to retain more flexibility in their dealings with 
industry than their U.S. counterparts. While flexibility is not a hallmark of the German 
legalistic style of regulation, these observations clearly highlight differences in 
preference for procedural rules. 
Not surprisingly, the change in European environmental politics strategy from 
command-and-control to more procedural measures has been attributed to the successful 
uploading of domestic rules to the EU-level by states favoring rules that “do not fit with 
German regulatory philosophies” (Demmke 1999: 45). Related to this, Liefferink and 
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Andersen consider Germany the most ambivalent leader state, one which is highly active 
in some areas while being highly inflexible in areas that do not fit with its regulatory 
culture (cited in Demmke 1999: 49-50). 
The procedural nature of the proposed rules allowed for little compatibility with 
German regulatory culture, favouring target-based rules over procedural ones. This was 
amplified by the fact that pre-approval review of projects is standard practice for bank-
type ECAs which need to evaluate all risks a project may bear, while insurance-type 
ECAs like the German Hermes have little incentive to evaluate a project in detail prior to 
granting cover (see chapter two). An insurer’s mode of operation not only suggests that 
conditions can be written into cover agreements, but also implies that there is no use in 
assessing whether or not these conditions have been met unless a claim is filed against 
this insurance. Thus, procedural rules provided a misfit not only with German regulatory 
culture, but also with the business model of German export credits. 
6.1.1.2 Transparency 
Adoption of U.S. style transparency rules for Hermes credits would require more 
than just modification of ECA rules. In fact, it may require extensive reform of German 
administrative law for which there was little political interest/drive at the time of the 
Common Approaches negotiations (personal communication with German activist, 17 
July 2003), necessitating an expansion of the regulatory community involved which 
could spark further unintended reforms. However, when viewing ECA harmonization 
from a regulatory reform perspective, the Common Approaches – just like the Aarhus 
Convention and the EU Environmental Information Directive – already serve as external 
forcing events promoting such reforms with respect to transparency. While limiting the 
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regulatory community to its current members served to control the range of modification 
to Hermes policies, it did little to control the reform agenda in public discourse. German 
reluctance to agree to U.S. initiatives in fact increased the domestic political salience of 
Hermes reform. 
Part of the environmental impact assessment process in the U.S. is the publicity of 
these assessments. This provides stakeholders with an opportunity to comment on the 
projects’ anticipated impacts and possibly challenge the adequacy of the environmental 
review. Similar to the requirement of supplying an environmental impact statement, 
process transparency is deeply institutionalized in the United States. Quite to the 
contrary, such information is considered commercially confidential and not to be released 
by public agencies in Germany. New ways were sought out to integrate the Common 
Approaches’ 30-day transparency requirement into German regulation, but not 
surprisingly, German negotiators were strongly opposed to this rule for a long time. As 
pointed out above, flexibility provisions incorporated in the Common Approaches 
facilitated agreement but also rendered the agreement less effective. 
Legal provisions (Paragraph 30 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz and Paragraph 203 
Strafgesetzbuch) regarding personal and commercial confidentiality could easily be 
changed or amended by law. However, this would mean involving the legislature in 
implementation rather than implementing environmental policies for Hermes credits via 
administrative procedure. As outlined above, negotiator-implementers seek agreements 
they can implement within their own sphere of authority. Modification of confidentiality 
provisions in German administrative and criminal law clearly lie beyond the reach of 
these bureaucrats, and, not surprisingly, German negotiators sought common rules that 
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could be implemented without modifications to fundamental legal provisions that would 
also entail a widening of the involved regulatory community. As Dunne reports:  
On transparency, officials note that German privacy and data protection laws do not allow 
the sort of insight available in the US. ‘We have to work within German law,’ says Thomas 
Wohlwill, joint head of the agency’s credit department, with special environmental 
responsibilities. ‘If an exporter allows us to publish details of a project ahead of a decision, 
then we would do it. But if not, we have to respect that company’s right to confidentiality’.” 
(Dunne and Simonian 2002)  
Wohlwill, a Hermes employee, was involved in negotiating the Common 
Approaches as an environmental expert in Germany’s delegation to the ECG. 
Beyond the specifics of transparency in ECA decisions, the general regulatory 
culture concerning transparency is informative. The U.S. Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) of 1966 predates NEPA (and thus environmental assessment procedures); the 
German legislator, however, has passed right-to-know legislation only rather recently in 
2005, which went into effect on 1 January 2006, and, it should be noted, only after the 
Common Approaches had been negotiated. Freedom of information rules have been 
around since at least 1766 with the adoption of Sweden’s Freedom of the Press Act. The 
U.S. FOIA marks a relatively early adoption of such rules, while Germany is clearly a 
late-comer. In France access to administrative documents is a constitutional right and has 
been law since 1978. The British freedom of information regime of 2000 went into in 
effect in 2005 (Banisar 2005; Bugdahn 2005: 190). 
In a comparison with the U.S. approach to information access, Wieland labels the 
German one a “denial of access” that “tends to increase [bureaucracy] power by 
excluding the public and by keeping its knowledge secret” (Wieland 2000: 98). Access to 
information is not intended to provide democratic control, but rather only serves to 
protect the individual in disputes over administrative acts (Wieland 2000: 98-9). The 
German Gesetz zur Regelung des Zugangs zu Informationen des Bundes of 5 September 
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2005 (Informationsfreiheitsgesetz 2005) was one of the last laws of its kind to be adapted 
in Europe. Though rather restrictive in nature, the German law took more than seven 
years to mature from initial proposal to final adoption 
{http://www.freedominfo.org/countries/germany.htm, accessed 31 July 2007 and 
\Banisar, 2005 #3017}. Whereas the law does establish a right-to-know, it also upholds 
pre-existing limitations, including those confidentiality restrictions that Hermes 
supporters typically cite in support of a restrictive transparency regime for ECAs. 
Prior to the adoption of general freedom of information regulation in Germany, 
the EU Access to Environmental Information Directive 90/313/EEC required the creation 
of laws governing the access to environmental information throughout Europe. Germany 
transposed this directive into national law in 1994. In her analysis of the directive’s 
transposition in Ireland, Great Britain, and Germany Bugdahn argued that Germany 
“ha[d] a strong contradicting tradition and is most likely to adopt a transposition with 
conservative and cost-restrictive interpretations” (Bugdahn 2005: 186). Not surprisingly, 
the half-hearted transposition triggered infringement procedures by the EU Commission 
which conferred the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1997 (Bugdahn 2005: 
191) mirroring the reluctant transposition of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive 85/337/EEC. 
The meta-regulation story with regard to transparency is that it has spread to 
Germany at last. However, this harmonization process was driven primarily by 
“penetration by external actors” (Bennett 1991): the Aarhus Convention, EU directives, 
and a proliferation of international agreements stipulating transparency forced regulatory 
reform in Germany. The Common Approaches certainly fall into this category of 
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externally-forcing events, while their negotiation was also subject to a “last stand” 
mentality within a German bureaucracy seeking to fend off undesired infringements on 
their autonomy over administrative confidentiality. In any case, broad transparency 
provisions as part of the U.S. negotiation pitch certainly did not facilitate German 
agreement to the U.S. proposal. Not surprisingly, German implementation of the 
Common Approaches exhausted all flexibility in the Common Approaches’ language 
regarding transparency, and thus, agreement to the harmonized rules would have been 
unlikely without the passages that allowed implementation without fundamentally 
changing existing procedures (see chapter seven). 
6.1.2 Moving beyond incompatibility 
Cowles and Risse argue that misfit brought on by Europeanization not only poses 
a problem for harmonization, but it can also generate adaptational pressures on domestic 
structures that can help change existing practices (Cowles and Risse 2001). In this view, 
regulatory harmonization and competition can serve as external forcing events in 
regulatory reform. 
With regard to environmental impact assessments and transparency, negotiation 
of the Common Approaches provided yet another external event pushing Germany 
further towards the incorporation of procedural meta-regulations that had been on the 
regulatory reform agenda for a considerable time. The consideration of both preceded the 
Common Approaches, but neither was fully institutionalized at the time the ECG was 
negotiating harmonized environmental rules for ECAs. Environmental impact 
assessments had been implemented in Germany from 1996 on, but the experience with 
the new instrument had not been a very good one in that it slowed down administrative 
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processes considerably. Given the Commission’s infringement proceedings concerning 
Germany’s transposition of the directive, it was not surprising that bureaucrats were not 
keen on establishing yet another administrative process that required formalized 
environmental review. 
Freedom of information legislation was even more nascent at the time when 
consideration was being given to a general right-to-know act (starting in 1998); 
furthermore, the 1994 transposition of the Access to Environmental Information 
Directive was being challenged by the EU Commission at the same time. Here, too, 
German bureaucrats’ aversion to transparency provisions is very understandable. 
Nevertheless, the general climate in which the Common Approaches were 
negotiated slowly tilted towards environmental assessment and transparency, and 
complete resistance was therefore futile. The question was how much assimilation was 
necessary to secure agreement in the ECG while also protecting established domestic 
procedures. The timing of German domestic environmental rule revisions for Hermes in 
1998 and 2001 – in each case pre-dating agreements within the ECG – suggest that the 
negotiations did exert considerable adaptation pressures even if German rules fell 
somewhat short of faithful implementation of the OECD agreements. Although this is not 
an example of complete harmonization, these negotiations did bring German policies 
much closer to the level playing field favored by the United States. 
6.1.2.1 Incorporation of non-trade concerns 
ECAs can serve multiple purposes. First and foremost, these agencies were 
created to create jobs by promoting exports. Beyond job creation, however, ECAs can be 
used to achieve additional objectives. Access to export credits can be used as a tool of 
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foreign policy: countries can be blacklisted for ECA-supported exports if they do not 
fulfill certain criteria. ECAs can also work as agents of development by facilitating 
exports into developing countries that may otherwise not be able to finance these 
products and services. ECAs can implement industrial policy by supporting specific 
sectors and products. Most recently, ECAs have been discovered by NGOs to provide 
considerable leverage in promoting sustainable development. 
ECAs typically maintain lists of countries for which export credits are not 
available. Most of these lists are based on financial prudence; risks and exposure assumed 
by ECAs must be manageable. These agencies do support exports to much riskier buyer 
countries than commercial insurers could by relying on superior credit rating and the 
ability to write off losses with recourse to public budgets, but if buyer countries are 
unlikely to pay for exports, then even ECAs need to consider whether they can afford to 
provide credits and guarantees for exports to these countries. This restriction is dictated 
not only by financial and budgetary prudence, but also by WTO rules that stipulate that 
ECAs have to operate on a no-loss basis. Financial losses would equate to prohibited 
subsidies. Beyond excluding high risk-buyer countries from cover, some ECAs also 
exclude countries from cover for political reasons. 
6.1.2.1.1 Targeting countries 
Ex-Im reauthorization legislation is almost unthinkable without political 
considerations regarding countries that should be included or barred from Ex-Im support. 
The 1992 reauthorization prohibited assistance to “Marxist-Leninist countries” and to 
countries which violated human rights (United States Congress 1992a). In 1997, the 
Export-Import Bank Authorization bill prohibited transactions involving Russian firms, if 
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Russia proceded to transfer SS-N-22 Sunburn or SS-N-26 Yakhont missiles to China 
(United States Congress 1997). The most recent reauthorization from 2006 allowed 
support for railroad construction between Baku, Azerbaijan, Tbilisi, Georgia, and Kars, 
Turkey only if such a connection was to traverse or include Armenia (United States 
Congress 2006). Furthermore, the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006 
authorizes export credits to Belarus for delivery of humanitarian goods and agricultural or 
medical products only (United States Congress 2007). 
While excluding recipient countries for exclusively political purposes is not 
practiced in Germany – guidelines and policies for Hermes are after all set by the 
Economics Ministry – considering individual transactions can involve political 
calculations. Export credits must be approved by the inter-ministerial committee, and 
each department involved brings its own considerations to the table. The Finance 
Ministry is most concerned about financial risks; the Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
considers primarily developmental aspects; but the Foreign Office takes foreign policy 
objectives into account when export credits are considered. Given the committee’s 
consensual mode of operation, foreign policy considerations can lead to the denial of an 
application for cover. On the other hand, cover for individual transactions can also be 
politically motivated to improve relations with other states by encouraging exports. 
Similarly, political consideration can play a role in removing countries from exclusion 
lists. Russian defaults on old debt had resulted in the loss of eligibility for Hermes 
credits. However, the German government was politically interested in improving its 
relations with Eastern European countries in the late 1990s, and re-instatement of export 
credits to Russia therefore became a political issue. In 2001/02, support for 
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democratization and anti-terrorism were high on the political agenda. To this end, Cuba, 
Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia were moved off Germany’s blacklist – clearly a 
political move that was motivated more by the desire for improved relations than by 
changes in underlying risks (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2002; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
2001; Ehrlich, Thornhill, and Bokhari 2001; Süddeutsche Zeitung 2001; Schwennicke 
2001). In a related high-profile move, export credits were granted to China for the 
construction of a maglev train line connecting Shanghai with its airport. In this case, the € 
500 million in export credit guarantees (coupled with € 100 million in tied aid) served a 
dual purpose: improving economic relations with China while establishing the first 
commercial adoption of German Transrapid technology (Eichels Baustelle in Shanghai 
2002). 
What sets this use of export credits for political ends apart is that the United 
States is much more likely to have general policy objectives and categorical exclusions in 
place while keeping the approval process rather apolitical. Germany, on the other hand, is 
unlikely to task Hermes with grand policy designs, but nevertheless makes policy 
considerations part of the approval process for export credit applications (see also chapter 
four).  
6.1.2.1.2 Promoting development 
ECAs support a considerable volume of exports to developing countries. While 
export credits facilitate only around 3 per cent of total foreign trade, around 20 per cent 
of trade with developing countries is made possible with export credits. Considering this 
share of exports, it is apparent that ECAs can have a significant impact on developing 
countries through the types of projects or exports they support. This developmental 
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aspect has long been recognized and incorporated into ECA procedures – albeit to 
different extents. The Swiss Exportrisikogarantie has included developmental experts on 
its advisory board since the 1970s. The German inter-ministerial committee for export 
credits includes a representative from the Ministry for Economic Cooperation. 
However, ECAs’ primary objective is job creation through export promotion. 
Developmental concerns are secondary (see also Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 1999). This becomes especially apparent in the role of 
ECAs in supporting arms exports. Many have called on ECAs to stop providing credits 
and guarantees for arms exports to poor countries. Nevertheless, ECAs like the British 
ECGD continue to finance a considerable volume of arms to developing countries despite 
their negative developmental impact. 
6.1.2.1.3 Implementing industrial policy 
Targeted ECA programs can benefit specific sectors of the economy. Commercial 
aircraft would be much more difficult to sell without ECA support, and ships and nuclear 
power plants are also among the sectors for which OECD ECAs established sector 
agreements to harmonize ECA terms for exports areas considered central to ECA 
operations. Individually, ECAs have also implemented programs to help certain parts of 
their economy or to promote the export of specific products. 
Regarding domestic programs, support programs for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) are particularly popular among ECAs – especially among those ECAs 
defending themselves against corporate-welfare critics. The 2006 reauthorization for the 
U.S. Ex-Im Bank, which included the establishment of a Small Business Division, 
required small business specialists in each division and created a Small Business 
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Committee to coordinate SME activities within the agency (United States Congress 
2006). The German government similarly strives to make its export credits easily 
accessible for SMEs (http://www.agaportal.de/pages/aga/grundzuege/mittelstand.html; 
accessed 3 August 2007).  
Many ECAs have also established programs to support the export of 
environmental technology and thereby assist these sectors of their economy. Ex-Im has 
an Environmental Exports Program which offers preferential terms for qualified exports 
(http://www.exim.gov/products/special/environment.cfm; accessed 3 August 2007). The 
German export initiative for renewable energy is jointly run by the German energy 
agency and KfW and such exports are considered highly supportable through export 
credits (http://www.agaportal.de/pages/aga/grundzuege/erneuerbare_energien.html; 
accessed 3 August 2007). 
Compared with the extensive SME and environmental exports initiatives at Ex-
Im, German efforts in these areas are rather limited. While there are demands for both 
types of support in both countries, the United States government has been much more 
forthcoming in establishing broad policy-guided initiatives than the German 
administration where Hermes policies are rather immune to Parliamentary demands. 
6.1.2.1.4 Protecting the environment 
NGOs realized in the 1980s that challenging the sources of financing can be an 
effective tool for preventing the completion of unwanted projects. NGO campaigns which 
led to the adoption of environmental policies by international finance providers all started 
with environmental critiques of individual environmentally problematic projects. This 
leverage over large projects (see chapter four) means that even challenging relatively 
218 
moderate components supplied with ECA support can undermine the financial viability 
of a project. ECAs have responded to this relatively recent demand in a variety of ways, 
ranging from the denial of export credits’ relevance for the environment to the 
incorporation of far-reaching environmental policies regarding their operations. 
In Germany, the environmental response has been rather unenthusiastic. National 
environmental rules are at the low end of what is prescribed by the Common Approaches, 
utilizing all possible loopholes in the agreement. However, domestic nuclear phase-out 
has lead to the inclusion of a nuclear technology exclusion criterion: German export 
credits are not available for exports of nuclear technology. This marks the only policy-
guided categorical exclusion in Hermes guidelines, implemented by the SPD-Green 
coalition in 2001. This rule excludes nuclear technology from Hermes support but the 
rule was defined and implemented in such a way that it allowed the export of technology 
for nuclear facilities as long as the products themselves were of a conventional nature or 
improved the safety level of existing installations. The wording of this rule is considered 
weak, but it does represent the most the Economics Ministry was willing to concede to in 
2001 (interview with German official, 30 January 2004).  
The nuclear policy has been tested a few times since then. In December 2003, it 
became public knowledge that Siemens had applied for Hermes guarantees to cover its 
shipment of turbines to a new nuclear power plant in Finland. It was the first new nuclear 
power plant to be constructed in Europe after the Chernobyl disaster. This coincided with 
Siemens’ request for permission to sell its Hanau reprocessing facility to China. Due 
mainly to this overlap, public opposition mounted against this sort of nuclear technology 
support, and thus resulted in Siemens withdrawing its request for Hermes guarantees in 
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an attempt to secure permission to sell the reprocessing facility to China after political 
opposition to theses deals had increased. Since Hermes rules exclude only nuclear 
technology per se from support and not components of nuclear projects, initial enquiries 
for support by Siemens received support from Hermes officials. The ministries 
represented in the inter-ministerial committee (including the Green foreign office) did not 
object either. Only when the request became public, and the issue politicized, did 
members of the committee reconsider their support, and thus prompt Siemens to 
withdraw its request.13 Siemens’ structural power prevailed until the political cost of 
approval increased dramatically through publicity of the request. 
In addition to the nuclear exclusion provision, a special program for promoting 
renewable energy technology exports is the only other policy-oriented initiative regarding 
German export credits (see Schaper 2004b). Remarkably, both exceptions to general 
Hermes rules concern environmental objectives. No other such special rules exist for this 
export promotion instrument.  
6.1.2.2 Politics and ECA terms 
These political considerations should be irrelevant if ECAs would only serve to 
correct an aspect of market failure (i.e. the lack of affordable financing to many 
countries). However, ECAs are political creatures, and thus these concerns do matter to 
some extent. However, their relative importance varies across states: the U.S. Ex-Im 
Bank is frequently tasked with tasks beyond job creation by Congress. German Hermes 
credits, on the other hand, have proven largely resilient to such political interference. This 
culture regarding non-trade concerns in ECA objectives is a consequence of prior policy 
                                               
13 The IMA always never turns down applications, but it does signal to applicants when it may be 
“appropriate” to withdraw an application for cover. 
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history and institutionalized political bargains and power relationships. It also impacts the 
organization’s stance in negotiating international agreements that go beyond rules for 
core ECA business. Negotiating environmental terms came much more naturally to U.S. 
ECA representatives who had considerable experience in dealing with domestic political 
demands than to the German Economics ministry and Hermes representatives, who had a 
much narrower sectoral conception of appropriate ECA operations. Furthermore, the 
German government’s establishment of a domestic environmental policy had already 
conceded much more ground than any other “secondary” policy objective had received 
prior to this. A German official argued that the government could not give into the 
environmental reform demands, even if it considered them appropriate, as this would 
open the door to even more demands, possibly spilling over to social policy and human 
rights demands (interview with German official, 8 January 2004). The sectoral 
conception of German export credits (see chapter three) did not allow accommodation of 
overarching policy concerns (see also Schaper 2003). 
Consequently, Hermes credits serve their primary purpose of job creation through 
export promotion and are also employed as an industrial policy instrument. Cover 
decisions in a committee also involving representatives from the finance, development, 
and foreign affairs ministries enable the consideration of policy objectives beyond export 
promotion, but Hermes credits are unlikely to be used as a foreign policy instrument as in 
the U.S. case. Individual cover decisions may be politically motivated, but no policy 
objectives beyond export promotion guide the disbursement of German export credits. 
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6.1.3 Competing imperatives: how to overcome the dilemma? 
The obvious solution to retaining easy access to export credits for European firms, 
while at the same time appeasing the United States and environmental critics of ECAs, 
was to attain agreement on policies satisfying the moral requirement of establishing 
common environmental rules while at the same time leaving enough room for ECAs to 
implement them in a way that would pose the least amount of interference with business 
as usual, and thus minimize adaptation costs while harvesting political benefits. 
Both the United States and NGOs had suggested the World Bank’s environmental 
policies as a point of reference. Establishing this particular frame of reference proved 
successful and convincing for at least two reasons. First, supporters of environmental 
policies for ECAs could argue that the types of projects supported by the Bank were 
similar to those for which ECA rules were sought. This pitch was even more convincing 
because it came from a coalition of actors that included the very same NGOs that had 
earlier criticized the Bank for its environmental performance. Negotiators were thus 
restricted to an agreement that would mirror, resemble, or at least reference World Bank 
environmental policies. 
An initial agreement among these lines, however, was not supported by the 
United States in 2001. Revision 6 of the Common Approaches established common 
environmental rules for ECAs and provide flexibility in their implementation, but did not 
provide for strong monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. Rev. 6 did not provide a 
substantial solution to re-levelling the playing field among ECAs, but it could have 
provided a viable political solution by moving the issue off the agenda, it could have 
provided the U.S. Ex-Im Bank with a pretext to reconsider its environmental policies, and 
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it could have given European ECAs rules that were easy to implement without much 
adaptation. Still, the U.S. government objected to Rev. 6, and insisted on the negotiation 
of common guidelines reducing the range of qualitative standards which ECAs could 
apply, including stronger transparency and monitoring requirements.14 In other words, the 
United States sought an agreement that was more detailed in its provisions and provided 
more procedural guidance for implementation. Not surprisingly, continental European 
negotiators were opposed to rules that seemed out-of-step with continental regulatory 
culture (see chapter two). 
In addition to these institutional factors, German domestic politics also attached a 
considerable political price to supporting the Common Approaches for German 
negotiators whereas U.S. negotiators could only benefit from any agreement that departed 
from the status quo. After assessing the compatibility of harmonization proposals with 
domestic regulatory cultures, the next section turns to the power of competing demands 
on ECAs and their effects on the acceptability of proposed rules. 
6.2 Power 
Environmental policies for ECAs are behind-the-border-rules with an effect on 
trade. However, this effect is only indirect. These policies regulate the access to export 
promotion for domestic exporters. They neither limit market access to foreign companies 
nor provide export subsidies. In fact, these rules restrict access to export subsidies. This 
means that these rules are a detriment to exports, and we should expect states engage in a 
race to the bottom in order to serve the interests of exporters. Thus, one should not expect 
                                               
14 This decision was made by the White House, not on the level of the involved departments (interview 
with U.S. lobbyist, 7 July 2004; interview with three U.S. officials, 7 July 2004). 
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these regulations to be a primary target for upward regulatory harmonization (see chapter 
two). Nevertheless, the United States sought upward harmonization after it had put strict 
domestic rules in place unilaterally. 
Strict environmental rules for access to export credits impose costs on domestic 
firms, and thus hurt them. The political cost of these standards not only depends on the 
stringency of these standards (that is the amount of cost each affected firm incurs), but 
also on the number of affected firms and transactions, and the power of the affected 
firms. Since environmental rules for ECAs primarily affect large-scale infrastructure 
development and are largely irrelevant for other important ECA business like commercial 
aircraft, ships, or military exports, their national relevance depends on the volume of 
ECA-supported exports for infrastructure development. In 2002, 35 per cent of total Ex-
Im exposure was accounted for by aircraft financing; at the same time, the British ECGD 
had underwritten more than 60 per cent of its business for defense and aircraft, but only 
15 per cent of German Hermes guarantees went towards aircraft deals during the same 
year (Wang et al. 2005: 36).  
Among the exports supported by ECAs, environmental rules clearly play a more 
important role for those ECAs which support few exports in unaffected sectors. This is 
especially true for German Hermes guarantees which support far less commercial aircraft 
deals then either the U.S. Ex-Im Bank or the British ECGD. However, share of ECA 
portfolio is only part of the story. The size of the overall ECA portfolio must be 
considered as well: ECA relevance can be measured by the share of ECA supported 
exports of total exports. The more important an ECA is to national exports, and the more 
business it conducts in infrastructure development, the more relevant environmental 
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standards are for this particular ECA. This means that as much as 1.44 per cent of total 
German export of goods in 2005 were subject to the Common Approaches, whereas only 
0.59 per cent of U.S. and 0.22 per cent of British exports fell into categories which could 
have required review under the Common Approaches (see Figure 6.1). These figures may 
be small, but considering that ECAs provide assistance for not more than 3 percent of 
total exports (including short-term cover) on average, a difference of 1 per cent is highly 
significant.  
Figure 6.1 Business subject to environmental review 
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Sources: Author’s calculations based on OECD data on export credits, WTO data on 
merchandise exports, and UN data on SDR-USD conversion rates; Ex-Im Annual report 
2006, p. 36; ECGD 2005-2006 Annual Report, p. 20; Hermes Annual Report 2006. 
 Environmental rules for export credits are most relevant where much ECA 
support is afforded for construction or components supplied to large infrastructure 
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construction. This is especially true for the #1 Hermes client Siemens, whereas Boeing 
and Airbus as the largest clients of Ex-Im and ECGD respectively, need not fear that 
environmental ECA policies would impact their support. Thus, if there exists a general 
incentive for downward competition on environmental requirements among ECAs, the 
downward-pull should be stronger among ECAs supporting much infrastructure business 
than among agencies involved primarily in exports lying outside the scope of the 
environmental assessment requirement. 
This can serve as a partial explanation for Germany’s reluctance to establish strict 
environmental rules, but it does not quite adequately account for the establishment of the 
Common Approaches after all. The distribution of differential gains from harmonization, 
depending on sectoral composition of ECA portfolios, provides an important backdrop 
for the following discussion of motivations and strategies for harmonization, but a look 
inside the rules is required for understanding the harmonization process beyond 
Germany’s initial aversion to the establishment of common environmental rules. This 
was driven by its concerns about the proposed rules’ impact on German exports – a clear 
manifestation of German industry’s structural power. 
6.2.1 U.S. motivation for seeking harmonization 
The U.S. motivation for seeking common environmental rules among ECAs is 
easy to understand. The unilateral adoption of environmental requirements to gain 
support by Ex-Im resulted in a disadvantage for U.S. exporters vis-à-vis their foreign 
competitors. This disadvantage could only be removed by either relaxing Ex-Im’s 
environmental policies or through the adoption of similar rules among other ECAs. Since 
Ex-Im’s environmental policies were mandated by the U.S. Congress, the administration 
226 
could neither repeal Ex-Im rules nor significantly alter them on its own. Though the 
Congressional requirement did not provide particular details for these rules, it is obvious 
that significant relaxation of Ex-Im policies could be challenged during its next re-
authorization. Thus, the only viable option for re-leveling the playing field was a solution 
at the international level. Even if this endeavor would have proven futile, it may have 
helped U.S. exporters, as such a failure might have provided the political context for 
scrapping Ex-Im’s environmental rules. If uploading of Ex-Im’s rules proved successful, 
no further domestic action would be required; either way, an international initiative was 
the only solution. The administration and Ex-Im were held hostage by supporters of 
environmental policies who had successfully instrumentalized Congressional power. 
In addition to these strategic considerations, which were a consequence of the 
U.S. separation of powers, there were additional political motivations for uploading Ex-
Im rules. In addition to industry (which favored the removal of a competitive 
disadvantage), environmental activists were also in favor of bringing environmental rules 
to other ECAs. This constellation of industry and activists is a perfect “Baptists and 
Bootleggers” coalition as described by DeSombre (2000; 2005); it can exert considerable 
pressure on the administration to act on their behalf, and is thus a good predictor of 
international environmental action by the U.S. government. The existence of strict 
domestic U.S. rules also suggests that the administration would actively pursue the 
establishment of international environmental rules for ECAs (Haas 2003). 
Not surprisingly, the U.S. administration sought the establishment of international 
rules for ECAs soon after the implementation of Ex-Im’s environmental policies. 
Initially, the issue was raised by the U.S. government in the OECD in 1994, subsequently 
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considered in the context of G-7 meetings (first at the 1997 Denver summit over which 
the United States as the host had agenda control), and after an endorsement at the head-
of-state level at these meetings, the OECD ECG was tasked with the development of 
international environmental rules for ECAs. 
6.2.2 Why harmonize? 
Both Germany and the United States have a history of internationalizing their 
domestic environmental regulations, and at the same time resisting internationalization by 
others when the proposed rules were in conflict with their own domestic rules. While this 
is helpful in identifying conditions under which either nation is likely to be either a 
“leader” or “laggard,” it does not help us to understand when an internationalization 
attempt is likely to succeed, with the rare exception of a proposal acceptable to all parties 
involved. Although DeSombre makes the case that U.S. market power “over the target 
state is an important predictor” (2000: 247) of successful internationalization of domestic 
U.S. regulations, her argument only holds for domestic standards that can be used to limit 
non-conforming foreign products’ access to the domestic market. Since environmental 
standards for export credit agencies apply only to a nation’s own ECA and its clients, 
they cannot be used to exert external pressure on target states. 
In the case of environmental standards for ECAs, setting unilateral standards does 
not directly result in pressures on competing nations to adapt. Such unilateral standards 
only serve as a barrier for domestic exporters to gain support from their national ECA. 
Consequently, a level playing field among ECAs can only be created by scrapping 
domestic environmental standards, that is, a race to the bottom, or by actively seeking an 
agreement with competing nations.  
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By attempting to internationalize its domestic export credit policies, the United 
States has followed an established pattern described by Elizabeth DeSombre (2000) and 
Peter Haas (2003). When both environmentalists and industry favor international 
environmental regulation, the United States is likely to promote internationalization of its 
domestic policies. Similar to the import restrictions for tuna and shrimp discussed by 
DeSombre, binding environmental standards for ECAs implemented throughout the 
OECD would provide for benefits to U.S. industry over the status quo. The difference in 
this case is the United States’ dependency on international cooperation to achieve its 
goal. While import barriers are problematic under WTO rules, they only require passive 
cooperation – i.e. no appeals to the WTO against these rules –, harmonizing 
environmental standards, on the other hand, requires other states to actively cooperate by 
embracing the idea and working towards a common set of rules.  
The U.S. dependency on international cooperation in its effort to harmonize 
environmental standards for ECAs is evident from the discussion above. Given the nature 
of export credit rules, the United States could not rely on its market power to promote its 
agenda, but rather, had to seek out cooperation from the other ECG members. The other 
ECG Member governments, however, had little incentive to concede to the American 
want for environmental standards harmonization, save with the exception of similar 
demands made on them by domestic activist groups and their concerned constituency. 
Consequently, the other ECG Member governments were much more concerned with the 
nature of the proposed rules. The U.S. proposals consisted of procedural rules for the 
evaluation of environmental impacts of supported projects as well as of binding standards 
to be used in the evaluation process, and of public transparency of the environmental 
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evaluation process. The transparency provisions, especially, were at odds with 
continental European regulatory traditions. 
Since there is little economic reason for a nation to agree on stricter 
environmental standards which would result in a competitive disadvantage for its 
exporters, explanations must be sought elsewhere. Among the first candidates for such 
alternative explanations are domestic-level explanations such as public pressure or 
interest group politics. U.S. domestic standard-setting occurred in response to domestic 
pressure to establish such standards, and most ECG Members also experienced some 
degree of domestic political pressure for the establishment of environmental standards for 
their ECAs. Normative factors, for example, the way an issue is being framed in public 
discourse, can also influence the acceptability of various potential solutions to the 
harmonization challenge. Research by David Vogel (1995) as well as the Environmental 
Policy Research Centre at the Free University Berlin (Busch and Jörgens 2004), points to 
the effects of pioneer standards on the policies in other polities. 
While it is easy to understand why the United States sought to upload its ECA 
rules to the international level, explaining the adoption of the Common Approaches is 
much more difficult. From a strategic trade perspective (Krugman 1986), only the United 
States had to gain, because ratcheting up of environmental requirements for ECAs would 
result in relative losses for all other involved ECAs as such international rules would 
restrict their exporters’ access to export promotion, and thus remove the relative 
advantage they had over U.S. competitors who had to comply with Ex-Im rules. 
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6.2.2.1 Balancing environmental with industrial policy concerns 
Thus far, this discussion has treated the issue of environmental policies for ECAs 
as one-dimensional, that is, being only about the departure from the status quo (non-
existence of environmental rules for ECAs). Portraying this as a conflict simply about 
relative ease of access to export promotion neglects the environmental dimension. This 
negotiation game occurred in two dimensions: the desirability of limitations on export 
promotion and environmental protection. Each government had to cater to two competing 
constituencies: business and environmental activists. Only the United States was in the 
fortunate position to have a coalition of these groups backing its push for common 
environmental rules, thanks to its unilateral implementation of similar rules which put 
U.S. business in a position to favor harmonization, even if it meant legitimizing and 
supporting environmental conditionalities. 
Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) analysis of transnational advocacy networks has 
shown how activists can use transnational networks to put their concerns on the domestic 
political agenda, even if they lack political access domestically. By linking with activists 
in other polities they can inject their views into the international debate and even see to it 
that their concerns are fed back into the domestic debate via the international level. 
Advocacy networks can help activists bypass closed domestic political opportunity 
structures (Kitschelt 1986). While this may affect their domestic standing and political 
access only marginally, they can decisively influence discussions by re-framing the terms 
of debate through the strategic use of information. “When they succeed, advocacy 
networks are among the most important sources of new ideas, norms, and identities in the 
international system” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: x). 
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Though environmental activists lacked the clout to influence their governments’ 
negotiation position through direct lobbying, they did manage to influence the terms of 
the public debate and thereby impose political costs onto any settlement that would not 
address environmental concerns. In a way, this opened a second front for European 
governments: while negotiating the U.S. initiative in Paris, they also had to justify 
lacking or weak environmental policies for their ECAs to domestic critics. They were 
caught in a two-pronged approach orchestrated in Washington (DC): the U.S. 
government exerted pressure on the intergovernmental level (G8, OECD) while NGOs 
networked transnationally and created domestic pressure by working as norm 
entrepreneurs, questioning the ECA mission of exclusive job creation. Instead, activists 
suggested, the public nature of export credits required broadening the objectives of export 
promotion beyond job creation to include developmental and environmental concerns.  
The existence of groups favoring environmental rules for ECAs mattered not only 
where they were successful in shaping state preferences (namely in the United States) but 
also in states where they had little access. Even German negotiators with close ties to 
industry could not ignore the political cost of openly rejecting all environmental 
concerns. The only way out was to aim for a bargain that would establish environmental 
rules without compromising the preference of not placing strong restrictions on the access 
to export credits. German NGOs’ influence was mostly limited to their discursive power, 
but this was sufficient to frame the debate to their ends. 
6.2.2.2 Framing acceptable outcomes 
The U.S. government sought to upload Ex-Im environmental policies to the 
international level through initiatives in the G8 and OECD. However, it was effectively 
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fighting an uphill battle against other states that had no interest in constraining access to 
support for their domestic exporters based on environmental criteria. Unlike product or 
process standards which can regulate access to (and thus shield) domestic markets, ECA 
policies govern exporters’ access to government support. This means that governments 
cannot use their market power to drive other states to adhering to the same rules. Both the 
U.S. government and the international NGO network promoting common international 
rules for ECAs had to therefore rely on discursive power to work towards an agreement 
among states on environmental rules for ECAs.  
The alliance between the U.S. government and the NGO network allowed the 
promoters to re-frame the discourse on ECAs and the environment both internationally 
and within other OECD Member States. Ex-Im could claim moral superiority by having 
environmental rules in place and by refusing to support exports to the controversial 
Chinese Three-Gorges Dam project which was made possible with support from 
European ECAs despite its unmitigated social and environmental impacts (“Export Credit 
Still a Race to the Bottom?” 2001). NGOs compiled extensive documentation of 
environmental impacts of ECA-supported projects (Berne Declaration, et al. 1999). Their 
combined efforts allowed the U.S. government and NGOs to raise public awareness, and 
also to reframe the debate from one over the desirability of environmental policies for 
ECAs in general to one over the specifics of common ECA environmental rules. The 
altered discourse, consequently, did not allow opponents to challenge environmental 
standards completely; they could merely seek to design the emerging OECD 
Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported 
Export Credits, the international agreement establishing common environmental policies 
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for ECAs, in a way that would minimize adaptational costs of these rules (Görlach, et al. 
2007). 
After 5 years of negotiations, all parties agreed on the Common Approaches in 
2003 which required members’ ECAs to screen and classify all applications for cover 
exceeding 10 million SDR for their environmental impact and conduct environmental 
reviews of these projects if they fall within two of three categories of potential 
environmental impact. The Common Approaches do not contain quantitative or 
qualitative criteria for deciding whether environmental impacts can be considered 
acceptable or not, but they do reference a number of international standards, including 
World Bank environmental policies. 
Similar to the World Bank, public ECAs are in a privileged position vis-à-vis their 
clients: they are the sole providers of export finance in cases where the risks associated 
with an export are considered non-marketable. Their environmental policies define the 
range of acceptable environmental performance of projects to which supported goods 
may be supplied. The structural power flowing from these policies has resulted in a 
decline in applications for support of exports to projects which do not meet the 
requirements set forth in their environmental rules (see Görlach, et al. 2007). In affecting 
project design, ECAs do rely not only directly on their own power, but they also enlist 
exporters to exert pressure on project developers. Depending on the type and relevance of 
an export to a given project, the exporter may wield structural power of the project 
sponsor if the project depends on the availability of a certain export for completion. If 
this is not the case and the exporter lacks this hard structural power, persuasion may be 
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the only available strategy to convince the project developer of bringing the project into 
compliance with ECA standards. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Considering the low relevance of ECAs for trade (less than 3% of exports are 
facilitated by them), why has harmonization been so slow and cumbersome? At their root, 
many transatlantic disputes are caused by a misunderstanding or lack of knowledge about 
the other side’s politics. Cornelia Ulbert (1997) has shown how different domestic 
discourses on global climate change in the United States and Germany have been a 
source of different policy responses. Similarly, Ansgar Baums (2001) has identified 
varying problem perceptions as a key factor in obstructing transatlantic agreement on 
GMOs. Common to these examples is the policy-makers’ lack of knowledge of the other 
side’s politics. When issues are framed differently, even agreement in word, may in effect 
be considered disagreement. Therefore, the basis to the solution of a transnational policy 
problem requires understanding and appreciation of the other side’s politics. 
In this case, a number of issues obstructed quick agreement: environmental 
protection by means of an export promotion instrument ran counter to sectoral 
conceptions of policy-making in Germany and other states; transparency provisions were 
at odds with continental European regulatory cultures; and international negotiations on 
environmental standards for export credits were the result of U.S. domestic politics – 
other states desired negotiations on the issue far less than the United States did. 
The extent of time it took to arrive at a set of commonly accepted Common 
Approaches can be attributed to the U.S. attempt in pushing for an agreement, the terms 
of which were difficult to accept for many of the other parties involved. At the time of 
235 
my research, U.S. policy makers repeatedly expressed their dismay with the German 
unwillingness to increase transparency in the approval process for Hermes guarantees. 
They perceived this as inflexibility on behalf of their colleagues aimed at bolstering their 
own negotiation position. For German politicians, the provisions in administrative law 
against making project information available were a real issue that was not easily solved 
or circumvented. Not surprisingly, agreement in 2003 was facilitated by the flexibility 
incorporated into crucial provisions. The transparency loophole is contained in paragraph 
16 of the 2003 Common Approaches: 
16. […] For Category A projects, seek to make environmental impact information publicly 
available (e.g. EIAs, summary thereof) at least 30 calendar days before a final commitment 
to grant official support. In the case where environmental impact information cannot, for 
exceptional reasons, be made public Members shall explain the circumstances and report 
these in accordance with paragraph 19 (OECD 2003b). 
Had the Common Approaches not called for procedural standards outlining how 
environmental assessment was to be conducted, and had they only provided technical 
standards for exports and projects, agreement might have been much easier, because 
implementing states would have had more leeway in incorporating the new rules into 
their own regulatory frameworks. 
Interviews with policy makers have also revealed that they had little knowledge of 
other states’ environmental standards. Most could not evaluate their own ECA’s policies 
vis-à-vis other ECAs. This seems to indicate that the relative strictness of standards 
compared to other standards did not matter much – most likely with the exception of the 
United States’ benefits from an agreement in relation to the concessions necessary from 
all other parties. 
Both the German and the U.S. negotiation positions throughout most of the 
OECD negotiations were shaped by the distribution of political power at home. The 
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United States needed an agreement that would provide for rules similar enough to its own 
to re-level the playing field, and to take pressure off Ex-Im. The German delegation, 
headed by the SPD-run Economics Ministry, had little incentive to support substantial 
reforms that could potentially alienate industry support needed for other reform projects. 
Knowing that the rules would not affect Ex-Im’s largest client Boeing was certainly 
helpful for the U.S. initiative, while the German delegation was aware of the fact key 
production sectors of Hermes’ largest client Siemens could be adversely affected by 
environmental requirements. For the German Greens, ECA reform was a critical topic, 
but the Green Environmental Ministry and Joschka Fischer’s Foreign Office could only 
gain more influence on negotiations, and thus be able to facilitate agreement when 
changes in personnel in three ministries occurred almost simultaneously. The zero-sum 
game character of the domestic German discourse on the issue pitting the environment 
against jobs required such a power shift for environmental concerns to play a more 
significant role. 
The lack of institutional compatibility between the rules proposed by the United 
States and the regulatory contexts of other members of the Export Credit Group provides 
a good starting point for explaining the difficulties in reaching an agreement. In 
comparing the German and the American regulatory contexts, little institutional fit 
existed in at least three points: (i) the United States favors procedural rules which are 
incompatible with target-based regulatory culture in Germany; (ii) transparency of 
coverage decisions is at odds with German administrative law; and (iii) the explicit use of 
export credits for non-trade related policy objectives is not commonly practiced in 
Germany. 
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Contrary to U.S. regulatory culture, which allows to utilize export credits for non-
trade objectives, German policy-makers have refrained to task Hermes credit guarantees 
with any tasks other than export promotion. Long-standing membership of the 
Development Ministry in the inter-ministerial committee points to the relevance of non-
trade concerns in coverage decisions, but Hermes has not been used to advance goals 
other than the promotion of German exports. Given this history, it is not surprising that a 
very sectoral conception of export promotion worked against the incorporation of 
sustainability objectives into Hermes policies. 
Not surprisingly, the combination of minimal political pressure to resolve the 
issue with the proposed rules that would require substantial adaptation in Germany, 
resulted in the German delegation’s hesitant approach throughout most of the 
negotiations. This case emphasizes the argument that domestic politics and national 
interests drive international environmental politics. Norms and values do matter and 
certainly help those negotiating parties that can invoke them on their behalf, but they first 
need to overcome hard material interests that may leave little room for “good” policy. 
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Chapter 7: The “not so Harmonized” Result: Implementation 
and Limited Effects 
This chapter discusses the results of the transatlantic harmonization of ECA 
standards and places their effects in the context of the effects of World Bank rules and 
Equator Principles. Transparency emerges as a key component of strong rules and its 
absence is a good indicator for poor performance. The ECA agreement is less effective 
than it could be because of the flexibility provisions for transparency, project 
classification, and choice of reference standards included in it. Loopholes in the 
agreement have led to uneven implementation as the first section illustrates. Insights 
drawn from domestic regulatory harmonization in the United States and EU 
harmonization suggest that upward races in harmonization tend to be linked to downward 
races in implementation which in turn may feed back into subsequent harmonization 
rounds.  
An assessment of harmonization would be incomplete without the discussion of 
the effects of harmonized policies in the second section. Building on the discussion in 
chapter four, the effects of the Common Approaches are discussed in the MDB policies’ 
and Equator Principles’ contexts as part of the assessment of the overall influence of 
these standards in international finance. The effects of these policies not only hinge upon 
their provisions but also depend on the availability of alternative sources of finance. For 
ECAs, the increasing role played by non-OECD ECAs – especially the Chinese Export-
Import Bank – is crucial. With regard to private banks, the business underwritten by 
banks, which have not signed on to the Equator Principles, restricts the reach of the 
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principles. Both sets of rules have especially limited effects in Africa where Chinese 
export credits and loans from Middle Eastern banks provide alternatives to Western 
financing and their social and environmental requirements. 
7.1 Implementation of the Common Approaches 
Environmental policies of ECAs have been harmonized by the OECD Common 
Approaches which require ECAs to (i) classify projects over SDR 10 million according to 
likely environmental impact; (ii) conduct environmental reviews of projects with 
potentially significant environmental impact; (iii) apply international or home-country 
environmental standards to project evaluation; and (iv) make environmental review 
information available to the public prior to making support decisions.  
The U.S. goal for environmental policy harmonization for ECAs was the 
establishment of a common set of binding environmental review procedures and criteria 
among OECD ECAs that was to resemble the U.S. Ex-Im Bank’s procedures as closely 
as possible. While the final agreement was highly congruent with U.S. policy on paper, a 
range of loopholes in the Common Approaches reduced the status of its provisions to an 
almost advisory role. In particular, a broad range of international standards for project 
evaluation and flexibility with regard to information disclosure render the Common 
Approaches less effective than the specificity of its provisions would lead one to believe. 
7.1.1 Standards 
Members of the Export Credit Group report annually to the ECG Secretariat on 
the categorization and environmental assessment of projects. The most recent data 
available covers the period from 2002 to 2006, and thus includes two years of adherence 
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to Revision 6, plus three more years of ECA activity under the 2003 Common 
Approaches (OECD 2007a). Overall, as Table 7.1 illustrates, the share of category A 
projects receiving Environmental Impact Assessment has increased steadily from 67 per 
cent in 2002 to 93 per cent in 2006, but ECAs still do not review EIAs for all projects 
with significant environmental impacts. The proportion of category B projects subjected 
to EIA review has topped out at 17 per cent. While these projects do not require full EIA 
review under the Common Approaches, this category is likely to contain “big B” projects 
which could have been classified as category A projects, but were grouped into category 
B to receive less scrutiny.  
Table 7.1 Environmental review standards 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EIA review, category A 67 % 77 % 82 % 83 % 93 % 
EIA review, category B 6 % 17 % 17 % 17 % 18 % 
Intl’ standards, category A 65 % 68 % 82 % 79 % 92 % 
Host country standards, category A 20 % 26 % 13 % 17 % 5 % 
Intl’ standards, category B 50 % 61 % 63 % 69 % 80 % 
Host country standards, category B 36 % 24 % 23 % 19 % 14 % 
Source: OECD (2007a) 
Due to the transition phase, compliance with the Common Approaches could not 
be perfect, and it is difficult to assess the extent to which the lack of environmental 
review for a number of projects is actually a consequence of this transition, or an 
indicator of insufficient compliance with the Common Approaches. Even more 
informative may be an assessment of the extent to which ECAs use the agreement’s 
loopholes to formally comply with the established rules, while simultaneously evading 
the Common Approaches’ requirements. Here, the degree of transparency in the approval 
process and the stringency of the applied standards are especially promising indicators. 
The application of international standards has increased at the same time that the 
application of (presumably less rigorous) host country standards has decreased for both 
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category A and B projects. However, five per cent of Category A projects and 14 per cent 
of Category B projects are still evaluated against host country instead of international 
standards (see Table 7.1). With regard to the type of international standards applied, the 
report notes that ECAs increasingly benchmark against World Bank standards. Still, “one 
Member applied International Standards to 50% of its projects […] and two Members 
applied International Standards to none of their projects” (OECD 2007a: 10). The 
available data (OECD 2004b, 2004c, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2006, 2007a) suggests 
considerable differences in implementation (see also Görlach, Knigge, and Schaper 
2007). Whereas some states revamped their domestic rules after the Common 
Approaches’ adoption and revisions, others – including Germany – retained their pre-
existing rules which were either considered sufficient to comply with the Common 
Approaches’ requirements, or were augmented with the Common Approaches as a 
separate set of rules. While ECAs did not engage in a run towards “lesser” international 
standards such as regional development policies, the persistence of host country standards 
in project evaluation and the relative small share of category A projects requiring 
modification (around 50 percent since 2003 compared to almost 80 per cent in 2002) 
suggest that ECAs have found a way to implement the text of the Common Approaches 
without substantially altering their behavior. While the overall trend points upward, 
current ECA practice appears to be far from the universal application of World Bank 
policies envisioned by the United States, as the agreement’s key promoter. 
7.1.2 Transparency 
Similar to the implementation of the Common Approaches’ environmental 
assessment criteria, implementation of the transparency requirements has also been 
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uneven. Since these rules provide the basis for effective monitoring and enforcement, this 
deficiency is especially troublesome.  
Being an OECD “gentlemen’s agreement,” formal procedures for ensuring 
compliance with the Common Approaches are, in fact, weak. Member ECAs report to the 
OECD Export Credit Group Secretariat annually on supported projects, project 
classification, and applied environmental standards. They also notify other ECAs if they 
intend to deviate from the agreement for specific projects, allowing other members to 
offer the same project-specific deviations to their exporters. Members can use the annual 
data as well as information about deviation from the Common Approaches to exert peer 
pressure on agencies which do not fully comply with the rules. Public reporting, however, 
is very weak: the Secretariat aggregates country data in its reports so that OECD reports 
are, essentially, only helpful in assessing overall compliance. Information about 
individual members’ compliance is not available unless it is supplied by the agencies 
themselves. There is no formal compliance mechanism beyond the reporting 
requirements. External government transparency to the ECG Secretariat is much better 
developed than domestic government transparency (Grigorescu 2003). 
However, the need to make environmental review information available prior to 
cover decisions (ex-ante transparency) enables NGOs (and the press) to monitor the 
performance of individual ECAs and employ name-and-shame tactics in those cases 
where ECAs violate their own rules or obligations under the Common Approaches. The 
United States lobbied hard to incorporate ex-ante transparency into the agreement, 
knowing that such rules would provide for an implicit but effective compliance 
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mechanism by increasing the reputational and political risks of non-compliance (Chayes 
and Chayes 1995). 
Disclosure provisions in the Common Approaches are modeled after NEPA and 
World Bank rules: environmental review information needs to be available to the public 
30 days prior to making a cover decision. However, the Common Approaches do allow 
for deviation from this rule (see Görlach, Knigge, and Schaper 2007), and the 
transparency commitment is not backed up by a formal compliance mechanism. Still, the 
availability of environmental project information implicitly tasks NGOs with policing the 
agreement. Ex-ante transparency was introduced into the Common Approaches precisely 
for this reason (personal communication with U.S. government official, 25 June 2003). 
Compliance monitoring is ‘outsourced’ to non-state actors via the agreement’s 
transparency provisions (see Görlach, Knigge, and Schaper 2007). Thus, the Common 
Approaches rely on peer monitoring among the Members through reporting requirements 
to the Secretariat and on monitoring by outside actors through external transparency. 
External transparency provisions empower civil society actors to assess ECAs’ 
compliance with the Common Approaches and allow them to enforce the agreement by 
highlighting problematic projects and the improper application of rules and procedures. 
Such fire-alarm monitoring (for a discussion in principal-agent relations see Cousins 
2006; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) can be only as effective as the information is 
complete. Inconsistent access to information thus leads to inconsistent enforcement. 
However, transparency provisions in the Common Approaches are only partly effective 
due to too much slack in the agreement. 
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The Common Approaches have established minimum transparency provisions to 
be implemented by all Members of the Export Credit Group. Thus, from 2004 on, all 
OECD ECAs were required to make environmental project information available prior to 
granting cover. In this sense, the Common Approaches mandated the extension of a 
practice employed by only a few ECAs (e.g. the U.S. Export-Import Bank) to all OECD 
ECAs, including those which had previously refrained from such a practice due to 
concerns of administrative and commercial confidentiality. The agreement established a 
public information period of 30 days during which environmental information for 
sensitive projects was to be made available to the public before a cover decision could be 
made. However, the rules also contained a deviation clause allowing ECAs to refrain 
from publishing such information on a case-by-case basis (Görlach, Knigge, and Schaper 
2007).  
The extent to which this deviation clause is applied has a strong influence on the 
effectiveness and impact of the Common Approaches. The ECG Secretariat has 
conducted annual surveys to evaluate implementation of the Common Approaches 
(OECD 2006, 2005d, 2005c; 2004c, the 2006 results have not been released as of 23 
September 2007). Compared to earlier surveys, more ECAs currently adhere to the 
transparency requirement, but implementation is far from being universal or uniform. The 
German and Swiss ECAs consistently report that they make information available only in 
cases where the client has agreed to publication and that they are legally precluded “from 
requiring the applicant to provide the disclosure as a condition” (OECD 2006, 2005c) 
despite the Common Approaches’ requirement to create such provisions. Belgium, 
Greece, and Luxembourg cite confidentiality rules precluding them from disclosing any 
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information. On the other hand, many ECAs have faithfully implemented the 
transparency rules, make information available, and require clients to consent to the 
publication of environmental information in those cases where such disclosure would be 
limited by confidentiality rules. Australia’s EFIC, Finland’s Finnvera, Italy’s SACE, the 
Dutch Gerling NCM, the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and Hungary all require their clients 
to agree to ex-ante disclosure (OECD 2006). 
The most recent report on supported Category A and B projects (OECD 2007a) 
indicates an upward trend in the ex-ante disclosure of environmental impact information: 
for all 38 projects covered in 2006, some environmental information was made available 
to the public prior to granting cover (up from 62 per cent in 2004 and 81 per cent in 
2005). Nevertheless, limitations on disclosure as in the German and Swiss cases continue 
to limit the effectiveness of the transparency provisions. The OECD figures cited here 
provide an incomplete view of the Common Approaches’ implementation, as they 
represent only covered projects, and thus exclude the transparency track-record on 
projects which have been turned down or remain under consideration due to the 
unsatisfactory mitigation of environmental impacts. Reliance on voluntary consent by 
clients to ex-ante information disclosure results in a selection bias: consent is much more 
likely for unproblematic projects than for environmentally contentious ones. Therefore, 
even the upward trend in overall disclosure may still obscure a tendency for information 
about more problematic projects to remain unavailable. Coupled with the ECAs’ 
flexibility in categorizing projects (“large B” projects do not require disclosure) the 
deviation clause limits the effectiveness of ex-ante transparency as the Common 
Approaches’ most potent compliance instrument.  
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The German government’s response to a parliamentary inquiry by the FDP 
faction in Bundestag (Deutscher Bundestag 2003) revealed that for only 38 per cent of 
the applications for cover through Hermes guarantees from October 2001 to December 
2002 clients had agreed to the disclosure of environmental information. Thus, during this 
time period, environmental project information was unavailable for more than 60 per cent 
of the projects supported with Hermes guarantees, despite the Common Approaches’ 
requirement to lay open all applications for Category A and B projects. The rules allow 
for exceptions in exceptional cases, but here exception appears to have been confused 
with rule. It is also not far-fetched to assume that environmentally problematic projects 
are more likely to be among those not authorized for disclosure. 
7.1.3 Linked races 
States were engaged in “linked races” with respect to environmental standards 
and transparency for ECAs: responding to domestic political pressures and prevailing 
norms of environmentally sound behavior, ECA policies were harmonized upward. 
However, in implementing these rules, the prominent direction of competition was 
downward with states seeking to exploit the agreement’s loopholes to the greatest extent 
possible.  
Neil Woods (2006) observed a similar dynamic in the regulation of surface 
mining in the United States. Responding to citizen groups that argued for the 
federalization of mining rules to counteract mine operators’ desire for regulatory relief 
from strong state rules, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 
harmonized state mining rules. In this case, citizen activism had resulted in upward 
harmonization. However, U.S. states engaged in considerable competition over lenient 
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interpretation and over an implementation of national rules which would result in 
competitive advantages for operations within their own state borders. Woods shows that  
States adjust their enforcement in response to competitor states when their enforcement 
stringency exceeds that of their competitors. When competitors’ enforcement is more 
stringent, however, their behavior does not have a significant effect. (Woods 2006: 174) 
Here, upward harmonization is linked to a race-to-the-bottom in implementation. 
While it is too early to assess whether similar races are occurring in ECA politics, it 
seems to be clear that some states attempt to offset the stringency of the Common 
Approaches with leniency in implementation. That way, they appease environmental 
critics while preserving some of their own competitive advantage vis-à-vis states with 
more stringent implementations of the agreement. 
7.1.4 Domestication and harmonization 
Observing the implementation of EU directives, Bugdahn (2005) suggests that 
competition in laxity during the domestication of a new rule may eventually result in a 
downward pull on the supra-national rules. She argues that  
the implementation of EU policies is best conceptualized as a blend of domestic choices of 
options in a policy area, only some of which have been determined by the EU. Member 
states can make choices of non-prescribed, or non-recommended policy options that limit, 
mediate or accompany the Europeanization of the policy area in various forms (‘forms of 
domestication’)” (Bugdahn 2005: 178).  
Her varying domestication strategies can be categorized according to the degree 
of adaptation in the domestic arena. These forms of domestication range from “Business 
as usual” as the most persistent category over “Conservative interpretation;” “use of 
domestic patterns,” “Domestic supervision, and Organizational Incentives,” to “Broader 
reforms; progressive interpretation” (Bugdahn 2005). Put differently, forms of 
domestication can range from “doing nothing” to sweeping regulatory reform. 
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Europeanization (i.e. harmonization in the European Union) goes through 
multiple rounds, whereby rules are interpreted to either work in domestic regulatory 
frameworks or to change these frameworks as external drivers for regulatory reform. At 
the same time different domestications feed back into harmonization.  
Where the EU approves of a particular form of domestication adopted by a member state, 
EU actors may take the opportunity to ‘europeanize a domestication’ by promoting it as best 
practice (horizontal Europeanization) or even be adopting it as a new standard (vertical 
Europeanization), for instance when they review EU legislation. (Bugdahn 2005: 184) 
Differences in domestication strategies can exert both upward pushes and 
downward pulls on the Europeanization process. Depending on the forms of 
domestication chosen by influential member states, additional rounds of Europeanization 
can either soften European rules (if pivotal members chose conservative domestication 
strategies) or ratchet them up (if pivotal members engaged in progressive regulatory 
reform overshot the EU targets). Bugdahn links domestication strategies to the 
institutional compatibility of European rules with domestic regulatory frameworks. In her 
example of freedom-of-information legislation, she attests that  
In Germany, domestication is most likely to trigger new Europeanization; this is due to the 
fact that Germany […] has a strong contradicting tradition and is most likely to adopt a 
transposition with conservative and cost-restrictive interpretations (Bugdahn 2005: 186). 
Within the context of the EU, the EU Commission as a central authority (in its 
role as guardian of the treaties) can attempt to counter-act downward forces by plugging 
holes in directives, tightening provisions or by initiating judicial proceedings. However, 
for lack of a central authority in OECD governance enforcing full compliance, 
differential domestication processes soften harmonized rules. Subsequent harmonization 
rounds may then take on weaker versions of the domesticated rules as their starting point 
in seeking to arrive at universally applicable rules. This dynamic appears to be at play for 
ECA policies: the 2007 review of the Common Approaches is widely considered to be a 
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step backwards from their 2003 version – an observation that negates the U.S. 
government’s perception that ECA harmonization typically starts at a low common 
denominator and then continues upward through a ratcheting process (see chapter five 
and Export-Import Bank of the United States 2004: 101). The key difference in 
environmental rules is the absence of an enforcing authority. Neither a central authority 
(such as the Commission in EU harmonization) nor the U.S. government (with its war 
chest to counter subsidized interest rates and tied aid) can effectively counter downward 
implementation, which then results in a downward pull on other Member’s policies. 
7.2 Effects of environmental standards for international finance 
Given the proliferation of environmental policies for international financial 
institutions, one has to ask what effects these policies would have on projects, besides 
being good PR for the financial institutions involved. Effects can be assessed either by 
the environmental quality of the projects supported or through the characteristics of 
rejected projects. Either approach is problematic. Environmentally questionable projects 
may still be developed, even if a “green” financial institution turns them down and 
alternate financing that does not adhere to environmental rules fills the gap. Furthermore, 
assessment of rejected projects may also be misleading, as environmental standards are 
likely to result in a self-selection process where developers avoid approaching certain 
financial institutions that would likely turn down problematic projects. The intervening 
variable in both cases is the availability of an alternative means of financing. There may 
still be an advantage to having a “green” institution in a problematic project over having 
such a project developed without any environmental rules. 
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Given the problems of assessing the outcome of these policies, procedural 
measures of extent of their application may be more helpful in identifying the degree to 
which financial institutions are serious about the content of their rules, as opposed to 
“green-washing” their reputation. All three sets of policies employ a similar process in 
assessing environmental effects: in a first step, projects are screened for their potential 
environmental impact, and then classified into one of three categories of likely impact. 
Depending on their categorization, projects then undergo different levels of 
environmental review. In terms of compliance with these rules, the categorization process 
allows for limiting environmental review (big “B” projects; i.e. category “A” projects that 
are misclassified to evade the more stringent review requirements). The product of the 
review process, then, may or may not lead to consequences in project design or making 
support decisions. 
Common to all three sets of standards is that transparency of the environmental 
review process is employed as the most prominent compliance instrument. However, 
there are considerable differences in the implementation of transparency, ranging from 
the mandatory publication of environmental reviews and an inspection panel at the World 
Bank, to more restricted transparency among ECAs, to rather opaque processes at private 
banks. 
7.2.1 Effects of World Bank policies 
The environmental policies of the World Bank have turned this organization, once 
highly criticized for the environmental and social performance of its projects, into a 
model for environmental standards elsewhere. It may not have achieved its goal of 
streamlining the environment for sustainable development, but environmental concerns 
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are now an essential element of Bank operations. The Equator Principles, and ECA 
policies, reference World Bank Group standards and policies, and NGOs have pointed to 
the World Bank as the relevant role model in their campaigns. 
A side-effect of the Bank’s environmental policies, based on the U.S. 
environmental review model, is the vastly increased transparency of World Bank 
operations. Once an institution which regarded most information as clients’ property (and 
was thus reluctant to share any of it), the Bank now makes many of its decisions in 
public. 
Transparency and public participation are prevalent not only in the Bank’s 
operations, but also in its development of new policies. Modifications to its 
environmental policies are not only open to public comment, but it also seeks 
independent input on the formulation of new policies, as has been evident in the World 
Commission on Dams and Extractive Industries Review. 
The “greening” of projects has occurred in two dimensions: Environmental 
impacts are being considered in both project development and implementation, and a 
growing portfolio is being devoted to “environmental” projects, i.e. projects where the 
main objectives are of an environmental nature (e.g. clean-up or preservation). 
Some of this change may be attributed to a changing organizational culture, but it 
is doubtful that Bank operations would have changed as much without an effective 
compliance mechanism. Operations transparency has been the primary tool in ensuring 
compliance with environmental policies. A particularly effective instrument has been the 
Bank’s inspection panel. This independent panel reviews the compatibility of projects 
with Bank policies. Its review process can be initiated by citizen request, creating a 
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strong incentive among Bank staff to make their projects “inspection-panel-safe”- i.e. to 
make sure that they comply with Bank policies. A major criticism in the past has been 
that the organizational structure of the Bank has made it possible to obscure known 
environmental problems when decisions were taken several hierarchical levels removed 
from experts on the ground (Rich 1994). The independent inspection panel makes it 
therefore potentially dangerous at any staff level to omit or ignore project features which 
would violate Bank policies. 
Another side-effect of the quarrel over the Bank’s environmental performance has 
been an instrumentalization and politicalization of Executive Director (ED) votes on the 
Bank’s board. Starting with U.S. abstentions in votes taken on environmentally 
problematic projects, the use of ED votes became institutionalized with the Pelosi 
amendments (see Keck and Sikkink 1998; Park 2005b) which linked U.S. ED approval to 
projects in compliance with this Congressional mandate. The Pelosi amendment 
effectively uploaded key NEPA provisions on environmental assessment and 
transparency to MDBs. 
7.2.2 Effects of the Common Approaches 
As mentioned above, assessing the outcome of standard-setting with respect to the 
environmental quality of development projects in general is difficult. In all three 
instances of standard-setting, authority for implementation of policies was delegated in 
several stages. In the case of ECAs, NGOs pressured governments and legislatures, 
which in turn mandated ECAs to devise such policies. ECAs, in turn, have control only 
over the applications for cover which they process. By requiring environmental 
assessments from exporters, they in turn need to rely on exporters to furnish this 
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information and to work with project developers to implement any project modifications. 
It is apparent that given the delegated authority along this chain (governments – ECAs – 
exporters – project developers), any effects can be indirect at best. The impact any single 
ECA or group of ECAs can have on project implementation further depends on the 
relevance of ECA support for the project in question. If the financing of a project were 
likely to fall apart without ECA cover, project developers would more likely be 
responsive to environmental requirements by ECAs than if ECA support were not crucial 
for project success. In cases where ECA support is not essential, ECAs furthermore find 
themselves caught between the competing mandates of promoting domestic exports and 
protecting the environment. 
The long chain of delegation already makes it difficult for ECAs to contribute any 
substantial input on project performance. This difficulty is further amplified by their late 
involvement in the project cycle. By the time an exporter has responded to a tender and 
has approached an ECA with a request for cover, project design is mostly complete. 
Modifications in response to ECA requirements are therefore more likely to be of a 
mitigatory nature than to affect basic project design.  
Thus, these policies can be expected to be most successful when project 
developers expect the involvement of ECAs, and consequently design projects with good 
environmental performance in mind. Given their primary objective of creating domestic 
jobs by promoting exports, ECAs have little interest in rejecting applications. The 
primary goal of ECA environmental policies is to bring projects into compliance with 
their standards so that they can extend support to their exporters. 
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The discussion above applies to projects for which ECA support is requested. 
Another important aspect is the effect environmental policies have on applications for 
cover. This is a self-selection process by exporters whether they pursue a tender for an 
environmentally problematic project and whether they will seek ECA support if they do 
make a bid for such a project. Here it is also noteworthy to emphasize that such a process 
may only remove “dirty” projects from the reach of OECD ECAs but that projects may 
nevertheless be completed outside the reach of the Common Approaches. 
Assuming that an exporter has decided to make a bid for a problematic project, 
the next decision to make is whether or not to seek ECA support. This decision is 
impacted by the likelihood of success for such an application as well as by the ECA’s 
transparency provisions.  
Projects which are likely to fall into Category A are subject to publication of their 
environmental reviews. Through this process, the identity of an exporter providing 
components to a problematic project may become public and create reputational risks; in 
addition, competitors can learn about the exporter’s intentions through the environmental 
information made available. Thus, transparency provisions create a disincentive in 
seeking ECA support for morally hazardous projects likely to spark public opposition 
(e.g. nuclear power and dams). 
The down-side of this self-selection process includes projects executed with the 
support of ECAs not subject to the Common Approaches. The market for coal-fired 
power plants in developing countries, for example, is now dominated by Chinese 
companies selling equipment with comparatively lower-performing environmental 
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technology supported by the Chinese Export-Import Bank (which is not party to the 
Common Approaches). 
Such self-selection processes can result not only in deals going to foreign 
competitors, but also in incentives for multinational companies to shift production of 
environmentally problematic products to countries more likely to support them. For 
example, Siemens hydropower turbines are now mostly made in Brazil, and its nuclear 
power competence has been shifted from Germany to France, where it found a more 
favorable political environment for this technology. 
7.2.3 Effects of the Equator Principles 
Considering the lack of disclosure requirements in the 2003 version of the 
Equator Principles, it is very difficult to assess the effect the Principles may have had on 
member bank business (see for example a recent NGO implementation assessment 
plagued by the lack of available information: Chan-Fishel 2005). NGOs have compiled 
considerable evidence pointing to rather uneven implementation of the Principles, and 
they also claim that adoption of the Eps has not prevented EPFIs from supporting 
problematic projects (BankTrack 2006). With expanded disclosure and transparency 
provision in the new 2006 version of the Principles, it should also be possible to provide 
a better assessment of their implementation in the future. 
For now, it appears most promising to evaluate the reach of the principles. While 
MDB and ECA rules subject these institutions’ entire project business to environmental 
scrutiny, the Equator Principles apply only to project finance activities which meet the 
threshold of $10 million ($50 million in the 2003 version). This means that a 
considerable share of banking transactions related to infrastructure development in 
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developing and transition countries is not accounted for: (i) direct lending to project 
finance less than $10 million ($50 million previously); (ii) indirect lending to such 
projects; as well as (iii) other sources of debt such as bonds. 
Lowering the applicability threshold to $10 million will result in a considerable 
increase in projects subject to the Equator Principles – including all but the smallest 
projects fit for project finance. The previous $50 million threshold excluded a number of 
small- and medium-sized projects from the reach of the Principles. The 2006 Principles 
also include an expansion of the activities subject to the Eps. Previously, only direct loans 
were considered a case for application of the Equator Principles; now, advisory services 
in project finance also need to comply with the Principles. 
With their limitation on project finance, Eps still exclude other sources of finance 
for infrastructure developments. A prominent source of international finance are bonds 
(which accounted for $86 billion of debt flows to developing countries in 2003); bank 
loans (including project finance) amounted to only $9 billion more the same year (World 
Bank 2004: 38). The controversial Three Gorges Dam in China, for example, has been 
largely financed with bonds issued by the China Development Bank and underwritten by 
Western banks. Missbach (2004: 79) similarly reports that “the bulk for forestry projects 
does not come from project finance.” According to a recent NGO report, HSBC, 
Citigroup, and JPMorgan Chase have adapted environmental rules to other products and 
services when proceeds go to projects that would be subject to the Equator Principles 
(BankTrack 2006: note 7), but these are voluntary initiatives which go beyond the 
requirements of the Eps. 
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Regional variation within the application of the principles also exists. Christopher 
Wright and Alexis Rwabizambuga (2006) have illustrated regional limitation of the 
Principles. Almost all EPFIs are headquartered in Europe and North America, and their 
project finance business is also limited in scope: while a majority of Latin American 
project finance loans are arranged by EPFIs, equator banks play a much smaller role in 
African and Middle East loans. None of the top ten arrangers of project finance in Asia 
has adopted the Equator Principles (Wright and Rwabizambuga 2006: 102-3). 
Project finance packages are usually syndicated among a number of banks. Given 
the equator banks’ market position (80 per cent of project finance by volume), the 
Principles can be expected to have a considerable effect on those markets in which the 
EPFIs are active, as arrangements not including any equator banks are rather unlikely in 
these markets. Their effect on the ground, however, depends on the Eps’ faithful 
implementation, and this issue cannot be adequately assessed at this point.  
Regarding the business to which the Equator Principles apply, the Principles 
relieve the adopting financial institutions of the need to investigate the environmental 
risks associated with projects themselves. In financing arrangements that include MDBs, 
they can rely on the development bank’s environmental review of such projects. But with 
the retreat of MDBs from dam and mining projects, the Principles free the banks from 
conducting in-house environmental reviews of the increasing share of projects without 
MDB participation by delegating this responsibility to their clients (Amalric 2005: 10-1). 
In Amalric’s analysis, the “retreat of the World Bank Group from its function as 
delegated monitor” (Amalric 2005: 11) is hypothesized to have motivated the adoption of 
the principles. 
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7.2.4 Role of non-OECD competition: impacts vary by region 
Similar to the increased influence of the emerging economies of China, India, and 
Brazil, non-OECD ECAs play an increasingly relevant role in export credit politics. Not 
only do these new competitors challenge OECD ECAs’ business positions, but they also 
delimit the political manuveuring space available in the same way they re-define WTO 
politics. In international trade agreements, developing countries are increasingly weary of 
reducing tariffs, not because of OECD imports, but rather out of fear of being swamped 
by cheap Chinese imports – including agricultural products – that may challenge their 
domestic economies (Herald tribune, weekend 21/22 July 2007). This is mirrored by the 
large volume of Chinese export credits to Asia and Africa, exceeding Western credits 
considerably, and thus limiting the reach of the Common Approaches to those areas 
where OECD ECAs provide most of the support. 
A crucial difference between environmental standards for access to finance and 
product or process standards is the leverage the rule-setter has over the regulatory target. 
When states or firms set product or process standards, their market leverage directly 
affects producers’ or suppliers’ decisions whether or not to conform with the standards: 
the larger the regulator’s control over the market, the greater is his power over the 
regulatory targets. Environmental standards for access to finance, however, do not 
regulate access to a shielded market, but merely access to support by a cartel of financial 
institutions. As long as the cartel does not have complete control over the finance market, 
any number of financial institutions not bound by the rules of the cartel can render them 
ineffective by providing alternative financing. With respect to ECAs and private banks, 
the cartels are imperfect: only OECD-member ECAs are bound by the Common 
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Approaches allowing for an increasing role played by non-OECD ECAs such as the 
Chinese and Indian Exim Banks that can provide alternatives to OECD funding. The 
Equator Principles, too, have only limited membership, representing primarily North 
American and Western European financial institutions. Only in markets which are 
dominated by financial institutions bound by environmental standards can these be 
expected to carry much weight. 
The reach of these standards varies by region. Similar to the relatively low 
relevance of the Equator Principles in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, export credit 
standards reach only as far as OECD ECA business does. MDB policies, however, apply 
to projects throughout the developing world. The Common Approaches and Equator 
Principles apply only to projects for which sponsors seek support from equator banks or 
OECD export credit agencies. Thus, these standards travel only as far as there is demand 
for financing from these institutions. The effects of standards can be expected to be 
greater in regions in which the bulk of international financing provided is subject to such 
standards. The smaller the market share of Northern financial institutions, the smaller the 
likely impact. 
In addition to variations among regional impacts, one also needs to consider the 
overall relevance of these financial institutions. A study by the IMF notes:  
“Financial flows facilitated by official export credit agencies are large in comparison with 
official development assistance and gross lending by international financial institutions to 
developing countries” (Wang et al. 2005: 2).  
“However, relative to total capital flows to developing countries or exports, export credits 
supported by ECAs in industrial countries have been on the decline. Preliminary estimates 
suggest that new commitments by official ECAs amounted to near 35 percent of total official 
and private lending plus foreign direct investment to developing counties in the early 1990s; 
the ratio declined to about 20 percent in 2000-02” (Wang et al. 2005: 7). 
“New export credit commitments to low-income countries have been declining since 1995, 
and this trend has not been affected by the world economic cycle. The share of new 
commitments to low-income countries (excluding India) declined from 15 percent in 1995-
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96 to about 8 percent in 2000-03. […] Indeed, a number of ECAs have remained off-cover in 
many low-income countries, even in HIPCs that have passed the completion point (thereby 
receiving irrevocable debt relief committed under the HIPC initiative)” (Wang et al. 2005: 8-
9). 
Table 7.2 Long-term export credits by country category (over five years) – (million SDR) 
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Source: (OECD 2004a, 2005e); author’s calculation of Sub-Saharan figures; classification of economies 
from the July 2006 World Bank List of Economies 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS; accessed 14 December 
2006); LDC classification from the United Nations LDC list (http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm; accessed 14 December 2006); *= cannot be clearly identified due to changes in 
OECD reporting. 
 
Table 7.2 illustrates the low relevance of long-term OECD export credits to Sub-
Saharan Africa. Very few projects requiring environmental review under the Common 
Approaches are supported in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1998 and 2003 only six (out 
of 27) Sub-Saharan LDCs (least developed countries) generated enough export credit 
business so that their annual portfolio eventually exceeded $10 million SDR for one or 
more years, thus possibly triggering the Common Approaches’ environmental screening 
process by volume (projects in sensitive areas require review irrespective of volume). 
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Five OLICs (other low income countries), four LMICs (lower middle income countries), 
and three UMICs (upper middle income countries) also generated enough business so that 
their transactions may have included projects subject to the Common Approaches. Due to 
the nature of ECG reporting, it is not possible to identify the number or share of projects 
in Sub-Saharan Africa that actually underwent environmental screening. The OECD 
reports on environmental reviews are not broken down by recipient country or region. 
While OECD ECA engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa is limited, the Chinese 
Exim Bank – not party to the Common Approaches – is active in power generation, 
mining, and energy projects throughout Africa. Now among the top three ECAs by 
volume of new commitments, its lending volume has increased eight-fold from 1995 to 
$8 billion in 2003 (Wang et al. 2005: 12). NGOs criticize the China Exim Bank both for 
its human rights and its environmental record. 
The Exim Bank’s portfolio includes projects such as the Merowe Dam in Sudan, the 
Imboulou Dam in Congo–Brazzaville, the Tekeze Dam in Ethiopia, the Lower Kafue Gorge 
Dam in Zambia, the Yeywa Dam in Burma, and the Nam Mang 3 Dam in Laos. China Exim 
has also signed deals for projects in other countries with human rights problems, including 
Nigeria (Papalanto and Omotosho power plants) and Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Iron and Steel 
Company). 
[…] One case in point is Merowe Dam, Africa’s largest new hydropower project, which is 
currently being financed by China Exim. Located in Sudan, the project will create a reservoir 
with a length of 174 kilometers, generate electricity with a capacity of 1,250 megawatts, and 
displace 50,000 people. In spite of the project’s large dimensions and potential social and 
environmental impacts, no independent environmental impact assessment was ever carried 
out. One of the companies involved in the project prepared a brief environmental assessment 
report. In violation of Sudanese law, the technical arm of Sudan’s Environment Ministry did 
not receive a copy of the assessment, and was not able to review and clear the project. 
(Bosshard and Chan-Fishel 2005) 
Moss and Rose list a number of large pending projects which may involve support 
by the China Exim Bank: 
• A possible $1.2 billion in new loans to Ghana, including $600 million for 
construction of the Bui dam; 
• $2.3 billion in total financing for Mozambique for the Mepanda Nkua dam and 
hydroelectric plant, plus another possible $300 million for the Moamba-Major dam; 
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• A $1.6 billion loan for a Chinese oil project in Nigeria; 
• $200 million in preferential buyers credit for Nigeria’s first communications 
satellite; 
• A $2 billion line of credit to Angola, with the possibility of another $9-10 billion; 
• Reports of loans and export credits for other projects in Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan 
and Zimbabwe. (Moss and Rose 2006) 
Clearly, the effect of the Common Approaches is limited in Sub-Saharan Africa 
due to narrow engagement of OECD ECAs. At the same time, the Chinese Exim Bank 
provides an alternative throughout Africa. The Sudan, for example, is receiving US$ 387 
million in export credits from the China Export Import Bank for the construction of the 
Merowe Dam alone (Leadership Office of the Hamadab Affected People, International 
Rivers Network, and The Corner House 2007: 4) – more than 11 times as much as 
combined OECD export credits to Sudan between 1998 and 2005 (OECD 2007d). The 
China Exim Bank’s Environmental Protection Policy of November 2004 (International 
Rivers Network and Environmental Defense 2007: Annex) is a relatively unspecific one-
page document which establishes “approval or endorsement from the recipient country’s 
environmental administration” as the only performance standard. While it mentions that 
projects harmful to the environment are excluded from funding, no standards or 
benchmarks for the assessment of harm are included.  
The China Export Import Bank has approved loans with a volume of $20 billion 
in 2005 (Bosshard 2006). This places the Chinese ECA in the same range as its top three 
OECD competitors Korea ($22 billion in 2005), Japan ($20 billion in 2005), and 
Germany ($19.5 billion in 2005) (see OECD 2007d). In addition to China’s increasing 
role in providing export credits, India is also playing an evermore important role. 
“Between 1994/95 and 2003/04, the [Indian Export-Import] bank’s loan disbursements 
grew almost 30-fold, from $48 million to $1.5 billion” (Wang et al. 2005: 12). India does 
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not yet compete with the big OECD players in terms of export credit volume, but it 
already outpaces twelve smaller OECD ECAs such as those of Finland, Denmark, and 
Norway. 
7.2.5 Reliance on non-state actors for monitoring and enforcement 
All three environmental policies discussed here rely on transparency provisions as 
compliance mechanisms. While this mirrors the U.S. approach in NEPA (in which these 
policies find their common root and was championed by NGOs as well as the U.S. 
government), it places a considerable responsibility and burden on non-state actors. 
These policies are effectively policed by NGOs utilizing the transparency 
provisions to flag problematic decisions and projects. With the existence of an inspection 
panel or ombudsman, the capability burden on these organizations is limited, as they can 
initiate a review process with little impact on their own resources. However, where such a 
mechanism does not exist –which is the case for most ECAs and all Equator banks – the 
only way to enforce these policies is by researching violations and making them public. 
In the absence of explicitly delegated authority to assume this function and no 
compensation for such services, the role of NGOs in this area is problematic. 
Furthermore, faithful implementation depends on the existence of an active civil 
society to monitor institutions’ conduct. As a consequence, thoroughness of 
implementation may vary with the capacity of civil society. At the same time, the 
combination of problematic projects with a transparent decision-making process may 
serve as a catalyst for NGOs to form around opposition to projects. 
While it may be too early to assess the diffusion of these international rules for 
finance into recipient countries, it is clear that these policies can improve the 
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environmental performance of supported projects in countries where the government 
lacks either the capacity or the political will to implement similar policies. By making 
project sponsors directly responsible for the environmental impacts of their projects, ECA 
standards and the Equator Principles also avoid the involvement of public authorities that 
may be potentially ineffective in countries lacking regulatory capacity. 
ECA standards and Equator Principles are a manifestation of norm diffusion 
among providers of international finance. However, their impact is limited by the 
availability of other sources of international financing, and their legitimacy is challenged 
by the lack of an accepted authority sanctioning them. Both of these deficiencies could be 
addressed by an international consensus-building effort aimed at establishing common 
rules for international finance. Such a process could both bring in actors that are 
primarily active in markets not integrated with Western project finance markets (e.g. 
Middle Eastern banks active in Africa) and also exert pressure on non-OECD countries to 
adopt the Common Approaches. Such a dialogue that includes recipient countries could 
furthermore provide policies, built on the resulting consensus with a great deal of 






Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The purpose of this dissertation was to provide an answer to the question How 
could export credit agencies resist for 25 years the same pressure that greened other 
financial institutions in a relatively short time? This was done by breaking this question 
in two related sub-questions: one addressing environmental rule-making, and the other 
analyzing regulatory harmonization among ECAs. More specifically, by comparing 
environmental rule-making among ECAs with that of other financial institution and by 
comparing different regulatory harmonization processes among ECAs. 
This concluding chapter revisits these questions as well as the five hypotheses 
developed in the section discussing my theoretical approach, before outlining suggestions 
regarding areas in which further research would be most appropriate. These areas 
include: harmonization processes where the proponents of change cannot exert direct 
power, regulatory harmonization in the OECD, and transdomestic policy.  
The first question this dissertation addressed was as follows: Given the similarity 
in project portfolios and public demands for change, why were some ECAs slower than 
others, and all of them so much slower to respond to the environmental challenge than 
the World Bank and even private banks?  
All institutions were subject to campaigns by similar groups of environmental 
NGOs and were forced to address their challenges. The crucial difference between rule-
making for the World Bank and private banks on the one hand, and for ECAs on the 
other, is the role played by client interests in the rule-making process. The World Bank 
and private banks are structurally dependent on their clients, as its clientele constitutes 
the basis of their operations. Clients’ direct influence on shaping the institutions’ policies 
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is, however, very limited. Only in matters of environmental policy-making for ECAs are 
clients actually formally and significantly involved in the policy-making process.  
Exporters, who rely on their export credit agencies for support, exert considerable 
influence in domestic politics and can often influence their governments. Thus, ECA 
policies require the balancing of powerful competing interests in designing environmental 
policies, whereas the World Bank and private banks can respond to demands for 
environmental policies without further consideration of competing external interests. 
The influence of exporters on ECAs is related to the power an industry sector 
wields, and that power is in turn affected by changes made to the rules it abides by. The 
power of the industry sector hinges upon the relevance of affected exporters to total 
national exports, institutional factors channeling industry power, and the power of 
competing demands made on the ECA. This meant that the higher susceptibility of 
German exports to environmental restrictions, German institutions favoring strong 
representation of the interests of industry, combined with institutional hurdles limiting the 
power of its NGO opponents, resulted in slower and less ambitious environmental reform 
for Hermes guarantees than for its U.S. counterpart, Ex-Im. U.S. exports, in contrast, 
were affected by environmental restrictions to a lesser degree, and industry had to 
compete on equal footing with environmental NGOs for influence on policy-making. 
Considering only the two situations, (i) a closed political opportunity structure for NGOs 
but privileged industry access and higher industry vulnerability in Germany, and (ii) open 
interest group access and lower industry susceptibility in the United States, it is not 
possible to determine whether the decisive factor is NGO power or industry power. Given 
the information contained in these two cases, it can be determined only that the power 
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balance between industry and NGOs matters, but we cannot determine which of the two 
is more relevant. 
The second question I address is as follows: Considering the low relevance of 
ECAs for trade, why has harmonization been so slow and cumbersome?  
ECA harmonization involves changes to pre-existing regulations and 
compromises on meta-regulatory principles. This kind of agreement is very difficult to 
achieve – if achieved at all. The Common Approaches, for example, avoided real 
agreement through the creation of loopholes that permitted the continuation of pre-
harmonization practices. This led to a reduction in regulatory costs from adaptation to the 
new rules. Political benefits from agreement were concentrated on the U.S. side for the 
longest time. Over time, a joint effort made by the U.S. government and an international 
NGO campaign to re-frame the debate increased costs of non-agreement for European 
governments. 
This study cannot decisively establish whether it was the increased political costs 
of inaction or the decreased regulatory costs resulting from the established loopholes that 
finally facilitated agreement. However, the Common Approaches’ implementation record 
and, in particular, the recent approval of the Turkish Ilisu Dam by the Austrian, German, 
and Swiss ECAs, suggest that disregard for environmental demands may be less relevant 
than the minimization of adaptation costs. In either case, however, it is clear that 
institutional incompatibility between proposed rules and European regulatory cultures 
was a decisive obstacle to harmonization. 
 How could export credit agencies resist for 25 years the same pressure that 
greened other financial institutions in a relatively short time? 
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The answer to this question appears to lie less in ECAs’ ability to resist pressure 
than in the World Bank’s and private banks’ ability to accommodate these demands 
relatively easy. For ECAs, responding to such demands meant balancing environmental 
with industrial policy objectives and as a result, accommodating such demands was much 
more difficult to accomplish than it was for the World Bank and private banks. 
Variation in speed and scope of environmental reforms among ECAs themselves 
suggests that this balancing act involved different levels of complexity. The greening of 
ECAs as a group of institutions also required the harmonization of policies among them. 
This was difficult, however, because of the diverging regulatory cultures within these 
agencies’ states. 
Given the inductive nature of this inquiry, the results presented here are only 
preliminary results, and must be considered as such. Although my findings are based on 
sound theoretical reasoning, the limited number of cases studied here dictates that they 
should be further scrutinized by subjecting them to further testing. Examining only four 
instances of rule-making (World Bank, private banks, Ex-Im, Hermes) and two cases of 
regulatory harmonization (financial and environmental conditions) has provided enough 
variation among the factors under consideration to establish the claims made here, but 
given the interpretative nature of this research design, studies with additional cases are 
needed to test the broader applicability of the explanations advanced.  
8.1 Limits to environmental rules for international finance 
NGOs directed their campaigns at financial institutions not because these 
institutions promised to be “silver bullets” in greening infrastructure development 
projects, but rather because they were relatively easy targets. Consequently, ‘greening’ 
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such projects has been limited to projects supported by ‘greened’ financial institutions. 
As the implementation discussion in chapter seven has shown, ‘greening’ policies can be 
effective only where the ‘greened’ financial institutions command a large market share. 
Financing from other providers not subject to similar policies renders these providers 
ineffective, because environmentally problematic projects can nevertheless be carried out 
without modifications if a financial institution not bound by environmental rules gets 
involved. 
Substantial greening of infrastructure projects would require standards not tied to 
particular sources of financing. During my research in Berlin, German lobbyists strongly 
opposed to environmental restrictions on export credits suggested that an international 
agreement on an environmental performance certification of infrastructure projects would 
be desirable because it would neither affect competitiveness nor slow down export credit 
approvals (interview with two German lobbyists, 20 January 2004). Certified projects 
would have undergone environmental review during the certification process and, thus, 
not require any further assessments when financing or export credits were sought. 
Short of international agreement on project certification, such reviews could also 
be established as private sector agreements among parties involved in project design. 
Perez (2002) suggests that engineers should be involved in project design at a key stage 
when environmental effects can not only be assessed but also effectively managed. 
Relying on their international codes and practices promises considerable leverage and 
coverage, since “the international market for standard construction contracts is dominated 
by a small group of international organizations,” like the International Federation of 
Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) (Perez 2002: 86). However, the most effective 
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consideration of environmental effects (that is, early on in project design) typically pre-
dates the inclusion of a consulting engineer (Perez 2002: 93). Nevertheless, the lex 
contructionis covering contractual relationships among project sponsors, contractors, and 
operators promises to be a well-suited framework for addressing environmental review 
requirements. 
8.2 Hypotheses for further research on ECAs 
Additional studies are needed to confirm the explanations for environmental rule-
making developed here. Such further studies can build upon the explanations presented in 
this dissertation as well as upon a number of hypotheses developed within the context of 
the theory discussion in chapter two. 
The level of environmental standards for an ECA and the ECA’s institutional 
autonomy are inversely related: the more autonomous an ECA is, the more resilient it is 
against strict environmental standards. 
This first hypothesis was adopted from Carbonell and Stephen’s (2003) study. It 
clearly held up in this comparison of German and U.S. standard-setting. The highly 
autonomous German ECA clearly has more lenient environmental policies than its U.S. 
counterpart, which is under close Congressional control. Although this study did not 
falsify this hypothesis, it also did not establish institutional autonomy as an independent 
force. The arguments presented here consider institutional autonomy as an institutional 
characteristic that affects how the power of actors making demands on an ECA is 
channeled. 
Institutional constraints – including the political opportunity structure – have an 
impact on NGO power and strategies. 
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The interaction of political opportunity structures and movement strategies are a 
staple of the environmental politics literature (Dryzek et al. 2003; Kitschelt 1986; 
Schreurs 2002). Clearly, this dissertation could not challenge this assertion. However, the 
power discussion in chapter two has added an important aspect to the consideration of 
institutional impacts on NGOs by suggesting that, in addition to strategies, we also need 
to consider different forms of NGO power. Differences in political opportunity structures 
primarily determine which forms of power are available to NGOs in different institutional 
settings. The choice of strategy is then a consequence of the availability of certain kinds 
of power. Strategy choice is, therefore, not a direct consequence of political opportunity 
structure, but rather an outcome of power availability. 
ECAs supporting primarily business not affected by environmental standards are 
more likely to implement such policies because they only affect an insignificant share of 
their business. ECAs that support primarily infrastructure projects subject to 
environmental standards are less likely to pursue such policies. 
The portfolio composition hypothesis is a critical ingredient for the business 
power argument made in this dissertation. It is clearly supported by the evidence 
presented here, and was also confirmed as an important consideration in my interviews 
(interview with German official, 5 December 2003; interview with German lobbyist, 16 
December 2003). Business power is thought to result from affected exports’ relevance for 
exports (this hypothesis) and institutional factors determining business access to policy-
making. A refutation of this portfolio composition hypothesis would not necessarily put 
my entire business power argument into question since it is theoretically possible that 
environmental standards could negatively affect a considerable share of supported 
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exports, while the exporters themselves do not enjoy much clout in the political 
processes. Consequently, this hypothesis needs to be tested in cases where exporters 
affected by environmental standards possess good access to the policy-making process. 
In states where corporate welfare critics are strong, ECAs may seek the support 
of the environmental critics (who do not seek to abolish ECAs) and implement high 
environmental standards. In cases where ECAs respond to corporate welfare critics by 
implementing SME programs they may not need to address environmental issues as 
thoroughly. 
While not being refuted by this research, the hypothesis regarding welfare critics 
is nevertheless contested. Both the U.S. Ex-Im Bank and the British ECGD are subject to 
fundamental critiques and are also much more forthcoming with regard to environmental 
reform than other ECAs (like the German Hermes) which do not face this type of 
criticism. In interviews, however, one U.S. official dismissed the relevance of these 
critiques (interview with U.S. official, 21 June 2004), a lobbyist acknowledged its limited 
influence (interview with U.S. lobbyist, 7 July 2004), and another official suggested not 
only that these critiques mattered for Ex-Im, but that there was also no interaction among 
these demands (interview with U.S. official, 9 July 2004). Further research would require 
a comparison of ECAs facing multi-facetted critiques. 
ECAs acting only as insurers are confronted with higher regulatory costs in 
comparison to bank-type ECAs when implementing environmental project screening.  
Clearly, the business model of an ECA must have an impact on internal project 
review procedures. The question is: to what extent do these procedures differ, and how 
does this affect adaptation costs? This study could not test this question, given its focus 
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on rule-making rather than on implementation. German officials, however, cited this 
aspect as a key constraint to agreement on environmental review procedures (personal 
communication with German official, 3 September 2003). 
8.3 Implications for theory development 
This dissertation is the first thorough academic account of environmental 
standard-setting for ECAs and of the harmonization of these policies. As such, it is a 
mostly interpretive study which makes plausibility probes into the applicability of 
theories developed elsewhere. Based on the unique features of export credit policy 
harmonization, the cases analyzed here provide an important impetus for the refinement 
of regulatory harmonization theory. ECA harmonization provides interesting challenges 
to our thinking about regulatory harmonization in at least three ways: (i) promoters of 
stiffer rules cannot rely on market power to promote their agenda; (ii) in contrast to EU 
regulatory harmonization, lack of a central authority may result in divergent 
harmonization patterns; and (iii) the transdomestic nature of export credit rules goes 
beyond conventional categories of domestic and foreign policy. 
8.3.1 Regulatory harmonization in the absence of market power 
As is evident from the discussion in chapters two, five, and six, most accounts of 
regulatory harmonization are concerned with product or process standards which regulate 
the access of goods to markets. Thus, such rules can be used to shield domestic markets, 
and governments can utilize their control over markets as a bargaining chip in negotiating 
harmonized rules. However, an explanation which relies on market power to predict 
regulation outcomes does not work with regard to export credit harmonization. Export 
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credit rules govern the access of firms’ access to government support, and unilateral 
tightening of these rules works only to the competitors’ advantage. If races occur, they 
are more likely to be ‘races-to-the-bottom’ than ‘races-to-the-top’. The history of ECA 
financial terms provides ample evidence for this. 
How then, can upward harmonization be explained? Levit (2004) suggests that 
camaraderie among Members to the Arrangement fosters trust and cooperation among 
ECAs. Evans (2005) suggests that the cartel of OECD ECAs has an interest in 
maintaining harmonized rules in order to avoid costly subsidization races. Both 
explanations operate at the regime level and therefore do not help in understanding how 
the initial incentive for downward races can be overcome. While we could live with such 
a limitation to theoretical insight in the obscure niche of export credit policies, these 
rules, along with the harmonization process, really serve as examples of a broader range 
of harmonization of domestic rules and practices beyond the application of brute market 
power. What is driving the convergence of domestic rules (and even meta-regulation) 
beyond market integration and the hegemon? 
8.3.2 EU theorizing and OECD harmonization 
This analysis borrowed quite heavily from regulatory theory, which was 
developed in the EU context, and applied its principles to a harmonization endeavor 
within the context of the OECD. Many of the approaches work quite well. However, a 
key difference between the EU and the OECD is the lack of a central authority in the 
OECD. Given this difference, the OECD is often described as “tooth-less” or as a “talk 
shop.” Lack of a central authority not only limits the OECD in enforcing its agreements, 
but it also leads to different harmonization dynamics. When the OECD operates as a 
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think tank, it is very influential in disseminating good practices and fostering policy 
diffusion. However, when it operates as a facilitator of international agreements, its 
bodies lack the authority of the EU Commission to promote specific policy options. As a 
consequence, repeated rounds of Europeanization (see chapter seven and Bugdahn 2005) 
are likely to lead to upward harmonization, whereas weak domestication in key OECD 
Member States would result in downward pressures in subsequent rounds of 
“OECDization.” We need to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of 
harmonization under the auspices of the OECD. Given the authority of the WTO over 
much of the trade-related issues negotiated in the OECD, it appears more appropriate to 
borrow from supra-national EU theorizing than from IR approaches which assume the 
condition of anarchy among states.  
8.3.3 Need for further research: transdomestic regulation 
The challenge to legitimacy posed by the transdomestic nature of ECA 
environmental standards has been addressed in chapter four. However, the concept itself 
remains underspecified. This section provides a sketch of “transdomestic policy” as a 
theoretical construct and illustrates some of its implications. However, the concept still 
needs more thoughtful development than the limited discussion on the following pages. 
8.3.3.1 The concept 
In general, policies can be described by the dimensions of nature and scope of 
intended impact: purely domestic, purely foreign, transdomestic (domestic foreign), and 
boomerang (foreign domestic). Different types of policies tend to be associated with their 
own particular policy communities and policy-making venues. However, hybrid types 
transcend these boundaries: domestically-oriented policy-communities devise external 
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policies (transdomestic), and externally-oriented policy communities work on policies 
targeted within their own domestic sphere (boomerang). Figure 8.1 organizes these types 
of policies by nature of the policy-making process and their arena of intended impact. If 
we accept that policy-making processes vary depending on the nature of the policy-
making process, then these hybrid forms can provide both opportunities (the ability to 
circumnavigate veto players in the “proper” policy making process) and challenges (the 
exclusion of otherwise included actors and views). 
Figure 8.1 Categories of policies 
Impact 
Nature 
Domestic arena Foreign arena 
Domestic Domestic policy Transdomestic policy (domestic 
foreign) 
Foreign Boomerang policy (foreign policy 
that targets own domestic arenas) 
Foreign policy (deliberately 
external) 
 
The obvious question, when stumbling across such a void in the literature is: 
“does it matter?” I contend that it does. Most prominent is the issue of sovereignty, i.e., to 
what extent do these different kinds of policies affect the sovereignty of the state in 
which they originate, and in which they have their effect. In a second stage, these 
sovereignty concerns become policy-relevant: states are more likely to engage in 
international agreements which pose little threat to their national sovereignty than in 
those which require sacrifices of sovereignty. 
Also of concern is the question of voice in the policymaking process. States’ 
“voices” can be subsumed under the heading of sovereignty. However, those affected by 
regulation may or may not have an opportunity to bring their concerns to the table. 
Domestic policy is the easiest candidate: origin and effect are located within the 
same polity, and thus, domestic policy does not pose any challenge to sovereignty. 
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Foreign policy is the other classic example: states devise policies intended to 
influence the behavior of other sovereign nation-states. Though by its very definition, the 
goal is interference with the sovereignty of another nation-state, it is usually deemed 
acceptable, so long as these policies follow the traditional rules of diplomacy. 
Interactions that include non-state actors – a.k.a. transnational politics – can be included 
under this heading as well. Those actors affected by regulation do have a voice within 
their own state, to the extent they are provided with voice in domestic policy-making. Be 
it in a pluralistic or in a corporatist setting, they can exert influence in foreign policy as 
highlighted by Putnam’s (1988) two-level game metaphor. 
Transdomestic policy, however, defies these traditional categories: policies appear 
to be domestic in nature, yet their deliberate effects occur within the borders of another 
sovereign state. This quality leads to unusual implications for state sovereignty. Little or 
no concerns exist for the state in which these policies are devised, and the state in which 
the policies will have their effect has little or no influence on the policy-making process. 
Infringement of state B’s sovereignty comes at no cost to state A; state B, meanwhile, 
suffers from an infringement on its sovereignty and is left with little or no means of 
remedying it. Furthermore, foreign people in state B have no voice in this domestic 
policy process unless they can forge transnational coalitions with domestic partners in 
state A.  
Boomerang policy is targeted at regulating behavior at home. However, it is 
formulated and implemented as foreign policy. Policy-makers may pursue this option if 
traditional domestic regulation would come at high political cost, or if domestic veto 
players make it impossible to regulate in a purely domestic fashion. Weidner proposes 
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that German environmental politics made considerable use of boomerang policy via the 
EU and international levels: “[…] the Federal Minister for the Environment used 
international environmental policy as a vehicle to overcome obstacles in his own 
country” (Weidner 1991, cited in Pehle 1997: 192).  
This kind of policy has little implication for state sovereignty, but it does pose 
significant challenges to voice and legitimacy. If groups that are to be regulated possess 
enough voice to block domestic regulation, regulating them by means of a foreign policy 
detour questions the legitimacy of such a policy. Nevertheless, the boomerang path may 
be chosen for two reasons: either (i) other institutional channels are employed in foreign 
policy rather than in domestic policy making, thus rendering the veto players out of the 
game, or, (ii) the relevant veto players are mostly concerned with domestic policy and 
therefore do not monitor foreign domestic policy developments as closely. Once a policy 
commitment with other international actors exists, however, it is more difficult to undo 
than exclusively domestic regulation. 
These categories are analytic in nature. Any of them can have effects both at 
home and abroad. The question is where the deliberate or target effects occur and how the 
policy is formulated. 
While emerging literature on policy diffusion and regulatory convergence is a 
fascinating topic, it is not of central importance to my argument. The defining 
characteristic of transdomestic policy involves the intentional regulation of an external 
polity by means of domestic policy. Domestic regulations that diffuse by means of 
market forces or regulatory adoption, or domestic regulations that converge around an 
ideal type, are still domestic policies in nature. Even if EU regulation of biotechnology 
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has a strong impact on the U.S. market, for example, it remains a domestic EU policy as 
long as it is intended to regulate goods in the EU and not in the U.S. market. U.S. farmers 
may adapt their choice of crops to ensure marketability in the EU. Thus, EU policy may 
profoundly shape U.S. modes of agricultural production, but the policy still remains a 
domestic policy targeted at EU food markets. 
If international agreement is to be reached over policies in these ideal categories, 
agreement will most easily occur in foreign policy, as foreign policy requires 
international cooperation by definition. Most difficult is the harmonization of domestic 
policies. Transdomestic policy falls between these extremes: because it is domestic policy 
that is to be harmonized, harmonization therefore infringes upon the freedom of the 
regulating state to devise its own policies. However, since the effects of these policies are 
located within another nation-state, they do not have to be of concern to the regulator, 
and thus agreement is simpler than it would be in the case of traditional domestic policy. 
Boomerang policy, devised in a way which minimizes impact in other polities with 
potential veto power, should face the fewest international obstacles. 
8.3.3.2 Transdomestic policy reviewed 
If the concepts of transdomestic and boomerang policy are accurate and can be 
analytically helpful, the question looms as to why no one has thought of them before? On 
one hand, this could be a result of the analytical categories we are concerned with; we 
study either domestic politics or international relations. On the other, it could be a 
consequence of policy makers’ conceptions of politics; it is either domestic or it is 
foreign. As a result of both common views, we are left with an interpretation of how the 
world works that leaves out very interesting phenomena. Since these artificial divisions – 
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both in the academic sphere and in the policy world – are mostly analytical categories, we 
need to ask how politics works and adapt our categories to this reality. Thus, it is obvious 
that we need to address domestic sources of foreign policy, foreign sources of domestic 
policies, and policies that are neither purely domestic nor purely foreign.  
Much has been written about domestic sources of foreign policy – much of it on 
American foreign policy – and following Putnam’s piece on two-level games, scholars of 
domestic politics cannot ignore the effects of the international level anymore. But this 
scholarship is still built on the exclusiveness of the domestic and foreign categories. It 
only asks about the policy arena, but not whether the regulatory arena can be disjointed 
from the policy-making one. 
In analyzing ECA politics, this dissertation has provided a case study of 
transdomestic policy from the seller country perspective. The transdomestic nature of 
ECA politics allowed policy-makers to ignore the concerns of recipient countries in 
creating environmental rules. Full appreciation of these policies’ transdomestic nature 
would also require the consideration of their impact in the recipient countries where the 
policies unfold their primary effects. It should be noted that the irrelevance of client 
country concerns also was an important factor in facilitating the World Bank’s and 
private banks’ swift responses to environmental challenges. Obviously, the transdomestic 
label does not apply in these cases of International Organization and non-state regulation, 
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